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O VER three million American families bought homes in 1982,and the overwhelming majority pa d for their ho es by bor-
rowing money.1 Home mortgage loans are the largest extensions of
credit that most consumers ever obtain. For this reason, society
has long been concerned that mortgagors be treated fairly, and has
expressed this concern through laws governing residential
mortgages.
The form of this protection has radically changed in the last
hundred years, as Part I of this article demonstrates. Before 1968,
state usury ceilings were the primary means of protecting mortga-
gors against abusive loan practices. Developments in the real estate
market between 1920 and 1980, however, rendered this form of
regulation largely obsolete. Today, the first residential mortgage
transaction is deregulated, except for federal requirements that the
lender disclose the annual interest rate, the anticipated settlement
charges, and other contractual terms before lending the money. In
theory, this new regulatory regime should provide better consumer
protection because uniform credit information generates compari-
son shopping for loans and loan-related services, thereby assuring
a competitive price without the market distortion caused by fixed
usury ceilings.
Part II of this article examines whether these federal disclosures
adequately protect consumers. The dynamics of the mortgage
transaction and consumer decisionmaking suggest that homebuyers
seeking mortgage loans are in a very vulnerable position. The typi-
cal homebuyer is not very knowledgeable about the market for
homes, financing, and settlement services and tends to defer to
more sophisticated intermediaries (homebuilder, real estate broker,
or lender), who are more interested in closing transactions than in
obtaining the best deal for the buyer. Federally mandated disclo-
sures do little to protect many homebuyers from these problems;
they are made too late in the decision process to generate signifi-
cant comparison shopping and are often incomplete, inaccurate, or
incomprehensible to consumers. Moreover, because the industry is
highly interdependent and cooperative, market mechanisms do not
necessarily protect the homebuyer. As a result, the homebuyer is
often misled about the terms and hidden costs of the mortgage,
pays a high price for mortgage-related charges, or incurs unreason-
' See Mortgage and Housing Update, Real Est. Q., Summer 1983, at 3-4.
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able risks when entering into an alternative mortgage (one with
graduated payments, an adjustable rate, or early repayment of the
full principal). In short, a regulatory gap exists in this post-usury
law era.
Part I examines potential reforms: (1) better disclosure rules
(requiring more accurate comparative information to be made dur-
ing the shopping process); (2) standardization of mortgage instru-
ments, including preformulated risk protections for alternative
mortgage instruments; and (3) reduction in the distortions caused
by the shopping process and anticompetitive patterns of coopera-
tion within the real estate industry, both by assuring higher fiduci-
ary standards for those who advise the homebuyer and by attack-
ing these patterns of cooperation.
Obviously, policymakers will not pursue all of these reforms at
once. The most immediate problem is the confusing array of often
risky alternative mortgages; the most direct remedy is the stand-
ardization of these alternatives and the provision of consumer pro-
tections against excessive risk. The second priority should be revis-
ing disclosure rules so that they cannot be used, as they are now, to
deceive homebuyers. A third priority-encouraging the use of buy-
ers' agents or developing fiduciary standards for sellers'
agents-confronts the structural problems of educating the
homebuyer and cannot be accomplished quickly. This reform
should be a long term priority, however, because it may ultimately
be a useful way to help consumers with this inherently complex
transaction. Other long term priorities are redefining the focus of
disclosure rules (as to what is disclosed and when) and reviewing
and changing anticompetitive patterns of market cooperation.
I. STATE USURY LAws' REIGN OF ERROR AND THEIR DISPLACE-
MENT BY FEDERAL DISCLOSURE RULES
From colonial times through most of the twentieth century, state
usury ceilings were the primary means of regulating the home
mortgage transaction in the United States. Traditionally, these
ceilings limited the amount of interest a lender could charge to a
"just price" falling somewhere between 6% and 10%.2 These ceil-
2 For an early history of usury laws in the United States, see J. Blydenburgh, A Treatise
on the Law of Usury (1844) (reproducing the 28 state usury laws in effect in 1844 and
tracing their evolution); S. Homer, A History of Interest Rates (2d ed. 1977); F. Ryan, Usury
1984] 1087
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ings reflected at least three implicit policy assumptions: that "in-
terest" could be reliably determined, that credit regulation was
best left to local rulemakers, and that fixed ceilings of 6% to 10%
were workable and just. Residential mortgage lending grew and
changed substantially after 1920, however, so that by 1980 mort-
gage financing bore little resemblance to anything that state usury
ceilings were designed to regulate. Financing included numerous
hidden or ancillary charges tied to the sales transaction, was na-
tional and not local, and was characterized by high and fluctuating
interest rates. Because of these market changes, national disclosure
rules eventually displaced state usury ceilings as the means to pro-
tect homebuyers.
A. The Integrated Home Sale and Loan Transaction and the
Resulting Difficulty in Defining "Interest"
In this century, the mortgage transaction has become much more
than just the simple loan that states intended usury laws to regu-
late. Two fundamental changes in the transaction have been the
growth of loan-related charges paid by the buyer and the increased
role of the seller or its agents in arranging financing and closing
costs. As a result of these changes, it became far more difficult to
determine the true interest costs of any transaction.
Loan-related charges have increased significantly because of the
lender's increased risk of loss. The lender's anticipated return on a
mortgage loan includes interest payments plus any up front or sub-
sequent administrative charges (minus administrative expenses),
discounted by the risk of loss on the loan. Before the 1930's, risk of
loss was typically low because the loan-to-value ratio was small
(due to large buyer downpayments) and loan terms were short.
To stimulate the housing market after the Depression, federally
and Usury Laws (1924). In the early 20th century, many states passed special laws to regu-
late small loans and other transactions. See B. Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legisla-
tion (1965) (American Bar Foundation study of the increasing specialization of usury rules
and exceptions). In most states, however, usury ceilings remained the primary regulation for
mortgage loans.
Usury ceilings were traditionally justified as the community's assurance that lenders
would charge a "just price" for credit. See F. Bacon, Of Usurie, in Essayes 171 (West ed.
1896) (lending money should be allowed, especially in commercial transactions, but over-
reaching should be controlled); 1 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations 353-62 (J. Rogers 2d ed.
1880) (interest rate limits needed to curb the excesses of entrepreneurs).
[Vol. 70:10831088
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insured Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA) mortgages adopted higher loan-to-value ratios
(lower downpayments) and longer terms (lower monthly pay-
ments).3 Although these changes made more Americans eligible for
mortgage loans, they also increased the risk of loss. Since the
1940's lenders have tried to reduce this risk by ensuring that mort-
gagors will make timely payments, that the property will not be
subject to third party claims, and that the property is worth more
than the mortgage debt.4
To ensure timely payments, lenders will generally not make
loans where total monthly payments (principal, interest, taxes, and
insurance) exceed 25 % to 33 % of the borrower's gross monthly in-
come, where all debt payments exceed 34% to 40% of this income,
or where the borrower has either a poor credit history or an unsta-
ble future earnings stream.5 Moreover, the lender may require the
borrower to buy either private mortgage insurance to reimburse
the lender for the expenses in the event of foreclosureo or health or
life insurance to assure that payments are made notwithstanding
calamity to the borrower.7 Finally, the loan agreement usually pe-
nalizes delinquent payments and technical default by assessing
special fees in the event of either.
For protection against third party claims and inadequate secur-
ity for the loan, the lender has other protections. Thus it commis-
3 See generally P. O'Donnell & E. Maleady, Principles of Real Estate 329-30 (1975) (dis-
cussing the history of home loans).
4 For a more elaborate explanation of "loan risk analysis," see H. Hoagland, L. Stone &
W. Brueggeman, Real Estate Finance 206-18 (6th ed. 1977). The FHA in the 1930's (and the
VA in the 1940's) would guarantee loans only if they contained such risk protections, and
lenders adopted similar requirements for mortgages that the government did not insure. See
id. at 506-08, 523-30.
5 See id. at 207-08. These figures are simply "guidelines" that underwriters developed
through statistical studies showing historically what the average household comfortably
spends on housing. See Reppe, Why Residential Lenders Like Mortgage Guaranty Insur-
ance, Real Est. Rev., Fall 1973, at 58. Lenders can depart from these guidelines in specific
cases, and there is evidence that they have done so in recent years. See Letter from Dean
Dale A. Whitman to Professor William N. Eskridge, at 2 (Sept. 11, 1984) (copy on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association) [hereinafter cited as Whitman Letter].
' About 18% of the residential first mortgage loans in May 1983 included private mort-
gage insurance. See Mortgage Finance and the First-Time Homebuyer, Real Est. Q., Sum-
mer 1983, at 8, 9. This insurance is generally not required when the downpayment is 20% or
more (or when the loan principal is reduced to 80% of the property's value), nor is it re-
quired in FHA and VA loans.
7 See H. Hoagland, L. Stone & W. Brueggeman, supra note 4, at 230-31.
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sions a survey and appraisal of the property to determine whether
its market value exceeds the mortgage amount.8 And the lender
requires the borrower to obtain the opinion of an attorney or title
company that the seller had good title to the property, and usually
a title insurance policy as well.9 The lender may also require that
one or more attorneys review the sale and loan documents to as-
sure their legality and that the borrower insure the mortgaged
property.
Although the fulfillment of these requirements reduces the
lender's risk, the homebuyer-borrower pays for most of them."0
Thus, these payments effectually constitute a surrogate for a
higher interest rate.
The integration of the home sale and loan transaction further
complicated the determination of true interest costs. After World
War II, homebuilders realized that they could sell more houses
through package deals. That is, packaged with the home were loan
and settlement services required by lenders. One type of package
deal involves a loan commitment at a local bank. For a nonrefund-
able 1% "commitment fee," the institution agrees to hold a line of
credit open for purchasers of homes in the housing development,
and might also agree to arrange for the necessary settlement ser-
vices.1 The developer may also pay the lender to reduce, or "buy
down," the interest rate that can be advertised. (Like commitment
fees, buydown fees are typically calculated as a percentage of the
home price and paid by the seller, thus their popular name
"seller's points.") In the last decade or so, builders have begun to
form their own mortgage banking subsidiaries that originate loans
for the builders' customers at below-market rates and then sell the
8 See id. at 211-18.
* See id. at 231; Whitman Letter, supra note 5, at 2.
10 At or before closing, the buyer usually pays fees for the credit report, the survey, the
title examination and insurance certificate, the appraisal, the administrative expenses of
originating the loan (origination fee), and the attorney or notary. Typically, the lender is
also the agent for collecting taxes and insurance premiums, and an escrow fund of several
months' advance payments will be established. Thus, the lender makes these payments to
third parties as they fall due. Private mortgage insurance premiums are sometimes paid as a
lump sum at settlement, but most insurance premiums are paid out over time (either to the
lender or directly to the insurer) after settlement. On settlement fees and practices, see
generally H. Hoagland, L. Stone & W. Brueggeman, supra note 4, at 228-32 (explaining
various closing costs).
"I See generally H. Hoagland & L. Stone, Real Estate Finance 437-38 (3d ed. 1965) (de-
velopers find lenders willing to take over mortgages).
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loans to other lenders at a discount (for which builders reimburse
them by paying points).12
Similarly, the resale market has seen the rise of full-service bro-
kerage firms. As part of its effort to market homes, the firm or the
individual broker guides homebuyers to available financing (in-
creasingly through preexisting loan commitments) and arranges for
settlement services.13 Merrill Lynch and Coldwell Banker, for ex-
ample, have acquired mortgage-banking subsidiaries that arrange
mortgage commitments for their customers and have controlling or
participatory interests in title or mortgage insurance companies.
Although the main reason for broker integration of the resale
transaction is to facilitate the marketing of homes, a consequence
of this integration is that firms have opportunities to profit
through origination and servicing fees and settlement charges in
addition to the resale commission.14
The integrated home sale and loan transaction has thus devel-
oped logically, and the accepted wisdom is that it has made home
ownership more accessible. This development also caused problems
for usury laws because it was not clear whether the charges were
interest. Lenders could charge a nominally low rate of interest yet
obtain a high return by charging points to the buyer or the seller,
by overcharging for settlement services, by requiring the buyer to
pay to reduce the lender's risk, and by including costly future
charges in the mortgage agreement. State judges and legislators re-
Is The largest national homebuilders usually have their own subsidiaries. See Breck-
enfeld, The Other Way Builders Make a Buck, Fortune, Oct. 4, 1982, at 121, 122. Smaller
builders have pooled their resources to form mortgage companies that can obtain large-scale
commitments. See California BIA Forms Own Mortgage Access Organization, Prof. Builder,
Ap't Bus., Jan. 1984, at 13; Colorado Builders Form Their Own Mortgage Company,
Builder, Aug. 1982, at 39; Pennsylvania Builders and Brokers Join to Form Mortgage Corpo-
ration, Builder, May 1983, at 99.
Recently, the Home Mortgage Access Corporation (HOMAC) was formed. It is a nation-
wide mortgage conduit that negotiates master commitments for mortgage money on behalf
of its builder participants. See generally Nat'l As'n of Home Builders, Home Mortgage
Access Corporation Information Sheet and Master Builder Participation Agreement (Sept.
28, 1982) (explaining the terms for purchases of mortgage money) (copy on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association)
Is See Haney, Real Estate Heavyweights in the Eighties, Real Est. Rev., Summer 1980, at
35, 36-38; Miller, The Changing Structure of Residential Brokerage, Real Est. Rev., Fall
1978, at 46; Fannie Mae Plan Allows Direct Access to Mortgage Funds, Housing Fin., June
1983.
14 See Haney, supra note 13, at 36-38; Mortgage Power, Forbes, Feb. 1, 1982, at 122-23
(describing Citibank commitment offered to New York City brokers).
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sponded by expanding the definition of "interest" to include some
of these ancillary or hidden charges. Nonetheless, the process of
redefining interest was slow and sometimes yielded rules based on
inaccurate assumptions.
1. Closing Costs
The common-law rule was that closing costs paid out immedi-
ately to third parties (e.g., survey fees, title charges, and taxes) are
not includable as interest because they are not compensation to
the lender. Although some of the charges are incurred at the
lender's insistence, courts reasoned that it is ultimately in the bor-
rower's self-interest to be certain of boundaries and the title's va-
lidity.15 This theory fails to justify not allocating at least part of
those lender-required fees to the interest rate; nor is it persuasive
when applied to payments for property appraisal, credit checks,
and attorney review of loan agreements. The benefit of these latter
tasks inures almost entirely to the lender. Despite these objections,
state legislatures ratified the common law when they drafted de-
tailed usury law definitions of interest after 1966.18
Under the common law, charges that the lender retains to pay
for its own performance of loan-related services are also not inter-
est, as long as these charges are "reasonable." 17 Because courts
rarely found lender charges unreasonable, this rule effectively ex-
cluded lender-retained closing costs from classification as interest.
16 E.g., Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305, 166 So. 847 (1936); see Prather, Mortgage Loans
and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. Law. 181, 188-89 (1960) (customary loan expenses not consid-
ered interest). One flaw in this argument is that given the very low incidence of error in title
examination, many rational homebuyers would not find it in their interest to have title in-
surance. If required by the lender, and not necessarily the rational choice by the homebuyer,
it is reasonable to conclude that this risk insurance is "compensation" to the lender. Thus, it
should have been "interest" under usury law.
16 See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 17, § 6406(a) (Smith-Hurd 1981); Md. Com. Law Code Ann.
§ 12-105 (1983); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-1(9) (Supp. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-113(4)
(1979); see also Unif. Commercial Credit Code § 3.202(1)(a) (1968) ("loan finance charge"
does not include official fees and taxes); id. §§ 1.301(5), 3.202(3) (for disclosure purposes,
"loan finance charge" does not include "reasonable closing costs," which are typically paid
to third parties).
1,1 See Starkovich v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 14 Ariz. App. 382, 384-85, 483 P.2d
795, 797-98 (1971); Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 356 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.),
cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1978); Ferdon v. Zarriello Bros., 87 N.J. Super. 124, 130-31,
208 A.2d 186, 189-90 Law Div. (1965).
1092 [Vol. 70:1083
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Nevertheless, this rule was followed by legislative codifications in
the 1960's and 1970's.1s
2. Points
Courts usually held that buyer-paid points (mainly fees covering
administrative expenses of originating loans) are interest,19 even
though other "reasonable" fees paid to the lender for loan-related
services were not considered interest.20 Seller-paid points were not
often challenged because homebuyers were not aware that they
were paid. When they were challenged, they posed difficult ques-
tions. The common-law authorities generally agreed that bona fide
commitment fees are not interest because the fee is not paid for
the use of money, but only for the option of later using it.2' In the
18 See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 17, § 6406(a) (Smith-Hurd 1981); Unif. Commercial Credit
Code §§ 1.301(5), 3.202(3) (1968) (for disclosure purposes, "loan finance charge" does not
include "reasonable closing costs," even if retained by the lender). But see Tri-County Fed.
Say. & Loan As'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977) (disallowing the collection of
interest on money retained by lender); Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 12-105(c) (1983) (lender
may collect "actual expenses" which will not be considered interest "if not retained" by
lender). The Maryland position is subject to the obvious objection that it should make no
usury law difference whether the lender retains an outside attorney to prepare loan docu-
ments or prepares them through its own counsel See Casenote, Usury-Maryland Anno-
tated Code, Article 49-A Lender's Retention of Loan Related Costs, Unless Exempted,
Constitutes Interest-Unpaid Balance is that Sum Actually Owed by a Borrower to a
Lender. Tr-County Fed. Say. & Loan As'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977), 7 U.
Bait. L. Rev. 361, 365 (1978). The rule may rest, however, upon the suspicion that the lender
will tend to overcharge for services it provides and that a reasonableness test assures insuffi-
cient protection for consumers.
19 See, e.g., Vee Bee Sere. Co. v. Household Fin. Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1944), aff'd, 269 A.D. 772, 55 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1945); First Fed. Say. v. Norwood Realty Co.,
212 Ga. 524, 93 S.E.2d 763 (1956); see Real Estate Trustee, Inc. v. Rebhan, 153 Md. 624, 139
A. 351 (1927); Russell v. Lumberman's Mortgage Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 171, 172, 273 N.E.2d
803, 804 (C. P. 1966); see also Hershmnn, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 85 Bank-
ing L.J. 189, 206-09 (1968) (discussing the differing treatment of origination charges as over-
head expenses or as a commission for placing the loan).
26 Some legislatures recognized this anomaly, though they tended to resolve it by permit-
ting a loan origination fee that did not count as interest. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 58A,
§ 22 (1951) (permitting 4% inspection fee); Va. Code § 6-348.3 (1966) (organizations princi-
pally engaged in making mortgage loans for resale may make an initial processing charge);
W. Va. Code § 31A-4-30 (1982) (bank may charge borrower, in addition to the maximum
interest rate, "a reasonable amount to cover the expenses incurred in procuring reports and
information respecting loans and the value of and title to property offered as security
therefor").
S1 See People v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 41, 46-47, 385 N.E.2d 555,
557, 412 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (1978); Gonzales County Say. & Loan As'n v. Freeman, 534
S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976); Op. Att'y Gen. No. OAG 9-80 (Wis. Feb. 4, 1980), reprinted in
[1974-1980 Transfer Binder] Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 97,553; Prather, supra note 15,
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integrated home sale and loan transaction, however, this "option"
is almost always exercised, as the homebuyers will use most or all
of the precommitted mortgage money. After 1966, a few states did
redefine interest to include mortgage commitment fees under some
circumstances.2
Courts also failed to understand the true nature of buydown
fees. Some judges and commentators suggested that these fees are
not interest when paid to an originating lender to reimburse it for
the discount it offers in selling the loan to other lenders. 23 Their
rationale was that two separate transactions are involved-the loan
and then the sale of the note-and that the only charges includ-
able as interest are those formally paid in connection with the
loan. Functionally, however, when the loan is made by one lender
who acts as a conduit by immediately signing over the loan to a
second lender according to a prearranged commitment, there is
only one transaction. The loan is actually the entire two-step
transaction, and the compensation for the loan logically includes
the discount or buydown fees.24 After 1966, legislative revision of
usury laws often included discount and buydown fees in the defini-
tion of interest.2 5
at 188; Sintenis, Current Treatment of the Non-Refundable Commitment Fee and Related
Problems, 86 Banking L.J. 590, 604-11 (1969).
" See, e.g., Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d
128 (1978). Compare 56 Op. Att'y Gen. 285 (Md. 1971) (fee paid to a lender for a commit-
ment to make a loan to a future purchaser is interest) with 57 Op. Att'y Gen. 319 (Md.
1972) (commitment fee to assure mortgage money for indeterminate number of future pur-
chasers is not interest where it is unclear what each purchaser's pro rate share of such fee
would be).
23 See Hershman, supra note 19, at 212-13; see also Lake Hiwassee Dev. Co. v. Pioneer
Bank, 535 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1976) (usury statutes applicable only to loans and not to the
sale of commercial paper); Nosari & Lewis, How Usury Laws Affect Real Estate Develop-
ment, 9 Real Est. L.J. 30, 33 (1980) (a loan discounted to another at an effective rate higher
than usury limits is not generally considered usurious).
2 See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952)
(prospectively overruling prior decisions distinguishing loan from immediate sale at a dis-
count); Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d 915, 927, 528 P.2d 357, 364-65,
17 Cal. Rptr. 541, 548-49 (1974); Brown v. Pilini, 128 Vt. 324, 331-32, 262 A.2d 479, 483
(1970) (10% handling charge assessed in sale of commercial paper was interest because the
integrated transaction was a loan).
21 See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 17, § 6406(d) (Smith-Hurd 1981) (points, discounts, com-
missions limited to 3% of mortgage principal and included as interest); Md. Com. Law Code
Ann. § 12-101(e) (1983) ("interest" includes "any amount payable as a discount or point");
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 47.20(7)(1) (West Supp. 1984) (similar); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-1(9)
(Supp. 1983) (finance charge includes "discount points"); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-101.02(3)
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3. Other Charges for the Lender's Benefit
Common-law courts were reluctant to find that lender-mandated
insurance against default, the debtor's poor health, or casualty of
the secured property constitutes interest.2 6 This insurance is a sur-
rogate, however, for a higher interest rate because it lowers the risk
of default. Some legislatures in the 1970's recognized this relation-
ship and stipulated that insurance premiums are interest unless
the buyer agrees to incur the insurance and chooses the insurance
provider, subject to reasonable objections of the lender.
Because the buyer can avoid delinquency fees, default expenses
(including counsel fees), and prepayment penalties, the common
law also did not include them in interest.28 This position is sensi-
ble, except to the extent that lenders might charge borrowers much
more than is needed to cover administrative expenses. After 1966,
usury laws were amended to stipulate that delinquency, default,
and prepayment charges are excluded from the definition of inter-
est if they fall within certain limits. Typically, delinquency charges
are not interest if the borrower is given fifteen days beyond the
due date to make proper payment and delinquency charges are 5%
or less of the amount of payment in arrears.29 Similarly, some laws
(1978) (discount points are interest and are amortized over the life of the loan); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 56-8-9(E) (1978) (points added to interest to determine compliance with the usury
ceiling); Unif. Commercial Credit Code § 3.109(1)(a) (1968) ("loan finance charge" includes
discounts and points). But see Ala. Code § 5-19-1(1) (1981) (finance charge does not include
points and discounts paid by seller).
26 Again, the rationale was that the borrower also benefits from the added risk protec-
tions, an argument that seems unpersuasive. See supra note 15.
17 See, e.g., Unif. Commercial Credit Code § 3.202(2)(a) (1968) (premiums for loss/dam-
age/liability concerning property are not part of "loan finance charge" if lender gives bor-
rower written statement setting forth the cost and the borrower's right to choose the in-
surer); id. § 3.202(2)(b) (premiums for life/accident/health coverage of borrower are not part
of "loan finance charge" if insurance is not required and borrower gives written indication of
his desire to have the insurance).
" See Abbot v. Stevens, 133 Cal. App. 2d 242, 247-48, 284 P.2d 159, 162 (1955); Feldman
v. Kings Highway Sav. Bank, 278 A.D. 589, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306, affd, 303 N.Y. 675, 102
N.E.2d 835 (1951) (prepayment penalties); Prather, supra note 15, at 191-92 (prepayment
penalties and costs of default and foreclosure).
" See, e.g., Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 12-105(b)(3) (1983) (delinquency fee not interest
if imposed only after 15-day delinquency and does not exceed 5% of late payment); see also
Unif. Commercial Credit Code §§ 3.109(1)(b), 3.203 (1968) ("loan finance charge" does not
include "delinquency charges," but the latter can only be assessed when an installment has
not been paid within 10 days of its due date and cannot exceed 5% of the delinquent
installment).
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exempt prepayment fees from usury ceiling calculations only if the
penalty is less than a designated percentage of the outstanding
loan amount and is assessed only if the loan is repaid quickly (usu-
ally within three to five years).30
B. The National Mortgage Market and the Rise of Federal
Disclosure Rules
The home mortgage market has become increasingly national in
the twentieth century. Because of this development, the utility of
state usury laws diminished and regulatory efforts have shifted to
federal disclosure rules.
Before 1900, home mortgage lending was largely concentrated in
the hands of a few banks in each community. By the 1920's, com-
petition from savings and loan associations, large life insurance
companies, and mortgage companies eroded the local bank monop-
oly and its isolation from national capital markets.3 1 Another sig-
nificant change resulted from federal intervention into the finance
market. In response to the credit shortage during the Depression,
the federal government created federally funded banks to extend
credit to lenders so that they could refinance mortgages and meet
withdrawal demands.3 2 More important, the government estab-
lished a "secondary mortgage market" in which lenders could sell
mortgages they originated.83
With regard to the secondary mortgage market, the National
Housing Act S4 authorized the establishment of private mortgage
30 See, e.g., Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 12-105(b)(4) (1983) (prepayment fees not interest
in real estate mortgage loans if imposed within three years from the date of the loan and do
not exceed two months' advance interest).
31 See M. Bodfish, Savings and Loan Principles (1940); J. Ewalt, A Business Reborn 3-15
(1962).
32 See generally J. Ewalt, supra note 31, at 14-17 (discussing the effect of the Depression
on savings and loan associations); The Federal Home Loan Banks, The Federal Home Loan
Bank System (1961) (describing the origins and operation of the FHLB system).
33 The secondary mortgage market is, most broadly defined, "the aggregate of all
purchase and sale transactions of residential mortgage instruments." The Federal National
Mortgage Association, Background and History 6 (1973). Other authors "exclude transac-
tions from the secondary market that were preceded by the buyer's promise to purchase the
loans prior to the acquisition by the seller." D. Jones & L. Grebler, The Secondary Mortgage
Market 4 (1961).
Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 4, 48 Stat. 128, 129
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1460, 1464 (1982)), had earlier established the Home
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dealers"5 and created a mortgage insurance pool to be administered
by the FHA, which also insured lenders against the risk of bor-
rower default.8 The Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) was created in 1938 to buy and sell FHA-insured (and, in
the 1940's, VA-insured) loans. Because they were standardized
and virtually riskless, FHA and VA loans were routinely originated
by mortgage bankers in the 1950's and 1960's and sold to FNMA
and other buyers. By 1970, over one-quarter of the outstanding
home mortgage loans had been sold on the secondary market.3 8
In 1968, Congress created the Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA) to purchase VA and FHA loans and shifted
FNMA to private ownership. 9 Two years later, Congress created
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) and au-
thorized it and FNMA to buy and sell conventional loans. 40 Al-
though FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA are primarily mortgage buy-
ers, national mortgage sellers have also emerged. For example, the
mortgage-banking subsidiaries of homebuilder and brokerage firms
sell mortgages nationally to FNMA and other buyers pursuant to
multimillion dollar loan commitments. As a consequence of these
and other developments, well over half of the mortgages originated
in the 1980's have been sold on the secondary market. 1
Owners' Loan Corporation to purchase and refinance defaulted mortgages as a temporary
emergency measure.
116 See 12 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (1982).
3 Id. §§ 1708-1709 ($10 billion mortgage insurance pool administered by FHA). FHA
would insure lenders against loss due to borrower default if the loan conformed to standard
FHA requirements-interest rate maxima, a long loan term, full amortization of the princi-
pal, and borrower qualification standards needed to minimize the risk of default.
"I In 1935 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was established, in part, to
purchase FHA mortgages. Acting under power implicitly granted by the National Housing
Act Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-424, § 211, 52 Stat. 8, 23 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1982)), the President directed the Chairman of RFC to establish the
FNMA and vest it with initial capital. The Act of July 1, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-864, § 301, 62
Stat. 1206, 1207 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1717 (1982)), was the formal congres-
sional authorization for FNMA's activities.
3 See Wetmore, FHA Operation Now Vital to Secondary Mortgage Market, Mortgage
Banker, Dec. 1973, at 24, 27.
39 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 801, 82 Stat. 476,
536 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716b (1982)).
0 Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, §§ 301-310, 84 Stat. 450,
451 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (1982)). The FHLMC is a subsidiary of
the Federal Home Loan Banking System and specializes in buying and selling mortgages
that savings and loans originated.
4' Secondary Mortgage Market. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Commu-
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These developments have significantly influenced regulatory
theory and practice. Since the Depression, home mortgages have
become a federal concern as national or regional actors have in-
creasingly dominated the market. FNMA, FHLMC, GNMA, and
most private mortgage buyers do so on a nationwide or regional
basis. Financial institutions selling the mortgages are often na-
tional, as are the builders of homes. Even the institutional mort-
gage insurers-the government agencies (FHA and VA) and pri-
vate insurers-are national. Because the mortgage instrument has
incorporated standard features to minimize risk and is now rou-
tinely traded on a national market between sophisticated buyers
and sellers, the problem of local monopolies gouging homebuyers
with high rates has been radically curtailed.42 Thus, the need for
usury ceilings diminished.
The growth of a nationally competitive mortgage market has
also fostered the view that regulations most helpful to the con-
sumer are those that improve the mortgage market's competitive-
ness. Disclosure rules are therefore preferable to usury ceilings.
Theoretically, if there is uniform disclosure of credit charges and
terms, buyers will be more aware of the cost of credit and will flock
to the best credit opportunities, thus eliminating bad deals and
making the mortgage market even more competitive. State disclos-
ure laws enacted in the 1960's reflect this philosophy,43 as does the
nity Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 89, 162 (1984) (home mortgages sold as percent of mortgage originations increased
from about 30% in 1971 to an average of 57% between 1980 and 1982) [hereinafter cited as
1984 Secondary Mortgage Market Hearing].
,1 Although the market rate does vary, it varies from region to region (not state to state)
and does not vary nearly as much as it did 40 years ago. Recent studies have found that,
notwithstanding the supposedly "unifying" force of the secondary mortgage market, "local
credit conditions continue to be an important determinant of regional mortgage rates in the
existing house market," and "regional mortgage market insulation persists in spite of the
unifying effects of the Federal credit agencies." Ostas, Regional Differences in Mortgage
Financing Costs: A Reexamination, 32 J. Fin. 1774, 1778 (1977); accord Rudolph, Zumpano
& Karson, Mortgage Markets and Inter-Regional Differences in Conventional Mortgage
Terms, 10 Am. Real Est. & Urb. Econ. A. J. 94 (1982). Although the evidence suggests that
interregional mortgage differentials may persist (generally higher the further the region is
from the financial centers of Boston and New York), the range among all SMSAs for new
house loans was 88 basis points (less than 1%) in 1963, and 88 basis points again in 1972.
See Ostas, supra, at 1778.
43 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 36-393 to -417 (Supp. 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 360.210-
.991 (1970 & Supp. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-125 (1979).
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Uniform Consumer Credit Code." Not surprisingly, however, the
most important disclosure legislation was passed at the federal
level.
Seeking "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit," Congress passed the Truth-in-Lending Act in 1968.,1
Before extending credit in a closed-end loan such as a mortgage
loan, the lender must supply the borrower with specified informa-
tion, including the principal sum of the loan, the amount of credit
extended, the "finance charge" expressed as an "annual percentage
rate" (APR), the payments scheduled, the amount not calculated
in the finance charge, default and delinquency assessments, pre-
payment penalties, and the security for the loan.4" The Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation Z, which implemented the Act, requires
APR disclosure in advertisements that state an interest rate or
other triggering facts.47
44 At least 11 states have substantially adopted the 1968 or 1974 Uniform Commercial
Credit Code (UCCO): Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 7 U.L.A. 322, 377 (Supp. 1984). Two of the
UCCC's basic assumptions are that (1) competition to determine prices is a good way to
protect borrowers, see Prefatory Note to 1968 Revised Final Draft, id. at 242 (1978), and (2)
competition to assure fair prices for credit requires easy entry into credit markets and "uni-
form disclosure of the costs and terms of credit to permit informed judgments as to whether
or not to use credit, to facilitate 'shopping for credit' and to enable the forces of competition
to work freely." Id. at 243. A third assumption is that usury ceilings are not the best form of
regulation. See id. at 242-43. Thus, the UCCC defines "consumer loan" to include loans
"primarily secured by an interest in land" for purposes of its disclosure and remedies sec-
tion, but not for other UCCC sections unless (inter alia) the interest rate exceeds 10%. Unif.
Commercial Credit Code § 3.105 (1968). Most of the states adopting the UCCC have a
higher floor to exclude first mortgage loans. See 7 U.L.A. 403 (1978); id. at 350 (Supp. 1984).
45 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1982). The Truth-in-Lending Act is part of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1665 (1982)).
46 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)-(b) (1982). Compare id. with Unif. Commercial Credit Code
9 3.306(2) (1968) (similar disclosure requirements). As defined in the Truth-in-Lending Act
and the UCCC, the APR is the rate that, when applied to the unpaid balance of the princi-
pal (calculated according to the actuarial method), would yield a sum equal to the finance
charge.
47 Section 144(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1664(b) (1982), provides that the Act's truth-in-
advertising rules do not apply to real estate advertisements, except to the extent that the
Federal Reserve Board requires. Regulation Z currently provides that advertisements for
closed-end credit shall use the APR when they state a rate of finance charge, 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.24(b) (1984), and that if advertisements state the amount of any downpayment, pay-
ment, or finance charge, they must also state the APR, the terms of repayment, and the
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Although the Truth-in-Lending Act did not preempt state regu-
lation,4 s it has had the practical effect of dictating the format of
state disclosure laws.49 The Act does not affect state usury ceilings
and, indeed, borrows heavily from state law in defining "finance
charge," which includes discounts and points, service charges and
loan fees, and various insurance premiums. 0 Excluded from the
definition are taxes and other fees required by law and paid to
public officials, delinquency and default charges, title examination
and insurance fees, escrow funds, notary fees, appraisal and survey
expenses, and charges for credit reports.51 Early Federal Reserve
Board interpretations of the Act excluded commitment fees from
the definition and included buydown fees only if the seller raised
its price to pay them.2
The Truth-in-Lending Act covered only the extension of credit
in loan transactions. In the 1970's, however, it was revealed that
homebuyers were paying exorbitant prices for closing services, not-
withstanding usury law "reasonableness" rules. In 1974, after con-
sidering several reform proposals," Congress enacted the Real Es-
amount or percentage of the downpayment. Id. § 226.24(c).
4s The Act preempted state credit disclosure laws only to the extent that they were incon-
sistent with the Act or Regulation Z, 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1982), and authorized the Board
to exempt from federal regulation any class of credit transactions within states whose regu-
lation of those transactions "is subject to requirements substantially similar to those im-
posed [by the Act and where] there is adequate provision for enforcement." Id. § 1633; see
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, app. B. (1984) (describing exemption application procedures).
4" For example, the 1974 revised version of the UCCC simply provides that compliance
with the Truth-in-Lending Act constitutes compliance with any state disclosure require-
ments. Unif. Commercial Credit Code § 3.201 (1974). "[A]ctual experience from 1968 to the
present time has demonstrated that in substantially all cases, creditors engaging in con-
sumer credit look to the federal law and Regulation Z as the controlling law in the area of
disclosure." Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 583, 598 (1978); see Va. Code §§ 6.1-
330.6, .17 (1983) (compliance with Truth-in-Lending Act is automatic compliance with Vir-
ginia law).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)-(c) (1982).
s2 Compare id. § 1605(d)-(e) with Unif. Commercial Credit Code § 3.202 (1968) (similar
charges excluded from "loan finance charge" in consumer loans under UCCC).
52 See 35 Fed. Reg. 17,029 (1970) (formerly codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.406(b) (1980))
(finance charge includes discount fee "to the extent it is passed on to the buyer through an
increase in the selling price"); Interpretative Decision FC-0033 (Dec. 22, 1976), reprinted in
12 C.F.R. at 635 (1980) (commitment fees are not finance charges "unless they are in fact
imposed by the seller/developer only on the credit customer").
53 In 1971, Senator Proxmire introduced a bill to require lenders to bear settlement costs,
and hearings were held in March 1972. See S. 2775, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in
Mortgage Settlement Costs Including a Bill, S. 2775, Which Would Reduce Certain Charges
and Expenses in Connection with the Purchase of Residential Real Property, and for Other
1100
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tate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),5 prohibiting kickbacks
and referral fees to lenders and requiring disclosures of closing
expenses.
As amended, RESPA requires that within three days after a loan
application to finance the purchase of residential real estate is
made, the lender must give the borrower a "good faith estimate" of
the amount of settlement charges and a special information book-
let that HUD prepares explaining the various settlement costs and
escrows, the rights and choices open to the buyer, and unfair prac-
tices or charges that lenders must avoid. 55 The lender also must
complete a HUD-developed form itemizing closing costs and other
charges and make it available to the borrower at or before settle-
ment.56 By guaranteeing early disclosure of settlement charges and
practices, Congress hoped that consumers would become more
aware of abuses and would shop for the best prices.
The Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 198057
cut back on the mandated disclosures for loans. Congress shifted
the emphasis of disclosure to five key factors: total amount fi-
nanced, total finance charge, APR, total of all payments, and total
Purposes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972). The bill went
nowhere. In February 1972, the HUDNA Mortgage Settlement Cost Report was transmit-
ted to Congress, suggesting disclosure and anti-abuse rules to regulate settlement costs. In
July 1972, HUD proposed dollar limits for settlement services in six metropolitan areas.
Although some members of Congress were receptive to the HUD proposal, it drew such a
firestorm of protest that HUD abandoned it. See Oversight of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1975) (opening statement of Sen. Tower).
" Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2617 (1982)); see Real Estate Settlement Costs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing
of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973-1974)
(FHLBB, HUD, other federal agencies prefer disclosure and anti-abuse provisions over di-
rect price controls). For commentary on RESPA, see Stoppello, Federal Regulation of Home
Mortgage Settlement Costs: RESPA and Its Alternatives, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 367 (1979); Wal-
lace, "Explicit Pricing," Fraud and Consumer Information: The Reform of RESPA, 12 Rut.-
Cam. L. Rev. 183 (1981); Whitman, The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act- How to
Comply-Problems and Prospects, 4 Real Est. L.J. 223 (1976).
55 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982); see 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.6-.7 (1984).
- 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982).
" Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 32, 168 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665
(1982)). For commentary on the Act, see O'Connor, Truth in Lending Simplification, 35
Bus. Law. 1221 (1980); Shank, Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act- Changes
Affecting Disclosure Requirements in Home Mortgage Transactions, 12 St. Mary's L.J. 1130
(1981).
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sale price.58 Each item must be accompanied by a plain language
explanation of its nature and scope. The consumer is referred to
the contract for identification and explanation of terms relating to
delinquency, default, right to accelerate, prepayment penalties,
and rebates29
Other Simplification Act reforms were intended to facilitate
creditor compliance with the Act. The Federal Reserve Board was
charged with developing model forms that lenders could use to en-
sure technical compliance. The Board promulgated a revised Regu-
lation Z, mandatory in October 1982, which simplifies the required
disclosures, explains the disclosures in an interpretive appendix,
and presents various model disclosure forms.60 New Regulation Z
made other changes not specifically directed by the Simplification
Act, including a rule excluding seller's points from the finance
charge. 1
C. The Market and Regulatory Response to High and Volatile
Interest Rates
Usury ceilings work best when interest rates are stable. Between
1921 and 1966, market rates for first mortgages were relatively sta-
ble, fluctuating between 2% and 6%. After 1966, these rates in-
creased substantially and fluctuated over a larger range. They went
up to 7% in 1966-1967, climbed to 9% in 1970, reached 10% in
1974-75, and shot beyond 10% in 1978 (exceeding 20% in 1981 and
'hovering between 12% and 15% in 1982-1984). This volatile up-
ward trend in interest rates has led to major changes in the way
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(8) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c)-(e), (h), (j) (1984); S. Rep. No.
73, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 280, 280-
81. Background debate may be found in Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Simplification Act Hearing]; Simplification of the
Truth in Lending Act: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [herein-
after cited as 1978 Simplification Act Hearings].
:9 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(12) (1982); see 12 C.F.R. § 226.18 (1984).
80 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848 (1981). Though effective April 1, 1981, compliance with revised
Regulation Z was optional until April 1, 1982, a date later extended to October 1, 1982. 47
Fed. Reg. 755 (1982).
6' See 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848, 20,855, 20,894 (1981) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(5)
(1984)).
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bankers, brokers, and builders do business, and to federal preemp-
tion of state usury laws.
1. Adjustable or Variable Rate Mortgages
In the 1970's, the investment portfolios of savings and loans and
other mortgage lenders consisted predominately of fixed-rate long
term (thirty-year) mortgages, but their source of funds was short
term deposits. When interest rates increased after 1966, savings
and loans were forced to offer better terms on deposits to prevent
a massive savings shift to money market and other high-interest
funds. Their income remained tied, however, to fixed low-rate, long
term mortgages. The disparity between low-rate income and high-
rate outflow threatened the solvency of the traditional holders of
home mortgages, and some firms went bankrupt in the 1970's. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), which regulates feder-
ally chartered savings and loans, proposed that these institutions
be permitted to offer "variable rate mortgages"(VRMs), later
called "adjustable rate mortgages" (ARMs).62 Under such mort-
gages the interest rate and the monthly payment would rise or fall
in conformity with a market index. This type of mortgage shifts at
least part of the risk of rising rates from savings and loans to
homebuyers.
Although rebuffed by congressional opposition in 1969 and 1975,
the FHLBB authorized VRMs in 1978, subject to specified con-
sumer protections relating to the frequency and size of adjust-
ments."s The Board later revised that regulation to permit greater
market experimentation, and its current rules permit a great vari-
ety of mortgage instruments and impose virtually no substantive
consumer protections." The main protections remaining are dis-
" See Variable Rate Mortgages: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 27-83 (1975) (statement of FHLBB on its proposed
VRM regulations).
" The Board originally authorized VRMs and other instruments in FHLBB Resolution
No. 78-708, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,336, 59,338-40 (1978) (formerly codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2
(1979)) (amended in significant respects by 44 Fed. Reg. 32,199, 32,201-02 (1979)). Under
these regulations, only one index could be used for rate adjustments, 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-
2(c)(3) (1979); only one change in rate was allowed per year, id. § 545.6-2(c)(4)(i); no rate
change could exceed 1%; and increases over the life of the loan were limited to 2.5%. Id.
§ 545.6-2(c)(4)(iv). When the rate increased, moreover, the borrower had the option of ex-
tending the loan maturity, or prepaying the loan without penalty, or accepting an increased
monthly payment. Id. § 545.6-2(c)(4)(v).
"Lenders argued that the 1978 VRM Regulation was too restrictive, and in 1980 the
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closure rules requiring that the lender give a "full explanation" of
how the interest rate, the monthly payment, the loan balance, and
the term may be adjusted and how the adjustment of one item
may affect the others; a description of all contractual contingencies
under which the loan may become due or which may result in a
forced sale of the home; and an example of the interaction of the
variable features of the loan. 5 Other federal regulators followed
the FHLBB in permitting their regulated lenders to use ARMs and
other novel instruments after 1979.6
State usury laws also began a gradual process of accommodation
to VRMs in the late 1970's.67 In the Gan-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982 (the Garn Act),68 however, Congress pre-
empted state regulation of alternative mortgage instruments. The
Act permits state-chartered lenders to originate and enforce ARMs
and other alternative mortgages secured by residential real prop-
erty, but only to the extent permitted by federal regulations appli-
cable to analogous institutions regulated under federal law .6  The
Board issued its "RRM Regulation," which permitted short term loans with long term
amortization in which interest rates and payments are periodically renegotiated. 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.6-4a (1981). In 1981, the Board's "Alternative Mortgage Loan Regulation" further
liberalized that set of rules. See 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (as amended by 47 Fed. Reg.
36,612 (1982)) (currently codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.33 (1984)). For a detailed history, see
Walleser, Balancing the Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home Mortgage Financing
in America, 31 Drake L. Rev. 1 (1981).
as 12 C.F.R. § 545.33(0(7), (9), (11) (1984). For a more complete list of FHLBB-required
disclosures, see infra note 165.
66 See 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (1981) (amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 9506 (1983)) (codified as
amended at 12 C.F.R. §§ 29.1-.9 (1984)) (Comptroller of the Currency's rules for commercial
banks).
67 Usury common law was relatively hostile to ARMs throughout most of the 1970's. See,
e.g., Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Kramer, 263 Ark. 169, 563 S.W.2d 451 (1978); Sailboat
Apartment Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust, 363 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978). Many states adopted laws or regulations permitting ARMs, however, if they
contained specified consumer protections. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16-207(b) (1981); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:3504(D) (West 1983); Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 12-118 (1983); 41 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 301(e) (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-202 (Supp.
1983); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. VIII, § 1256 (Supp. 1981).
as Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. VIII, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). Title VIII does not apply to financings offered by individual homeowners in the
sale of their houses, but is otherwise very expansive with regard to lenders and mortgage
instruments to which its preemption applies. Rudolph, Schmelzer & Weiner, Federal Legis-
lation Affecting Mortgage Credit, 38 Bus. Law. 1311, 1319-20 (1983). States may override
the preemption within three years. Garn Act § 805(a), 12 U.S.C. § 3804(a) (1982).
11 Specifically, state-chartered commercial banks are authorized to use alternative mort-
gages conforming to the Comptroller's rules for national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 3803(a)(1)
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substantial deregulation of alternative mortgage instruments has
permitted them to dominate the mortgage market. It is estimated
that two-thirds of the home mortgages originated in 1983 were
ARMs, and over $175 billion in ARMs are anticipated in 1984.70
2. New Seller Strategies
High interest rates also dampened demand for homes by increas-
ing mortgage loan costs and by decreasing homebuyers' ability to
qualify for these loans. In response to these problems, sellers have
tried to avoid high rates-or at least avoid their appearance. Thus,
although the apparent market rate for home mortgages in April
1982 was 17%, the average rate advertised and charged in major
cities was between 12% and 14%.1
One reason for below-market rates has been the use of "creative
financing" to sell old homes. Under such fimancing the buyer may
"assume" the seller's existing low-rate mortgage and finance the
difference between the selling price and the balance on the loan
through a second mortgage provided by a financial institution or
the seller.72 Even though the second mortgage bears the current
interest rate, the "blended" rate is substantially below market.
(1982); see 12 C.F.R. pt. 29 (1984). State-chartered credit unions may use alternative mort-
gages permitted by the National Credit Union Administration. 12 U.S.C. § 3803(a)(2)
(1982); see 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6B (1984). State-chartered savings and loans, mortgage banks,
and other creditors may avoid state restrictions by following the FHLBB's rules for federal
savings and loans. 12 U.S.C. § 3803(a)(3) (1982); see 12 C.F.R. § 545.33 (1984).
70 E. Gray, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Develop-
ment of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 4 (June 21, 1984),
reprinted in Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hous-
ing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (forthcoming) (statement of Chairman, FHLBB) [House
hearings hereinafter cited as 1984 ARM Hearings]; H. Snyder, Statement on Alternative
Rate Mortgages 2 (July 31, 1984), reprinted in 1984 ARM Hearings, supra (statement of
Director, W. Coast Regional Office, Consumers Union). Many of these ARMs are sold on the
secondary mortgage market. See Browne, The Development and Practical Application of the
Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loan: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's Adjusta-
ble Rate Mortgage Loan Purchase Program and Mortgage Loan Instruments, 47 Mo. L. Rev.
179, 197 (1982).
71 See New First Mortgages!, Housing Fin., Aug. 1982, at 1, 2 (average initial rate for first
mortgage loans in 1982 was 13.4%).
72 See Case, Creative Financing Instruments, 48 Real Est. Appraiser & Analyst, Spring
1982, at 45; Jaffee, Creative Finance: Measures, Sources and Tests, 3 Housing Fin. Rev. 1
(1984); Selling Creative Financing, Housing Fin., May 1982, at 1 (by Oct. 1980, 40% of
single-family home sales involved creative financing- in Apr. 1982 the proportion was 70%).
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This technique is thwarted, however, if the mortgagee inserted a
"due-on-sale clause" entitling it to accelerate repayment in the
event of a sale.7 3 In that case the seller might accept the first mort-
gage at a below-market rate.74 Generally, seller first or second
mortgages are short term: a big "balloon" payment is due after
three to ten years, consisting of the principal and the interest not
covered by prior monthly payments.75
A second way to avoid the appearance of high interest rates has
been seller buydowns: the seller pays the lender several points so
that the advertised interest rate is below market.76 Buydowns help
sales both by making the interest rate look less frightening and, in
some cases, by helping purchasers qualify for loans. Because lend-
ers require that the first year's monthly payments be no more than
a certain percentage of total family income, sellers can buy down
the interest rate for only the first few years (partial buydowns) and
still enable a marginal homebuyer to qualify for a loan.77 Even
without seller buydowns, lenders often offer ARMs for low initial
rates.
Finally, some of the new loan instruments that lenders devel-
3 "In the late 1970's, several states, either by statute or judicial decision, voided due-on-
sale clauses in mortgage deeds of trust. See Rudolph, Schmelzer & Weiner, supra note 68, at
1315-16. Title III of the Garn Act, however, preempts these restrictions and permits a broad
range of "lenders" to enter into contracts with due-on-sale clauses. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(2),
(b)(1) (1982). The Act sets forth nine circumstances where lenders are prohibited as a mat-
ter of federal law from accelerating a loan. Id. § 1701j-3(d) (as amended by Act of Nov. 30,
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. IV, § 473, 97 Stat. 1153, 1237). The Act permits acceleration,
however, in the event of a sale of the home.
74 In April 1982, 77% of assumed mortgages, 79% of seller first mortgages, and 75% of
seller second mortgages were three points or more below market. See Selling Creative Fi-
nancing, supra note 72. New imputed-interest rules with tax laws might discourage below
market creative financing. See infra note 189.
75 See Balloon Mortgages, Housing Fin., Dec. 1982, at 1-2 (in 1982, balloon mortgages
were used in 20% of resale transactions, most of them involving seller financing; average
term of a seller loan was 6.4 years).
76 See J. Guttentag, Recent Changes in the Primary Home Mortgage Market 8-14 (Apr.
1984), reprinted in 1984 ARM Hearings, supra note 70; New First Mortgages!, supra note 71,
at 2 (in 1982, 38% of new first mortgages provided by institutional lenders had seller
buydowns of the interest rate; the interest rate was bought down an average of 4.0 percent-
age points); Marketing Strategies to Sell Homes, [Economics Dep't Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders] Econ. News Notes for the Building Indus., Mar. 1982, at 2 (in 1982, 60% of build-
ers used buydowns as part of their strategy).
77 See Jones, Buying a lower interest rate sells houses, Builder, July 1, 1980, at 22; FNMA
Expanded Buy-Down Mortgage Option, in FNMA Affordability Plus: New Programs Tai-
lored to the Needs of Today's Builders 2-7 (1982).
1106
HeinOnline  -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  1106 1984
Home Mortgage Rules
oped have been used to help buyers meet initial qualification re-
quirements or to avoid high institutional interest rates. Graduated
payment mortgages (GPMs) have low monthly payments for the
first several years of the loan and then increase over time. The
advantage of these loans is that more homebuyers can qualify for
loans because more have an income of four times the initial pay-
ments.7 8  Graduated payment adjustable mortgage loans
(GPAMLs), shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs), and other loan
instruments share the GPM features of low initial payments, which
help first-time homebuyers qualify for loans.
3. End of Usury Ceilings
Another consequence of rising interest rates was that they com-
pelled regulators to reconsider state usury ceilings. In each of four
periods of sharply increasing national interest rates (1966-1967,
1968-1971, 1974-1975, 1979-1981), the market rate hit or exceeded
the usury ceilings of several states.80 During these periods lenders,
brokers, and homebuilders warned their legislatures that if they
refused to lift the ceilings, mortgage money in the state would dry
up and flow to areas that allowed higher interest rates.
State legislatures responded in three ways. At first, believing
that rate increases would be only temporary, many states increased
their ceilings to just above the prevailing rate."1 As rates continued
78 See McTernan & Nagle, The GPM/VRM: A Mortgage for Inflationary Times, Mort-
gage Banking, Oct. 1981, at 39; Personal Business, Home-Buying Help from a Graduated-
Mortgage Plan, Bus. Wk., Jan. 29, 1979, at 113; see also Smith, Wiest & Field, Demographic
Study of Potential Demand for AMIs, in 1 Alternative Mortgage Instruments Research
Study ch. IV (1977) (GPMs can increase overall homeowning potential by 1.5% to 5%)
(FHLBB, publisher).
" See FTC, The Mortgage Money Guide: Creative Financing for Home Buyers (1982).
"Cf. McNulty, A Reexamination of the Problem of State Usury Ceilings: The Impact in
the Mortgage Market, Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus., Spring 1980, at 16 (discussing market rate in
Georgia in 1974-1975).
s, In 1965, before rates started to rise, the usury ceilings of 10 states were at 6%, six
states were at 7%, and 12 states (plus D.C. and Puerto Rico) were at 8%. See Fand, Mort-
gage Market Impediments and Uniform State Transaction Laws, in Housing for the Poor 68
(D. Reeb & J. Kirk eds. 1973) (Table 4.6); Hershman, supra note 19, at 198 (listing states).
Between 1968 and 1970, when national market rates increased to over 9%, states having low
usury ceilings increased their rate maxima. By 1969, no state ceiling remained at 6%, four
were at 7%, three were at 7.5%, and 15 were at 8%. See Report of the Commission on
Mortgage Interest Rates 115-16 (1969). By late 1973, only the Vermont's ceiling was less
than 8%. See Matthews, Housing Squeeze Spurs State Legislators to Act on Usury Laws,
Mortgage Banker, Jan. 1974, at 40, 44-47. Nonetheless, mortgage rates reached the ceilings
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upward in the 1970's, many states simply abolished usury ceilings,
at least for residential first mortgage loans.82 Finally, some states
adopted a "floating" ceiling set several points above an objective
market index, such as long term U.S. bonds."
Reconsideration of state usury ceilings also occurred at the fed-
eral level. In 1979, congressional hearings found experts and fed-
eral regulators virtually unanimous in criticizing state usury ceil-
ings for cutting off credit to high-risk homebuyers, discouraging
home loan and construction activity, and disrupting the secondary
mortgage market.8 4 In December 1979, Congress temporarily pre-
empted state ceilings on first residential mortgage loan charges.8 5
After further hearings in 1980, Congress concluded that where
usury laws required below market interest rates, mortgage funds
would be unavailable and would instead flow to states where mar-
ket yields were available."' As part of its plan to deregulate finan-
cial institutions in 1980, Congress passed the Depository Institu-
of 19 states by September 1973. See The High Cost of Money, Newsweek, Sept. 10, 1973, at
62.
82 Six states did so in the mid-1970's-Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia. At least eight other states abolished ceilings for home mortgage loans
after 1979-Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont,
and Wisconsin.
83 Four states adopted floating ceilings by 1978-Alaska, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsyl-
vania. At least 13 more adopted floating ceilings in the next two years--California, Dela-
ware, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
8 Usury Lending Limits: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979) (statement of Jay Janis, Chairman, FHLBB);
see id. at 20 (statement of J. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency) (usury laws "fail to
accomplish their desired objectives, have an adverse impact on production and employment,
distort allocation of credit among markets and among States," and harm medium-income
savers and borrowers); id. at 25 (testimony of H. Black, Board Member, Nat'l Credit Union
Administration); id. at 34-35 (statement of F. Schultz, Vice-Chairman, Board of Governors,
Fed. Reserve Board Sys.) (usury ceilings are useless or counterproductive). Chairman Janis
gave similar testimony before members of the House on January 24, 1980. Regulation Q and
Related Measures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-95 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Regulation Q Hearings].
85 Pub. L. No. 96-161, § 105(a)(1), 93 Stat. 1233, 1234 (1979) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7 (1982)). Section 105(a)(1) preempted state usury laws governing most residential
first mortgages for the period December 28, 1979 to March 31, 1980. Id. § 104.
86 S. Rep. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 236, 254 ("This artificial disruption of funds availability not only is harmful to
potential homebuyers in states with such usury laws, it also frustrates national housing poli-
cies and programs.").
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tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act,"7 Title V of which
preempts state usury regulation of first mortgages on homes.88 Sec-
tion 501(a)(1) preempts the "provisions of the constitution or the
laws of any State expressly limiting the amount of interest, dis-
count points, finance charges, or other charges" paid or received in
connection with federally related residential first mortgage loans
made after March 31, 1980.89 The preemption does not apply to
second mortgages,90 but is quite broad as to first mortgages: there
is no requirement that the borrowed funds be used to buy the resi-
dential property or that the debtor live in the house purchased.9 1
The preemption is also subject to specific state override and rein-
statement of its usury law between April 1, 1980 and April 1,
1983.2 The FHLBB is the agency that Congress charged with the
87 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). For commentary on this Act, see Abeam, The Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and Its Effect on the Mortgage Market, 1981 Ariz. St.
L.J. 211; Burke & Kaplinsky, Unraveling the New Federal Usury Law, 37 Bus. Law. 1079
(1982); Climo & Evans, Interest Rate Deregulation, 37 Bus. Law. 1381 (1982).
12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982). Section 501(c) preempts state usury regulation of "res-
idential manufactured homes," but conditions that preemption upon lender compliance with
the FHLBB's regulations limiting prepayment penalties, balloon payments, late charges,
and deferral fees, 12 C.F.R. § 590.4(d)-(g) (1984); upon requiring a refund of precomputed
finance charges on prepayment, id. § 590.4(c); and upon requiring the lender to give the
borrower 30 days notice of default and a right to cure the default before accelerating the
debt or repossessing the mobile home. Id. § 590.4(h). Lenders must also comply with any
existing state consumer protection laws (apart from usury ceilings), except those that over-
lap with and are no more protective than the Board's consumer protections. Id. § 590.4(b).
so 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982). The Act specifies six classes of first mortgage transac-
tions that qualify for preemption, including virtually all residential first mortgage loans by
institutional creditors and loans by individuals financing the sale of residential real estate
owned and (at one time) occupied by the individual as his principal residence. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 590.2(b) (1984); Burke & Kaplinsky, supra note 87, at 1082-83.
90 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982).
'o See Op. FHLBB Gen. Counsel No. 37 (Sept. 22, 1980) (borrower need not expect to
reside in the dwelling); Op. FHLBB Gen. Counsel No. S-12 (Feb. 20, 1981) (similar).
92 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982); see 12 C.F.R. § 590.3(b) (1984). At least fifteen states
and Puerto Rico have opted out. 1981 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 107, § 2 (effective July 1, 1980);
Act of June 10, 1981, ch. 294, 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 1178 (effective July 1, 1981); Act of
March 29, 1983, § 7, 1983 Ga. Laws 1151-52 (codified at Ga. Code § 7-4-20 (Supp. 1984))
(effective Mar. 31, 1983); Idaho Code § 28-49-105 (Supp. 1984) (effective Mar. 31, 1983);
1980 Iowa Acts 547-48; Act of May 14, 1980, ch. 76, § 1, 1980 Kan. Sess. Laws 387 (effective
May 17, 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. IX-A, § 1-110 (Supp. 1984); 1981 Mass. Acts ch. 231
(effective Sept. 2, 1981); Act of Dec. 31, 1981, ch. 604, § 4, 1980 Minn. Laws 1156 (codified
at Minn. Stat. § 47.203 (Supp. 1984)); 1982 Neb. Laws 623 (effective July 17, 1982); 1981
Nev. Stat. S.B. 101 (effective June 14, 1981); 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 126 (effective Mar.
31, 1983); Act of June 14, 1980, Act 3, § 1, 1980 P.R. Laws 871-72 (effective June 24, 1980);
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implementation and interpretation of section 501."3
II. THE POST-USURY LAW REGULATORY GAP: MORE TRIAL AND
ERROR
Through preemption and substantive rulemaking, federal law
has largely displaced state law as the main guidance for bankers,
builders, and brokers engaged in residential first mortgage transac-
tions. The premise of federal policy is that consumers are best pro-
tected when they are well-informed and the mortgage market is
competitive.
In theory, federal intervention increases market competitiveness
in two ways. First, the federally encouraged secondary market
should give local financial institutions easy access to a national
supply of mortgage money, while permitting new firms to enter the
local market and offer a nationally competitive rate. Second, dis-
closure rules should ensure that consumers have complete informa-
tion about all alternatives, thus enabling them to compare compet-
ing offers. Advertisements indicating finance terms must give the
standardized APR for a home loan for easy comparison during the
shopping process. Upon deciding to buy a specific home, the con-
sumer can also shop for financing. He will receive a Truth-in-
Lending Act statement of the finance charge, a good faith estimate
of closing costs, and a HUD guide explaining closing costs from
each lender to which he submits an application. If the consumer is
interested in an alternative mortgage instrument, the lender must
disclose more detailed information. Armed with information re-
ceived at every point in the shopping process, the decisionmaker
supposedly shops for the optimal mortgage and settlement deal by
comparing alternatives and chooses a mortgage only after he is
persuaded that further search would not be worth the effort. At
settlement, a HUD form maps out the dollars-and-cents details of
the transaction for the homebuyer.
Based on this ideal situation of a competitive market combined
Consumer Protection Code Revision Act of 1982, No. 385, § 1, 1982 S.C. Acts 2289 (effective
June 30, 1982); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 54-3-15 (Supp. 1983); Act of Oct. 31, 1981, ch. 45,
1981 Wis. Laws 571 (effective Nov. 1, 1981).
93 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982). The Board has implemented § 501 through a regula-
tion (12 C.F.R. pt. 590 (1984)), official Board interpretations, and unofficial opinion letters
that the General Counsel issues in response to lender queries. See Burke & Kaplinsky, supra
note 87, at 1079-80.
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with readily available consumer information, an impressive body of
literature suggests that further government intervention is unjusti-
fied."' Professors Schwartz and Wilde, for example, argue that gov-
ernment intervention to increase information is justified only if a
market is noncompetitive. Where there are many active shoppers
for a relatively homogeneous product, the competitive pressures
will generally assure market-efficient prices and practices.9 5 Yet
there is considerable evidence that unfair dealing does occur dur-
ing the home sale and loan transaction.
This Part examines the evidence and suggests an explanation for
the persistence of unfair dealing. First, analysis of the transaction
in light of psychological decisionmaking theory reveals that
homebuyers are often imperfectly informed about mortgages and
related costs, in part due to their own tendency not to shop and
compare deals effectively, and in part due to the role of the sales
process in influencing, and sometimes distorting, consumer choice.
Second, existing disclosure rules do not necessarily ameliorate
these information imperfections because the mortgage-related dis-
closures are usually given to the homebuyer only after the decision
has been made, are sometimes inaccurate, and are often hard to
understand or are otherwise useless. Third, market forces, such as
commercial reputation and the existence of many active shoppers,
afford insufficient protection because sellers and their agents can
profit by segmenting the market. Because of these shopping and
market imperfections, home mortgagors frequently are deceived,
pay excessive mortgage-related charges, or assume excessive risk.9
By analyzing the need for government intervention from the perspective of this mar-
ket-analysis literature, this article does not assume that there are not other justifiable bases
for intervention. See Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769.
,1 Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz
& Wilde, Intervening in Markets]. Professor Eisenberg argues that seller exploitation of the
buyer's distress, transactional incapacity, susceptibility to unfair persuasion, or price-igno-
rance can only occur when the relevant market deviates from perfect competition. Eisen-
berg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1982); see also Crasweil,
Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L.
Rev. 661 (1982) (analyzing tie-ins and their regulation); Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Infor-
mation in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests,
69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983) (analyzing the behavioral consequences of imperfect consumer
information) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information].
"It might be argued that once market imperfections have been identified, then regula-
tory policy ought to attack the structural market problems rather than the imperfect infor-
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A. Structural Information and Shopping Imperfections in the
Integrated Home Sale and Loan Transaction
Systematic study of the home sale and loan transaction is still
rudimentary, and even the leading empirical work is disappointing
in its analytical approach and methodology. Conceding the interim
nature of conclusions based upon such work, it is still possible to
discern some of the structural features of the home sale and loan
transaction. Even this tentative picture of the process and its par-
ticipants suggests inherent problems with relying on existing fed-
eral disclosure rules as the only protection of homebuyers.
Homebuyers often do not approach the mortgage decision ration-
ally; they want to complete the sale quickly, and frequently make
elementary cognitive mistakes in evaluating what little data they
uncover. In addition, the market recognizes and takes advantage of
the inability or unwillingness of many consumers to shop. The
homebuyer is typically educated, not by reading complicated dis-
closures, but by talking to bankers, builders, and bro-
kers-intermediaries who often benefit from giving advice.
1. Homebuyer as Imperfect Shopper and Decisionmaker
A wealth-maximizing decisionmaker searches for information
until the search costs appear to outweigh the benefits. More im-
portant problems require a greater search effort, because the risk
of loss in the event of a suboptimal decision is greater. Most of the
literature on consumer behavior and disclosure rules seems to as-
sume that homebuyers act as rational wealth-maximizers who can
mation. This article's response is that imperfect information itself can create structural mar-
ket problems by allowing sellers profitably to segment less sophisticated consumers in the
market and exploit them. A substantial body of economic literature suggests that the pres-
ence of imperfect information gives firms market power. See, e.g., Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 311 (1970); Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69
J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961). Steve Salop concludes that "if information is costly, each small
firm obtains market power, and the equilibrium (if one exists) is characterized by prices
above competitive levels and sometimes price dispersion as well. The relevant market struc-
ture with imperfect information is not perfect competition but rather monopolistic compe-
tition." Salop, Information and Market Structure: Information and Monopolistic Competi-
tion, 66 Am. Econ. A. Rev. 240, 240 (1976) (emphasis in original); see Satterthwaite,
Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number of Sellers, 10 Bell J.
Econ. 483 (1979); Stuart, Consumer Protection in Markets with Informationally Weak Buy-
ers, 12 Bell J. Econ. 562 (1981).
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be expected to shop vigorously and compare deals. 7 Yet as early as
the 1950's, social scientists found it "surprising how lethargic and
casual" most consumers were in "the hunt" for a home.9 8 In his
study of two high-income Connecticut communities, Professor
Hempel found that about one-third of the homebuyers spent less
than a month actively searching for a home and visited or sought
information about fewer than six homes; almost one-half of the
homebuyers did not shop for a loan.99 Peat Marwick's 1980 report
to HUD on closing costs (the Peat Marwick Study) concluded that
two-thirds of the homebuyers sampled did no shopping for a
'7 Stigler, supra note 96, at 219; see Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note
95, at 1433. Yet empirical studies have shown that consumers often engage in very little
overt search for very expensive products. See, e.g., Katona & Mueller, A Study of Purchase
Decisions, in 1 Consumer Behavior. The Dynamics of Consumer Reaction 30, 56 (L. Clark
ed. 1954) (durable goods); Newman & Staelin, Prepurchase Information Seeking for New
Cars and Major Household Appliances, 9 J. Marketing Research 249 (1972). Economists
have been working to refine the classical model in light of these studies. See, e.g., Beales,
Mazis, Salop & Staelin, Consumer Search and Public Policy, 8 J. Consumer Research 11
(1981).
19 See Norris, Processes and Objectives of House Purchasing in the New London Area, in
1 Consumer Behavior: The Dynamics of Consumer Reaction, supra note 97, at 25; Ray &
Dunn, Local Consumer Information Systems for Services: The Market for Information and
Its Effect on the Market, in The Effect of Information on Consumer and Market Behavior
92, 94 (A. Mitchell ed. 1978) (median number of houses that a homebuyer sees is around
two or three, and many consumers apparently buy first house shown).
" Table 1 in Hempel, Search Behavior and Information Utilization in the Home Buying
Process, in Marketing Involvement in Society and the Economy 241, 243 (P. McDonald ed.
1969) (1969 Fall Conf. Procs. Am. Marketing Ass'n), reveals that 28% of the surveyed
homebuyers spent a month actively searching for a home before signing a purchase agree-
ment, 32% visited only two homes with the intent of considering for purchase, and 46%
contacted, at most, one institutional lender concerning a mortgage loan. Thirty-nine percent
of the sample actively shopped for two to six months before signing purchase agreement,
34% visited three to seven homes with intent of considering for purchase, and 34% con-
tacted two to three lenders. About one-third of the sample shopped quite vigorously. In
another publication based on the same data, Professor Hempel reported that factors reduc-
ing consumer search included not wanting to miss out on a "good value" (48%), expiration
of a lease or sale of home (22%), husband or wife were "busy" and wanted to minimize
search (12%), desire to get settled before baby was born or school started (11%), desire to
stop paying rent and avoid double payments (4%), and others (15%). D. Hempel, The Role
of the Real Estate Broker in the Home Buying Process 35, table 8 (1969). Factors extending
search were inability to find what the family wanted (45%), lack of urgency (11%), need to
find mortgage financing (11%), delay pending change in family situation (10%), inability to
shop intensively for any solid period of time (9%), need to find a buyer for the previous
home (5%), one family member hesitant to buy a home (5%), and others (18%). Id. These
reasons for extending searches suggest that some of the "vigorous" shoppers actually did not
do a thorough job of searching.
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lender and over 80% did no shopping for title insurers or other
providers of closing services.100
Professor Arndt persuasively argues that homebuyers usually do
not engage in wealth-maximizing behavior but, instead, act like
"satisficers." 10 1 They search for alternatives until they find one
that is "good enough," rather than "best," because it satisfies their
threshold needs.0 2 A satisficing strategy involves a more superfi-
cial search for information and less cognitive work than a wealth-
maximization strategy: fewer requirements must be met, fewer al-
ternatives will be canvassed (and will be tested rather haphaz-
ardly), and the testing criteria will be a minimum range of quali-
ties (i.e., a cutoff point rather than a weighted addition of desired
qualities).
Although satisficing uses sensible short-cuts that generally yield
good results for low-cost decisions,103 it may be a poor strategy for
high-cost decisions such as buying and financing a home. A bad
decision made on insufficient information costs the homebuyer
thousands of dollars. Given the high stakes, why do so many con-
sumers fail to shop? Professors Janis and Mann suggest a conflict
model to explain why people act as satisficers instead of maximiz-
ers even when the consequences may be costly.104 The conflict
model asserts that choices create stress within the decisionmaker
and that the greater the perceived potential losses the greater the
100 2 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Real Estate Closing Costs: RESPA § 14a, at XIV.7
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Peat Marwick Study]. This study is the published report of Peat
Marwick's comprehensive investigation of the effectiveness of RESPA, which HUD
commissioned.
101 See J. Arndt, Consumer Search Behavior An Exploratory Study of Decision Processes
Among Newly-Married Home-Buyers 27-28 (1972).
102 Id. Professor Arndt's study of first-time homebuyers in Bergin, Norway found that
about half of the consumers searched for a month or less, relied on word of mouth, and only
inspected one home. Id. at 24-25. The distinction between maximizing and satisficing in
decisionmaking is also discussed in J. March & H. Simon, Organizations (1958); H. Simon,
Models of Man: Social and Rational (1957); Wright, Consumer Choice Strategies: Simplify-
ing vs. Optimizing, 12 J. Marketing Research 60 (1975).
103 Although conceding that decisionmakers are "not always motivated to seek an optimal
choice," Professor Klein argues that satisficing strategies very often produce good decisions.
Klein, Utility and Decision Strategies: A Second Look at the Rational Decision Maker, 31
Organizational Behav. & Hum. Performance 1 (1983).
104 1. Janis & L. Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and
Commitment (1977). For other studies that incorporate conflict theory, see F. Hansen, Con-
sumer Choice Behavior. A Cognitive Theory 145-63 (1972); Bettman, Consumer Information
and Search Strategies, in The Effect of Information on Consumer and Market Behavior,
supra note 98, at 35.
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stress.105 Some perception of risk (thus, stress) is necessary for ef-
fective decisions because this perception creates a condition of
"vigilance."108 Low risk, on the other hand, suggests to the deci-
sionmaker that he need not spend much thought or effort on the
decision, according to the conflict model. A very high degree of risk
(stress), however, can actually disrupt the rational decisionmaking
process.
First, such risk may lead to "defensive avoidance," in which the
decisionmaker becomes frustrated by the stress of what apparently
are a series of costly alternatives that are hard to compare. A de-
fensive avoidance reaction may take one of three forms: "procrasti-
nation," if the decisionmaker thinks the disadvantages of post-
ponement are not great; "shifting responsibility" for the decision
to someone else, if he believes that someone else is more knowl-
edgeable and can be trusted; or "bolstering," simply choosing the
most readily available alternative, if he thinks the disadvantages of
postponement are great and has little confidence that further in-
formation will help him make a better decision.0 7 Second, a high
level of risk may lead to "hypervigilance," in which further infor-
mation may be useful, but the decisionmaker thinks that there is
insufficient time to search for that information and deliberate. 10 8
This perception causes panic, paralyzing the decisionmaker's
search abilities. 09 Again, he chooses the most readily available
alternative."10
This explanation of decisionmaking provided by the conflict
model suggests intuitively appealing reasons why consumers' de-
gree of search activity in looking for homes differs so markedly.
The above-noted studies suggest that the amount of shopping is
I'l See I. Janis & L. Mann, supra note 104, at 45-80.
108 The conflict model specifies four conditions for "vigilant" decisionmaking: (1) aware-
ness of a serious threat, disadvantage, or lost advantage if no action is taken; (2) awareness
of risks if the most obvious action is taken (low confidence that path of least resistance is
the best one); (3) hope that a search for information and advice will lead to a better, or less
risky, escape route (confidence that a satisfactory solution exists and can be discovered);
and (4) belief that there is sufficient time to search and deliberate before any serious threat,
disadvantage, or loss of advantage will materialize (high confidence that a good solution can
be found within the time available). See id. at 62.
:07 Id. at 87.
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usually more a function of people's emotional response than a ra-
tional assessment of the costs and benefits of further search."1
That is, the high stakes and the overwhelming complexity of the
transaction will paralyze many homebuyers' desire to shop for the
best deal. For instance, first-time homebuyers tend to shop for
homes less effectively than more experienced homebuyers because
of excessive stress.
1 12
The conflict model also explains that homebuyers are generally
less inclined to shop for mortgage loans and related expenses be-
cause these decisions are less likely to be made under the ideal
amount of stress.113 Although costly, settlement services are minor
compared to the price of the house. Thus, the consumer will have a
low level of stress and, as a result, less incentive to shop for the
best deal. Even when the buyer has more stress, such as in the loan
decision, bolstering or shifting of responsibility may occur because
the complex factors involved discourage all but the most confident
and knowledgeable shopper from a thorough search. Moreover,
there is a substantial likelihood of some hypervigilance for both
the loan and settlement decisions. Once the homebuyer has signed
the sales contract, there is pressure on him to obtain a loan and
retain settlement providers quickly. In addition, upon making the
big decision of which home to buy, the consumer may want to "get
it over with," by completing the deal; the choice of the home may
have consumed whatever cognitive energy the consumer had.
The conflict model suggests that homebuyers do not always
make the best choices concerning the home, the loan, and the set-
" See D. Hempel, supra note 99, at 37 (homebuyer comments that the search process
was often terminated "to reduce the frustration and anxiety resulting from attempts to rec-
oncile a bewildering array of factors which affect the purchase decision"; the general atti-
tude, "'I'm glad it's over.' ").
12 This fact may explain the difference in shopping found in the Hempel and Arndt
studies. Professor Arndt's sample (half looked at only one home) was young, first-time
homebuyers in Norway, whereas Professor Hempel's sample (two-thirds of the homebuyers
looked at several homes) consisted of persons from an affluent area in Connecticut, who
were more knowledgeable and experienced consumers.
13 For sources empirically supporting this conclusion, see 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra
note 100 (little shopping for closing costs); U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urb. Dev. & Veterans
Admin., Mortgage Settlement Costs (1972), reprinted in Real Estate Settlement Costs, FHA
Mortgage Foreclosures, Housing Abandonment, and Site Selection Policies: Hearings on
H.R. 13337 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 735 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HUDVA Settlement Costs
Study]; Hempel, supra note 99, at 243, 247 (little shopping for loans).
1116 [Vol. 70:1083
HeinOnline  -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  1116 1984
Home Mortgage Rules
tlement services because they may not shop for alternatives. Even
when they do shop, consumers often make poor choices because of
cognitive error in the weighing and evaluation of information.114
One type of cognitive error is that decisionmakers often give too
much weight to "vivid" information (information that is either
presented dramatically or that sparks an emotional response) be-
cause it is more memorable. Because of this "availability heuris-
tic," useful but straightforward and bland information may be
slighted in favor of flashy, emotive information.11 5 This tendency
may skew homebuying and financing decisions because the infor-
mation conveyed in the most dramatic form (advertisements and
sales talk) is usually biased.
Another type of cognitive error is the "representativeness heuris-
tic," in which decisionmakers categorize something based on its
similarity to a scheme or stereotype, thus ignoring the possibility
of random similarity or differences in a particular case."" Thus,
the homebuyer whose friend likes the house that a certain
homebuilder built or who received a low-interest loan from a cer-
tain bank may overgeneralize what could be a random experience
and want to do business with these same firms without a careful
survey of other experiences.
A third cognitive problem is "anchoring," in which the deci-
sionmaker makes an initial judgment based on a single characteris-
tic and then fails to adjust the initial decision to account for other
characteristics.11' " In the home sale and loan transaction, the buyer
114 For the best sources of this genre of psychological decisionmaking literature, see R.
Ni.bett & L. Ross, Human Inferences: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment
(1980); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty. Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci.
1124 (1974), reprinted in Judgment Under Uncertainty- Heuristics and Biases 3 (D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited with page references to the
reprinted article].
I For an excellent discussion of the biases that vivid, or "salient," information creates,
see R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 114, at 45-62.
"6 See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 114, at 17-28, 36-42; Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 114, at 4-11. Experimental results show that most people do, indeed, believe in the
erroneous "law of small numbers"--that a small sample set of the population will yield
representative results. This erroneous belief causes decisionmakers to have unrealistic ex-
pectations about the stability of observed patterns and the replicability of prior beneficial
experiences. See Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 2 Psychologi-
cal Bull. 105 (1971), reprinted in Judgment under Uncertainty. Heuristics and Biases, supra
note 114, at 23.
117 See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 114, at 41-42; Tversky & Kalneman, supra note
114, at 14-18.
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may focus on a vivid feature or a generalization and fail to adjust
the deal's value when he later learns more of its details, such as the
loan terms or settlement costs.
2. The Importance of Intermediaries-The Sales Pitch
An agent or broker is the person who actually sells the house. If
the seller is a large homebuilder, it typically has its own staff to
show potential homebuyers model homes or sample apartments. If
the seller is not a homebuilder, he usually retains a real estate bro-
ker or firm. The broker helps the seller price the house, "lists" the
house (i.e., places a description of it on his own list of homes for
sale and usually on a "multiple listing service" that a pool of bro-
kers use), and shows the house to potential buyers; he also helps
the buyer arrange closing services and financing. When a home is
listed in a multiple listing service, "cooperating brokers" may show
the house to buyers whom they have contacted. 118
Whatever the species, agents have an incentive to shorten
homebuyers' shopping and steer them to particular deals. Agents
are eager to make sales because they typically earn all or most of
their income on a commission basis.119 The "sales pitch" is the tool
agents use to make sales. Honed to a pseudo-science by builders
and brokerage firms to make their agents more effective, the sales
pitch seeks to maximize the prospect that the marginal homebuyer
(the buyer who is likely to buy a competing home or not buy at all)
will promptly purchase one of the houses for which the agent is
responsible.
118 Eighty-one percent of the existing homes sold each year are sold through real estate
brokers operating under exclusive listing contracts, 92% of sales through brokers are listed
on a multiple listing service, and 66% of the broker sales involve cooperating brokers. See 1
FTC Los Angeles Regional Office, The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry 8 (Dec.
1983) [hereinafter cited as FTC Brokers Study].
"' Discussion of the means of compensating sales agents, especially real estate brokers,
can be found in id. at 79-110; 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at 11.6-.14; Garfinkel,
Your Sales Staff Can Be Your Best Asset If You ... 1. Train Salespeople to Hang in There
and Work a Little Harder; 2. Motivate and Compensate Salespeople so They Don't Cop Out
Mentally, Housing, June 1982, at 56-59.
In 1966, three out of four builders used their own staff to sell houses, and 61% of the
builders paid the staff on a pure commission basis. Bureau of Building Marketing Research,
Builder Practices in Selling Single-Family Homes 2 (1966). Today, it appears that fewer
builders pay a straight commission, and many builders pay a salary augmented by a sum
based on sales performance.
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A common and widely publicized technique of home marketing
is "action selling"-continuous controlled interaction between the
agent and the buyer, where the agent is always the initiator, push-
ing the buyer toward a particular sale.120 Once the agent en-
counters a prospective customer,12 1 he determines the buyer's pref-
erences and suggests homes that seem to fit them. 22 If the buyer
seems interested in one of the suggested homes, the agent "in-
volves" the prospect by demonstrating how various features of the
home solve the buyer's problems or advance his goals. During this
time, the prospect is treated as the future owner of the home.
12 3
Once the prospect becomes involved with the recommended home,
the action seller pushes him toward a decision by feeding him jus-
tifications to buy now rather than later. The most common justi-
fier is that "this home is a real bargain that might go away,1 1 24 but
other justifiers appeal to tax advantages of owning a home, possi-
12O "Action selling" is explicated at great length in J. Mills, Action Selling. NAHB's New
Handbook for Salesmen (1975). Other recent expositions along similar lines include Gers,
How to Sell Today's Wary Homebuyer, Housing, Feb. 1981, at 37-45; Jordan, Concrete
Ideas to Sell Houses, Builder, May 1982, at 82, 84; Thagard, How to Sell a House, Builder,
Aug. 1983, at 38-40; Nine Techniques for Winning Sales Game, Prof. Builder, Apartment
Bus., Mar. 1981, at 72.
It is unclear how prevalent action selling is in the day-to-day activities of salespeople and
brokers. It is clear, however, that many (and probably most) of the unusually successful
sales personnel and firms use some variation of the technique. These "successful sellers"
proselytize the technique in trade journal articles, in speeches at professional conventions,
and in lectures at seminars run by firms and trade associations (such as the national and
state associations of Realtors and homebuilders). Finally, homebuilding and brokerage firms
train their personnel in these techniques; indeed, action selling is the subject of a set of
video tapes (starring Jim Mills) that have in the last decade been widely used to train sales
agents.
" See J. Mills, supra note 120, ch. 3, at 47-72 ("Prospecting-or How to Dig Up Your
Own Raw Material"). Mills suggests aggression at every point. For example, in phone and
advertisement prospecting, he urges the use of "power words," words that pack a "wallop."
Id. at 64-67. "Real impact comes when you involve emotions with your words and phrases."
Id. at 65.
'" See Thagard, supra note 120, at 38; see also J. Mills, supra note 120, at 83-84 (the
most persuasive approach to selling homes is to solve the buyer's problems for him); id. at
97-113 ("digging out the buying situation" by a friendly interview to determine most impor-
tant considerations for the particular buyer).
12 Even if the prospects "decide against the lot, by drawing them in as participants in-
stead of treating them as audience you've set them up so their next lot will be seen through
the eyes of potential owners ...." J. Mills, supra note 120, at 140.
M" According to Jim Mills, "A Bargain Justifies Almost Anything: Any purchase seems
justifiable, if it's a wild bargain." Id. at 174 (emphasis in original).
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ble investment value, or the importance of a settled home for the
family.
12 5
The buyer often has reservations about purchasing a home that
the sales agent recommends. Rather than avoiding discussion of
these objections, the action seller seeks them out so that he can
negate them.I2 6 For example, buyers can usually afford higher
monthly payments than their current rental payments because of
the tax deductions for mortgage interest. The agent may answer
other reservations, which point to real trade-offs, more indi-
rectly-by minimizing the importance of the objection, refocusing
the objection to make it answerable, deflecting attention from the
objection with countervailing advantages, or (if all else fails)
resorting to generalities about the importance of owning a home. 27
Despite the agent's justifications, the buyer may hold back. The
action seller then seeks to "pivot" the prospect from involving and
analyzing to buying.1 28 Sometimes the pivot will be a small prelimi-
nary decision (for example, the color scheme of the kitchen) that
can make the buyer feel committed to the ultimate purchase. 2 e
The pivot may also be a summary of the justifications mentioned
earlier, especially the idea that the purchase must be made immne-
diately or the buyer will suffer. Such "urgency pivots" include the
following: "The available interest rate looks like it may go up next
week. Better buy now." Or: "Another buyer is interested in this
125 For these and other justifiers, see id. at 173-89. Among the justifiers used by T. Richey
& Co. of Texas are the following: "Play on the prospective buyer's fear of loss by demon-
strating the expected amount of money that may be lost by waiting until later to buy a
house"; "[e]xplain and clarify tax benefits"; and "show the reluctant buyer how withholding
taxes can be reduced to increase monthly cash flow." Nine Techniques for Winning Sales
Game, supra note 120, at 72.
114 See Thagard, supra note 120, at 40 ("Eliminate the objections, and help the shoppers
make a decision. People avoid decisions just by nature."); see also J. Mills, supra note 120,
ch. 11, at 210-29 ("Defensive Actions"); Ryness, Twelve Marketing Points to Help Sell
Homes, Pac. Coast Builder, Dec. 1980, at 15 (most buyers seek reasons not to go ahead with
a purchase; salesperson's job is to blunt these reasons by systematically eliminating per-
ceived problems).
117 See J. Mills, supra note 120, at 219-27. Jim Mills' basic advice is "to consider NEGA-
TIVES AS POISON IVY-the sooner you can return to a positive environment the better
.... Defend, and then get the hell out of there." Id. at 227.
11 See id. ch. 10, at 200-08 for a comprehensive analysis of the types of "pivots" and their
role in selling homes.
139 See Thagard, supra note 120, at 40 (once salesperson has interested the buyer in a
house, he should try to obtain a money deposit to hold the home open and commit the
buyer to the decision).
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one-of-a-kind home. If she makes a deal, all our effort will be
wasted. Better move fast."130
The sales pitch often helps orient the homebuyer to the many
factors involved in the purchase of a home and conveys useful in-
formation. On the other hand, it is also calculated to short circuit
the process of rational decisionmaking by engaging the buyer's
emotions (to stimulate faulty cognitive evaluations) and by de-em-
phasizing the need to shop and compare.13 1 For example, a primary
purpose of action selling is to convey vivid information that makes
the home appear to be an attractive deal. The most vivid charac-
teristics of the house may be the kitchen, the low-rate financing,
and the energy-saving insulation package. Less vivid trade-offs and
disadvantages will then be less important in the buyer's evaluation
of the home. The buyer might even anchor his decision to the fea-
tures the sales agent emphasizes, without sufficiently adjusting for
other important considerations, such as the high-risk mortgage
needed to finance the house. If the consumer is concerned about
the terms of the mortgage packaged with the home, the agent can
reassure him through the representativeness heuristic: other
homebuyers have found that the risky mortgage works fine.
The sales pitch also seeks to minimize or eliminate homebuyer
shopping that would reveal comparable or better deals. It creates
conditions for bolstering by giving the homebuyer the impression
that further shopping would not be useful. It creates conditions for
hypervigilance by stressing urgency items and conditions for shift-
ing responsibility by giving the buyer the impression that the
agent is an expert on the complex process of home buying.
This phenomenon of the agent's befriending and counseling the
homebuyer is the most significant.13 2 The agent may seriously mis-
lead the buyer, who may not be aware of the agent's duties and
motives (a "hidden agenda"). When a cooperating broker shows
the buyer a home advertised on a multiple listing service, for ex-
1SO The pivots in text are adopted from Seven Urgency Items to Weave Into Every Sales
Presentation, Housing, June 1982, at 60; see Gers, supra note 120, at 40-41 ("create ur-
gency" for the homebuyer by offering bargains, fostering fears of loss due to inflation in
sales prices or interest rates, and building a "buy now" psychology).
131 See, e.g., B. Napier, How to Show and Tell to Up the Selh A Guide for Home Builders,
Real Estate People and Bankers 21 (1979) ("Tip 7. People Buy Emotionally, Then Justify
Purchases Rationally").
13 See Home Builder, A Good Friend In Today's Mortgage Market, Home Builder News,
Oct. 1983, at 8.
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ample, the buyer becomes aware that there is another broker-the
"listing broker"-who represents the seller and splits his commis-
sion with the cooperating agent. Because the cooperating broker
has been so helpful, the buyer naturally believes that the broker is
his agent and is thus representing his interests.133 This conclusion
is not necessarily correct. Many multiple listing services contem-
plate that the cooperating broker will be the subagent (for the
seller) of the listing broker."' The law in many states is quite am-
biguous about when, if ever, the cooperating broker represents the
buyer.13 5 Functionally, the cooperating broker sees his job as put-
ting together a deal, not necessarily representing the buyer's
interests.
13 6
The homebuyer is even more likely to shift responsibility for the
loan decision to the agent. The homebuyer is usually under pres-
133 See Levine, Does the Home Buyer Need His Own Broker?, Real Est. Rev., Spring
1983, at 98, 99. But see Adler, Disclosure and the Buyer-Broker Relationship, Real Est.
Rev., Winter 1982, at 94, 99 (buyers realize that brokers are self-interested and so discount
the sales pitch). The FTC Brokers Study reports that 72% of the surveyed buyers believed
that the cooperating broker "represented" them (31% believed this even when the listing
broker sold the home), 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 69, and therefore told the
broker the highest price they would pay (assuming that the information would remain confi-
dential). Id. at 78. Four-fifths of the buyers said that the cooperating broker played a major
role in negotiating the price on their behalf. Id. at 183. Sellers are also confused by the
broker's ambiguous role. See id. at 78-79 (62% of buyers were told by brokers how low the
seller was willing to go). The FTC Brokers Study concluded, however, that buyers are more
seriously underrepresented in the process. Id. at 186-88.
13" According to 1 H. Miller & M. Starr, Current Law of California Real Estate § 4.8, at
18-19 (1975),
[t]he standard form multiple listing agreement expressly authorizes the listing broker
to seek the aid of cooperating brokers ... [and] expressly authorizes the service or
its members to act as sub-agents in procuring a purchaser in accordance with the
terms of the listing. The result of this express authorization is that a cooperating
broker becomes the agent of the listing seller for the purpose of imposing on the
cooperating broker the fiduciary duties generally owed by an agent to his principal.
Accord Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 300 P.2d 855 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Frisell v.
Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Comment, Real Estate Brokers' Duties to
Prospective Purchasers, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 513 (1976); Comment, A Reexamination of the
Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1343, 1353 (1972).
13' See infra note 356. The FTC Brokers Study notes the modem industry view that coop-
erating brokers are agents of the seller, but points out that most buyers believe cooperating
brokers represent them and that many brokers see themselves representing both buyer and
seller in transactions. 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 182-84.
136 See 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 193-94 (because they are paid on a con-
tingency basis, some brokers view negotiation more in terms of closing the transaction,
rather than representing a client).
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sure to obtain financing immediately, is inexperienced in dealing
with mortgage lenders, and is bewildered by the array of loan
choices. Because the agent has already revealed his expertise in fi-
nancing options (an integral part of the sales pitch), the buyer will
often welcome or seek the agent's advice on which lender to use.
1 37
Similarly, the homebuyer will be inclined to shift responsibility
to the agent or the lender for decisions relating to settlement ser-
vices because of their complexity, their comparatively small cost,
and the pressure induced by the lender's limited time commitment
to make the loan." 8 Sometimes the lender will all but dictate the
settlement services by requiring them to meet its standards of
quality.13 9 If the lender requires mortgage insurance on a conven-
tional mortgage loan, it typically retains a mortgage insurer when
the loan application is submitted, without even consulting the
borrower.
In shifting responsibility for loan and closing cost decisions to
the sales agent or the lender, the homebuyer is giving the decisions
to people who may not care about price or future risks. Indeed, the
referring intermediaries often have a hidden agenda of incentives
to refer the homebuyer to second-best providers-either because
the providers pay them, provide them with services, or have ongo-
ing business connections with the intermediaries.1 4 0
237 The Hempel Study found that 46% of the buyers relied on real estate brokers or
builders in deciding where to apply for a mortgage loan; 31% of the buyers also relied on
brokers and builders for advice about the terms and conditions of the loan. Hempel, supra
note 99, at 247, table 3.
The Peat Marwick Study suggests that one-third of all homebuyers today do no shopping
and simply use the lender that the agent recommends. Peat Marwick found that in the eight
metropolitan areas surveyed (Boston, Denver, D.C., Jacksonville, Los Angeles, San Antonio,
St. Louis, and Seattle), 65% of the surveyed homebuyers did not shop at all for a lender, of
this group of nonshoppers, 40% selected the lender a real estate broker recommended, and
11.5% used a lender the seller or homebuilder specified. 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note
100, at X.14, .31.
I" See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at VIII.2 (complexity and time constaints
lead consumers to depend on others to arrange for settlement services).
"I' Peat Marwick found that 24.3% of the surveyed borrowers were required to use one or
more service providers-especially title insurers (in 72.4% of the cases), escrow agents
(53.5%), attorneys (44.5%), and surveyors (43.2%). Id. at X.48, exhibit X-16. Lenders af-
firmatively recommended providers to 24.4% of the surveyed borrowers-mainly title insur-
ers (73.0% of the cases), escrow agents (58.2%), mortgage insurers (54.2%), surveyors
(33.8%), and attorneys (33.1%). Id. at X.49, exhibit X-17.
10 See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act-Controlled Business: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
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3. The Formally Integrated Transaction
The "functionally integrated" transaction, where the builder or
broker selling the home refers the homebuyer to sources of financ-
ing and settlement services, makes it easier for consumers to buy
homes but also has the effect of discouraging shopping. Large
homebuilders and a few brokerage firms have carried this process
one step further by creating a "formally integrated" transaction for
the buyer. In the formally integrated transaction, the firm controls
the loan and settlement decisions and may use this control as an
important part of the sales pitch. Chart 1 sets forth the integrated
transaction as structured by many of the large builders.
Once the buyer contracts to purchase one of the homes the
builder offers, the agent will direct the buyer to the offices of an
allied lender, often a wholly-owned subsidiary of the builder.
142
The lender will offer a range of standard and alternative mortgage
instruments, some of which are specially designed to qualify
nance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (lender or broker referrals to their
"controlled" title companies may contribute to higher prices) [hereinafter cited as 1981
RESPA Hearings]; Breckenfeld, supra note 12 (builder-controlled mortgage companies ac-
counted for almost all of builders' profits in 1981).
141 For glimpses of the formally integrated transaction, see Breckenfeld, supra note 12
(role of builder-owned mortgage subsidiaries); Hale, Buying Down Interest Rates: New
Form of Typical Financing?, Real Est. Appraiser & Analyst, Summer 1983, at 21-23. Noth-
ing in the extensive real estate/builder literature, however, has investigated this important
marketing innovation. My research assistant, Kurt Giesler, and I therefore conducted a tele-
phone survey of the organization and marketing practices of the 10 largest homebuilders
and an in-depth study of one of the builders. W. Eskridge & K. Giesler, Survey of
Homebuilders (1984) (unpublished survey) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Asso-
ciation). The study found that all of the nation's largest homebuilders maintain mortgage
subsidiaries and an overwhelming majority of new homebuyers obtain financing from these
affiliated lenders. At least one firm simply refuses so-called "outside financing." The others,
on a local or regional basis, may refer prospective buyers to two or three selected alternative
lenders. In either case, financing alternatives remain closely tied to sales efforts: affiliated
and allied lenders provide virtually all mortgage financing in sales by large builders. Settle-
ment services are integrated in turn by the lenders. The homebuyer who enters a sales office
and finds ready financing next enters the mortgage company office to find title and mort-
gage insurance, legal services, taxes, and escrows conveniently prearranged. Comparison
shopping for some services is permitted in theory, but most new home buyers are, in prac-
tice, led through a standardized closing with a set cast of characters. First-time buyers are
especially likely to assume essentially passive roles in the settlement process.
142 See Breckenfeld, supra note 12, at 122 (at least 26 large homebuilders have their own
mortgage subsidiaries); see also H. Hoagland & L. Stone, supra note 11, at 437-38 (in many
instances, the financial institution making the loans for construction also does the final
mortgage financing).
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CHART 1
The Formally Integrated Homebuying Process
Seller prices home based upon
costs (lot, house, points, clos-
ing expenses, and profit) and
adjusted for comparable
homes
Allied lender offers varied
loan packages, making it
easier for buyer to qualify
'I
Allied lender has standing
agreement with title and
mortgage insurers to handle
all settlements
Seller advertises home, citing
-- low interest financing, easy
qualifying for loans, no clos-
ing costs
Advertisements attract buyers
to home, where sales agent
gives sales pitch and in-
troduces buyer to financing
options I
Buyer decides to purchase the
home package and signs sales
contract
.-- Sales agent sends buyer to
allied lender to apply for loan
--- Settlement
Proceeds paid Allied lender Good title
to seller receives note passes to buyer
4. 1-Seller reimburses allied-------* Allied lender sells
lender for points and note at a discount
closing costs
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"borderline" buyers to purchase homes. Employees of the allied
lender, or a firm with which it has an established relationship, will
conduct settlement. The allied lender receives the mortgage note
bearing the below-market interest rate that the builder advertised.
Soon after settlement, the allied lender will sell the note at a dis-
count pursuant to a prearranged commitment with a buyer on the
secondary mortgage market. The builder, which has received the
proceeds of the home sale, will pay the allied lender a specified
number of points to reimburse it for making the below-market loan
and will reimburse the allied lender for settlement costs.
This strategy has become popular because builders realize that
buyers are more concerned about high interest rates and their abil-
ity to qualify for loans. A formally integrated transaction can allay
these concerns by offering a package deal offering a below-market
interest rate and easy qualification criteria, made possible through
GPMs or ARMs with low initial rates. To the extent that buyers
are also concerned about being able to afford both a downpayment
and closing costs, the builder might arrange for settlement and
even pay most of the expenses.14
This package deal often becomes a critical part of the builder's
marketing campaign. Advertisements stress low-rate financing
terms and reduced closing costs. The sales pitch further stresses
that the integrated transaction is effortless because all the deci-
sions have been made for the buyer and that the great financing
deal enables the buyer to qualify for a better home. Indeed, the
agent may be able to anchor the buyer's attention onto the financ-
ing and settlement terms, using them to bolster the buyer's origi-
nal attraction to the deal and to answer objections.
Like the sales pitch and functional integration, the formally in-
tegrated transaction is a market response to consumer desires to
make homebuying easier. The trade-off is that shopping is cur-
tailed and rational decisionmaking made more difficult. Builders
dispute this conclusion by arguing that shopping is now concen-
trated up front: the decision to buy a home explicitly includes clos-
'" Thus, in 1982, when demand was depressed, one survey found that 60% of the
homebuilders bought down interest rates, 55% paid buyer's points, and 44% paid buyer's
closing costs (except for taxes and prepaid escrow items). Marketing Strategies to Sell
Homes, supra note 76, at 2; see "What's Working?" Builder Success Stories, The NAHB
News, May 17, 1982, at 7.
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ing cost and financing considerations. 14 This argument, however,
suggests a further problem. Homebuyers often cannot understand
low-rate financing and closing cost deals because the builder has
factored the points and closing costs it pays back into the price of
the house.
Pricing a house, like the sales pitch, has been systematized by
many homebuilders, especially the larger ones. Each model the
builder offers is priced by adding up its costs-the lot, the struc-
ture, area preparation costs, profit, and anticipated closing costs
and points-and then adjusting the cost-plus price to fit the mar-
ket (increasing the price if the market is booming, lowering it in
periods of low demand).1 15 Customers typically do not understand
whether or how much the cost of closing costs and points bleeds
back into the home price.
The functionally or formally integrated home sale and loan
transaction encompasses all homebuying decisions, from house
shopping through closing. Marketed through a powerful sales pitch
as a convenient, no-hassle package, the integrated transaction can
cause consumers to truncate their shopping and distort their infor-
14 Cf. Leichey, Here's How Home Manufacturers Can Establish Own Finance Compa-
nies, Automation in Housing and Manufactured Home Dealer, Oct. 1983, at 22. Most build-
ers consider their involvement in the financing and settlement aspects of home sales inci-
dental to their primary objective of moving inventory. See W. Eskridge & K. Giesler, supra
note 141. Integration of the overall transaction is described as an efficient means of expedit-
ing home sales for the following reasons: (1) like builders, buyers consider financing and
settlement incidental to purchase, and they seek out vendors offering no-fuss packages; (2)
builders can comparison shop for these incidentals more effectively than most homebuyers
and can therefore offer a package worth more than the sum of its parts; and (3) integration
permits builders to qualify marginal borrowers for loans and to react flexibly in various
markets to changes in interest rates.
Some builders' marketing strategies specifically emphasize the integrated character of the
transaction. Most claim, however, to concentrate their efforts on matching buyers to homes
and to developing and employing expertise in finance and settlement matters only to the
extent necessary to consummate sales.
145 In the 1950's, development companies priced lots they sold based upon the costs of
land, overhead, and advertising. See H. Hoagland & L. Stone, supra note 11, at 439-40.
Builders in the 1970's have become even more rigidly tied to cost-plus pricing. See L.
Grebler & F. Mittelbach, The Inflation of House Prices: Its Extent, Causes and Conse-
quences 61 (1979). If as a matter of marketing strategy, the builder decides to pay points or
closing costs, they become a cost of doing business and part of overhead (or a separate line
for marketing costs). If, on the other hand, the builder pays points to rid itself of excess
inventory on an ad hoc basis, the points may then just be one-time expenses not considered
in pricing. See Hale, supra note 141, at 26. Under either approach, the home price will
remain subject to competitive pressures.
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mation processing. Ironically, it is these very activities that federal
disclosure laws are designed to encourage.
B. The Inadequacy of Federal Disclosure Rules to Correct
Information Imperfections
The tendency 'of the marketing process to discourage or distort
homebuyers' shopping is cause for concern because it creates infor-
mation imperfections and, therefore, opportunities for sophisti-
cated intermediaries to take advantage of homebuyers. The pur-
pose of federal disclosures is to reduce these opportunities and to
stimulate shopping and efficient decisionmaking. Usually, however,
the disclosures fail to accomplish these purposes because the
homebuyers receive them after they have reached a decision, and
because these disclosures are sometimes inaccurate, misleading, or
hard to use and understand.
1 4 6
1. Disclosure: Too Late
A central flaw is that the rules generally do not require disclos-
ure until the homebuyer applies for a mortgage loan.147 Yet the
effective decisionmaking period is usually before the application is
146 Several early empirical studies concluded that the Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures
did make consumers somewhat more aware of the cost of credit, but that "the improved
knowledge of credit rates and charges that could reasonably be attributed to TIL had rela-
tively little effect on credit search and usage behavior." Day & Brandt, Consumer Research
and the Evaluation of Information Disclosure Requirements: The Case of Truth in Lending,
1 J. Consumer Research 21, 31 (1974); see Brandt, Day & Deutscher, Information Disclosure
and Consumer Credit Knowledge: A Longitudinal Analysis, 9 J. Consumer Aff. 15 (1975);
Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the Effi-
cacy of the Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. Fin. 1143, 1148 (1971).
147 The Truth-in-Lending Act originally required that disclosure be made "before the
credit is extended," Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 128(b), 82 Stat. 146, 155 (1968), which permitted
lenders to provide the disclosures to homebuyers at settlement-the very point when the
homebuyer is likely not to read the disclosures carefully-supposedly because there is sim-
ply no time to do so earlier. The Simplification Act coordinated the Truth-in-Lending Act
requirements with the timing of RESPA disclosures. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2) (1982); see 24
C.F.R. §§ 3500.6-.7 (1984). For residential mortgage loans also subject to RESPA, "good
faith estimates" of Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures must be made to the mortgagor within
three days of his application. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a) (1984).
Federal agency regulations concerning alternative mortgage instruments require that the
requisite disclosures be made no "later than three business days following receipt of an
application," id. § 545.33(f) (FHLBB), or on the earlier of the date on which the bank first
provides written information concerning alternative mortgage loans or provides a loan appli-
cation to the prospective borrower. Id. § 29.7(a) (Comptroller General).
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made. The sales pitch is designed to focus the buyer's attention on
the special deal that the agent offers and to discourage the buyer
from comparing different lenders. Once a decision is made, even if
tentative, the theory of "cognitive dissonance" posits that the
buyer views subsequent data as supportive of the decision: he will
seek out and emphasize positive data, while ignoring or denigrating
negative data.148 Thus, a homeowner will tend to consider himself
committed to his decision by the time he submits a loan applica-
tion, and subsequent disclosures will have a minimal impact.14 9
Another reason disclosures do not necessarily encourage shop-
ping is that they do not yield comparative data. The homebuyer
will generally submit an application to just one lender because the
application process is troublesome and because most lenders
charge a nonrefundable application fee of several hundred dol-
lars. 50 With only one application submitted, there is only one set
of Truth-in-Lending, RESPA, or alternative mortgage disclosures,
and thus little basis for comparison shopping. In the formally inte-
grated transaction, there may be official barriers to comparison
shopping. The broker or builder may simply inform the homebuyer
140 The original theory of "cognitive dissonance" posited that decisionmakers confronted
with conflicting data will weigh alternatives and gather information before making a deci-
sion, but that once the decision is made the decisionmaker will attempt to reduce "disso-
nance" by justifying the decision and ignoring or denigrating contrary data and alternative
choices. See L. Festinger, Conflict, Decision and Dissonance (1964).
Later studies reject Festinger's distinction between predecisional and postdecisional cog-
nitive processes and argue that it is the pattern of coping rather than the stage of decision
process that is the crucial factor determining receptiveness to information and lack of bias
in evaluating that information. See I. Janis & L. Mann, supra note 104, at 171-72, 212-14.
Professors Janis and Mann, for example, divide the decisional process into five stages: (1)
appraising the challenge, (2) surveying alternatives, (3) weighing alternatives, (4) deliberat-
ing about commitment, and (5) adhering to the initial choice despite negative feedback.
They point out that suboptimal operation will occur long before commitment if the condi-
tions for defensive avoidance or hypervigilance are present. They do concede, however, that
the decisionmaker's pattern of coping will often change from vigilance to defensive avoid-
ance as he moves from stage three to stage four because the decisionmaker has formed the
tentative opinion that he will not find a better solution, and in stage four there will often be
a temporary period of selective exposure to information that bolsters the favored alterna-
tive. Id. at 213-14.
14 See White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of
New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 1207, 1210, 1239 (1971).
1 8 See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at 1H.12 (more than 60% of the lenders
surveyed required nonrefundable prepayment for credit report and appraisal at the time
loan application is submitted).
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which lender and title company should be used,1"' and the
homebuyer is likely to defer to that fiat.
2. Disclosure: Misleading
The most common disclosure made during the sales process is
the APR. Yet the applicable federal regulations permit sellers and
their agents to use APR or effective interest rate figures that se-
verely understate or deflect attention from the true costs of credit.
The Truth-in-Lending Act "finance charge" (the basis for deter-
mining the APR) does not include many expenses the homebuyer
incurs to induce the lender to make the mortgage loan. Thus, al-
though premiums for lender-required mortgage payment protec-
tion, mortgagor life/accident/health insurance, and property dam-
age/liability insurance are included in the finance charge,
premiums for title insurance, which lenders also require, are not.15 2
Attorneys' fees, notary charges, appraisal fees, and charges for
credit reports are also excluded, even though the lender would not
make the mortgage loan if the buyer did not agree to pay these
expenses.15s There is no functional difference among these charges
to justify excluding some of them from the finance charge; the rea-
son for the exclusions is largely historical and political. These ex-
clusions created the need for RESPA-a separate and somewhat
duplicative disclosure regime. As a result of these exclusions, the
APR is not only unrealistic but may be misleading, because sellers
and lenders have perverse incentives to keep the advertised APR
low, while charging higher prices for homes or settlement services.
The exclusion of seller's points from the finance charge is sub-
1"1 Although RESPA § 9, 12 U.S.C. § 2608(a) (1982), forbids sellers from requiring the
buyer to use any particular title insurer, the seller's allied lender can achieve the same re-
sult. See Ford & Allison, The Impact of Title Insurance and Controlled Business on the
S&L Industry, Fed. Home Loan Bank Board J., June 1981, at 2, 5 (lenders sometimes
charge review fee if the homebuyer does not use the title company it suggested). Some lend-
ers charge a review fee of several hundred dollars if the borrower does not use the attorney
it suggests, which also effectively forecloses buyer shopping.
'2' Compare 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(7)-(8), (d) (1984) (finance charge includes premiums for
credit life, accident, health, loss-of-income, property damage, or liability insurance, unless
certain consumer protections are assured) with id. § 226.4(c)(7)(i) (in residential mortgage
transactions, however, finance charge does not include title insurance).
'13 Compare id. § 226.4(b)(4) (finance charge generally includes appraisal, investigation,
and credit report fees) with id. §§ 226.4(c)(7)(ii)-(iii) (in residential mortgage transactions,
finance charge does not include document preparation, notary, appraisal, credit report fees).
1130 [Vol. 70:1083
HeinOnline  -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  1130 1984
1984] Home Mortgage Rules 1131
ject to the greatest manipulation.15 4 These points are excluded
even though buyer's points are included and the buyer is usually
indirectly paying most or all of the seller's points through a higher
home price. The original position of Regulation Z was that dis-
count or seller's points were to be included in the finance charge to
the extent that they were passed on to the buyer in the form of a
higher home price.1 55 The Federal Reserve Board revised the Regu-
lation in 1981 to exclude seller's points from the finance charge,156
on the ground that it is hard (if not impossible) for lenders to de-
termine whether the seller actually increased the sales price.
157
Similar arguments were successfully made by lenders and trade as-
sociations when the Board's staff recommended changing the rule
in 1982.158
Nevertheless, the difficulty of administration argument is unper-
suasive. If the earlier "soft" rule was difficult to administer, the
Board should have created a "hard" rule that seller's points are
part of the finance charge, regardless of whether they are passed
on to the buyer. Such a rule better fits the marketplace reality that
some or all of the points are passed on, and comports with the
Compare id. § 226.4(b)(3) (finance charge generally includes "points") with id.
§ 226.4(c)(5) (finance charge excludes "seller's points").
155 35 Fed. Reg. 17,029 (1970) (formerly codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.406(b) (1980)).
s 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(5) (1982) ("Charges excluded from the finance charge" include
"Seller's points"); see id. pt. 226, Supp. I-Official Staff Interpretations, Comment 17(c)(1)-3
(examples of third party buydowns). New Part 226 was promulgated after enactment of the
Simplification Act, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848, 20,892 (1981), but compliance with the new regula-
tions was optional until April 1, 1982 (later extended to Oct. 1, 1982).
157 See 47 Fed. Reg. 32,433, 32,433-34 (1982); FTC, Memorandum and Consumer Fact
Sheet (Mar. 17, 1983), reprinted in 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 96,752 (Mar. 31, 1983);
Schlar, From the Administrative Agencies: Disclosures to Home Buyers in "Creative Financ-
ing" Situations-The FRB Backs Down, 11 Real Est. L.J. 349, 353 (1983).
15 In response to criticisms of the new rule, the Board proposed two different types of
amendments in 1982. See 47 Fed. Reg. 32,433, 32,433-36 (1982). The first alternative would
have removed the exclusion and stipulated that seller's points are finance charges if (and
only to the extent that) they are passed on only to buyers taking advantage of a financing
arrangement. If the lender were unsure whether seller's points were being passed on (or the
amount), it could include all or any part of them in the APR. Id. at 32,437-39 (proposing
deletion of 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(5)). The second alternative would have required disclosure
in statements and advertisements of these facts: (1) that the seller has paid money to obtain
the financing, (2) the amount paid by the seller, and (3) that the APR understates the cost
of credit to the extent that the seller's payment is passed on in the form of a higher sales
price. Id. at 32,439-41 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(a)(1) n.38, .18(s), .24(b)-(c)).
Although the Board rejected both alternatives after adverse industry comment, 47 Fed. Reg.
44,742 (1982), either would be preferable to the existing regulation.
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language of the Truth-in-Lending Act, which says that discounts
and points are to be added to the finance charge. 159
Finally, current disclosure regulations enable sellers and their
agents to advertise initial interest rates, called "teaser rates," that
are substantially less than the rates that will prevail for most of
the loans' lives. Teaser rates are sometimes used with fixed-rate
mortgages (usually as the result of partial seller buydowns), but
they are particularly troublesome with mortgage instruments
whose future interest rate is indeterminate (ARMs). For these
mortgages, Regulation Z permits advertisement of an initially low
"effective rate" that enables buyers to qualify for loans, if the APR
is also disclosed and the advertisement shows the limited term to
which the rate applies.160 The APR for an ARM is a composite of
the initial rate and the future rate under the applicable adjustable
index. Because no one knows what the level of the index will be in
the future, the present index level is used."' It is hard to see how
this procedure will educate homebuyers, for neither of the rates
that may be advertised is the "real" rate. The effective rate is an
artificially low hook used to attract the buyer's attention or to en-
able marginal buyers to qualify for loans, and the APR is a hypo-
thetical blend of the present rate and what the future rate would
be if the future resembled the present.
-59 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982) (finance charge includes "any amount payable under a
point, discount, or other system of additional charges"); see infra note 167 (most or all sell-
ers' points are passed on to buyers in the form of higher home prices). There is also substan-
tial case law involving health spa and other tied financing plans suggesting that disclosure is
compelled when notes are sold at a "discount" to the ultimate lender pursuant to prear-
ranged commitments-similar to the arrangement in the wholly integrated home transac-
tion. See Yazzie v. Reynolds, 623 F.2d 638 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980);
Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 93-94 (8th Cir. 1976); Kriger v. Euro-
pean Health Spa, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health
Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d 915, 926-27, 528 P.2d 357, 364-65, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541, 548-49 (1974).
Other courts have declined to apply the Joseph-Kriger line of cases when a large number of
customers of the seller bought with cash. In these circumstances, the discount fees were
generally absorbed in the seller's overhead and not specifically built into the price. See Jen-
nings v. Edwards, 454 F. Supp. 770, 777 (M.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.
1979); Manzina v. Publishers Guild, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
260 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.24(b) (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 13,482, 13,484, 13,1486 (Apr. 5, 1984) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I-Official Staff Interpretations, Comment 24(b)-5).
161 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I-Official Staff Interpretations, Comment 22(a)(1)-4
(1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 13,482, 13,485 (Apr. 5, 1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp.
I-Official Staff Interpretations, Comment 18(f)-8); Anderson & Bowman, Does Your Ad-
vertising Pass Truth-in-Lending Test?, Real Est. Rev., Spring 1983, at 92-95.
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3. Disclosure: Too Much
Critics have complained that Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures
overwhelm consumers with complicated forms and too much infor-
mation, thus discouraging them from shopping.162 Consumers have
a limited ability to absorb and process information during any
given period. If they receive too much, they either will be unable to
make accurate comparisons or will be discouraged from even trying
to evaluate the data.163 Some psychological studies suggest that the
processing capacity of short term memory is five to seven "chunks"
of information-beyond that, processing problems occur." ' These
"information overload" studies may not represent the final word
on the subject, but there is substantial agreement that deci-
sionmakers cannot effectively process numerous chunks of infor-
mation. Even after the Simplification Act, which was meant to re-
duce information overload, the proliferation of disclosure rules
threatens the goals of federal regulation by overwhelming the
homebuyer with information.
The Truth-in-Lending Act form may be simpler, but it still dis-
closes more than ten items of information, and these disclosures
are in addition to those required by RESPA. There are even more
disclosures for a homebuyer applying to a savings and loan for an
ARM. Apart from the APR and RESPA disclosures, the
homebuyer will receive more than ten facts and several compli-
cated explanations that must be disclosed pursuant to FHLBB
regulations.16 5 The size and complexity of these disclosures will in-
'62 See, e.g., Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 841,
843-44 (1977) (consumers intimidated by excessive Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures);
Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 711, 721-
34 (1979) (Truth-in-Lending disclosures all but impenetrable for typical consumer).
16 See J. Bettman, An Information Processing Theory of Consumer Choice (1979);
Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. Consumer Research 419
(1982).
'6 Compare Simon, How Big is a Chunk?, 183 Sci. 482 (1974) (chunk capacity of short
term memory is five to seven), with Broadbent, The Magic Number Seven After Fifteen
Years, in Studies in Long Term Memory 1-18 (A. Kennedy & A. Wilkes eds. 1975) (magic
number may be as low as three or four); Malhotra, supra note 163, at 427-28 (dysfunctional
effects of information overload if respondents provided with 10 or more alternatives in the
choice set or with information on 15 or more attributes).
16 FHLBB regulations require that the following facts be disclosed:
-the term of the contract;
-the initial interest rate (if known);
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timidate the average homebuyer, who will either not read the dis-
closures carefully or will read them only with guidance from an
intermediary.
In a sense, this confusion is not the fault of disclosure rules, for
they simply mirror the complexity of the choices. If a homebuyer
really does want to compare various ARMs, for example, he must
know the initial (qualifying) rate and how long that rate will re-
main; the index used to adjust the rate and the margin above the
index at which the new rate is set; how often the lender can adjust
the rate or monthly payment in response to index changes; the
loan-to-value ratio and mortgage insurance costs; the number of
points and any caps on how much rates or payments can go up
each year or over the life of the loan; prepayment penalties; delin-
quency and default charges; and property, life, or health insurance
requirements.
The desire for disclosure rules that foster rational decisionmak-
ing thus creates a seemingly insurmountable dilemma: complete
disclosure will be hard to use, if not utterly paralyzing, but frag-
mentary disclosure (as in the case of seller's points) creates oppor-
tunities for sellers or lenders to present misleading "bargains." A
second problem is that little if any of the disclosed information is
psychologically meaningful to the homebuyer. For example, the
-the amount of the initial payment (if known);
-an explanation of how the lender establishes the amortization schedule for the
loan;
-a full explanation of how the interest rate, the payment, the loan balance, or the
term to maturity may be adjusted, including identification of the index to be used
and the effect the adjustment of one item may have on the others;
-information to be contained in each notice of an adjustment and how far in ad-
vance that notice will be provided;
-a description of all contractual contingencies under which the loan may become
due or that may result in a forced sale of the home;
-if the loan is a partially or a nonamortized loan, a statement that a large payment
will be due at maturity and that the lender is under no obligation to refinance the
loan;
-a description of any prepayment penalty and escrow payments the contract re-
quires; and
-an example of the interaction of all variable features of the loan over a period of
time.
12 C.F.R. § 545.33(f) (1984). The Comptroller General requires banks to make similarly
detailed disclosures. Id. § 29.7. Note that the FHLBB and Comptroller General disclosure
rules are deemed to be substitutes for the special Truth-in-Lending Act requirements for
VRMs. Id. § 226.18(f) & n.43.
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FHLBB requires the presentation of a hypothetical situation show-
ing how the variable features of the loan might interact, but lend-
ers usually present "safe" scenarios in which interest rates fluctu-
ate without major consequence. Thus, nothing concretely reveals
the main risks; nothing counteracts the vivid portrait of the advan-
tages of buying that is painted during the sales process.
C. Market Forces Do Not Solve Specific Mortgage Loan
Problems
Many homebuyers make purchase and financing decisions based
on imperfect information. Current disclosures do little to rectify
this problem and may even exacerbate it by providing misleading
information that brokers can use during the sales process to anchor
consumer decisionmaking to an unrealistically low APR or effec-
tive interest rate. Thus, homebuyers are sometimes misled, pay ex-
cessive prices for the loan or settlement services, or take on too
much risk. Market incentives to offer consumers good deals are
weak because the market for loans and closing services is linked to
the home sale market. Moreover, the market is not perfectly re-
sponsive to competitive pressures because of the cooperative be-
havior of intermediaries and the failure of consumers to shop
carefully.
1. Misleading Apparent Bargains: "Free" Closing Costs and
Rate Buydowns
The homebuyer family reads the following ad: "TRUE VALUE
HOMES-FINANCING THREE PERCENT BELOW MARKET
(APR 11.25%). WE PAY CLOSING COSTS!!!!" The homebuyers
go to see a True Value model home and encounter a salesperson,
who emphasizes the low-rate loan available through True Value Fi-
nancing Co. and the minimal up front cash the homebuyers will
need to buy. The "easy terms" package impresses the homebuyers,
who say that they will think over this bargain. "Great," says the
agent, "but you'd better not dawdle because the builder won't be
offering the closing costs bargain much longer. And because federal
deficits might force interest rates up again, 11.25% financing may
be discontinued." The homebuyers sign a sales contract the next
week.
This strategy, where the homebuilder uses the finance and set-
19841 1135
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tlement terms as an integral part of its sales effort, is common.166
Sellers engage the potential homebuyer's attention through offer-
ing an apparent bargain interest rate and "free" closing costs, use
that bargain as leverage to push the buyer toward the product, and
clinch the deal by subtle warnings that this bargain may be short-
lived.
In many instances, the "bargain" is not what it appears to be.
The builder usually recoups closing costs and points paid to the
lender by charging more for the home. 167 The homebuyers' net
payments over time will be about the same-they trade lower up
front charges for slightly higher monthly payments.1 6 8 This trade-
166 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. A survey of builder advertisements in the
real estate section of the Saturday Washington Post from June 1976 to June 1978 (a period
of interest rate stability) and from December 1979 to December 1981 (a period of substan-
tial rate volatility), inspired this hypothetical. In the former period, typical advertisements
by the large homebuilders emphasized: "No closing costs (except prepaid items). VA $99
Moves You In. Excellent Conventional Financing Available." (Pulte Homes) "Low Down-
payment! Low Interest Rates! Ryland will pay $1500 toward Closing Costs (Except pre-paid
items)." (Ryland Homes) "VA-No Money Down. Closing Costs Paid by Builder." (Hylton
Enterprises) In the latter period, when interest rates were at very high levels, advertise-
ments by large builders de-emphasized the closing cost gimmick and stressed low-rate
financing.
This hypothetical was also inspired by the "Gregory Builders" scenario developed in the
"Jim Mills Tapes" used by some homebuilders to train sales staff (Tape # 3). See supra
note 120. To defuse homebuyer reservations about high costs and interest rates, the hypo-
thetical salesperson counters with the builder's bargain closing costs and mortgage rate.
167 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Many writers have made the flat assertion
that "the usual result of the existence of a point system is that the seller increases the price
of his house so that he can absorb the discount." Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine:
The Usury Headache, 19 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 819, 860 (1968); see, e.g., Alberts, Business
Cycles, Residential Construction Cycles and the Mortgage Market, 70 J. Pol. Econ. 263, 268-
69 n.15 (1962). One econometric study suggests that the pass-through may be significantly
less than 100% for FHA and VA loans, which purport to have strict appraisal checks on
home prices. See Zerbst & Brueggeman, FHA and VA Mortgage Discount Points and Hous-
ing Prices, 32 J. Fin. 1766, 1770-72 (1977) (only 43% of FHA points and 56% of VA points
are passed on to buyers, because sellers failed to predict accurately the number of points
needed to meet FHA/VA yield requirements). A response to that study, however, questions
its methodology and suggests that the pass-through is between 77% and 100% even for
these more strictly monitored loans. See Colwell, Guntermann & Sirmans, Discount Points
and Housing Prices, 34 J. Fin. 1049, 1054 (1979).
I" Assume that the homebuyer purchases a $55,000 home with a $5000 downpayment.
The builder pays $1000 in closing costs plus $4000 in points so that the lender will offer the
$50,000 loan at 13% interest, rather than the market yield of 14.4%. See FNMA, Mortgage
Yield Conversion Tables and Supplemental Amortization Tables 450 (4th ed. 1979). The
monthly payment on the 13% loan would be $553.10 for a 30-year mortgage, id. at 721,
compared with $608.30 on the 14.4% loan. Id. at 745. Reasonably assuming, however, that
the builder raised its price by $5000 to enable it to pay points and closing costs, see supra
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off might be advantageous to the homebuyers if they are short of
cash after paying the downpayment. It is just as likely, however,
that the homebuyers are fooled. They think they are getting a gen-
uine bargain (a gift of closing costs and low-rate financing), an im-
pression the wording of the advertisement reinforces: "True Value
pays your closing costs and gives you low-rate financing," rather
than "Closing costs included in the price of the house, and bought-
down financing available. '" 9 The agent's sales pitch will also try to
anchor the homebuyers' decision to the free closing costs and
points, directing attention away from the higher price or other dis-
advantages. As a result, the buyers may rush their decision and
truncate their shopping so as not to miss the apparent bargain; if
they understood the true value of this particular deal, they would
not be so eager to close the deal.
17 0
The homebuyers might actually be worse off with the True
Value deal. For example, had the homebuyers taken out a 14%
loan to finance the house at a lower price, they would have the
option of refinancing the loan at a lower interest rate in the event
that rates declined after the sale. They would not have that free-
note 167, the home price would have been $50,000 and the 14.4% mortgage would have had
a principal of only $45,000 (with a $5000 downpayment). The monthly payment for such a
30-year loan would be $547.47, FNMA, supra, at 745, or almost $6 less per month than the
"bargain loan."
"I At one point in the 1970's, the FTC in its informal compliance efforts took the posi-
tion that "no closing costs" and "builder pays closing costs" were misleading and that the
representation should be "closing costs included in price." The Federal Reserve Board, how-
ever, found that builders did not violate the Truth-in-Lending Act if they advertised "no
closing costs" and "no charges for the seller's arranging financing for the buyer." See Fed-
eral Reserve Board Advisory Letter No. 848 (Oct. 11, 1974), reported in Consumer Cred.
Guide (CCH) 31,170 (1974).
170 About half of the respondents in the Hempel Study who rushed their homebuying
decision did so to take advantage of a "bargain." See supra note 99. Professor Benfield has
cogently argued that points mislead the buyer because he will often not know the seller is
paying a discount to the lender. "If the buyer knew the amount of discount and the effect
on the rate, he might prefer to arrange a loan from a different lender, or use other assets of
his own in the purchase, or, perhaps, forgo the purchase until credit is available on better
terms." Benfield, supra note 167, at 861; see also Regulation Q Hearings, supra note 84, at
215-16 (colloquy between Rep. D'Amours and S. Klaman, Nat'l Ass'n Mut. Say. Banks) (few
borrowers know exactly how points work); id. at 729 (testimony of R. Gnaizda, Public Advo-
cates, Inc.) (points are deceptive if homebuyers are not aware of the actual hidden costs
they impose). In the hypothetical developed supra note 168, if the buyers did not realize
that seller-paid points and closing costs were factored back into the home price, they could
be convinced that their monthly payment was actually $55 less, instead of $6 more, than the
going rate.
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dom under the True Value deal because the note bears interest at
only 11.25%.171
Even if interest rates did not decline enough to make refinancing
attractive, the homebuyers might have good reasons to prefer a
lower price to a lower interest rate. For example, a larger percent-
age of their monthly payments over time would be tax-deductible
interest payments, rather than nondeductible principal." 2 Also, if
the homebuyers only intend to keep the house for a short time,
they clearly would prefer a lower price to a lower interest rate, be-
cause they expect to forgo most of the advantages of the low rate.
It appears that if the loan is paid off before year seven,
homebuyers who have effectively paid the buydown points have
lost money.17 3 Even if the homebuyers desired an 11 % loan be-
cause they wanted to stay in the house for a long period, it is in
their best interest to buy down the rate themselves (and get a
lower home price) rather than to permit True Value to buy down
the rate for them. When the homebuyers pay the buydown points,
they may take an additional tax deduction; they probably receive
no deduction when True Value pays the points.174
1 See Regulation Q Hearings, supra note 84, at 215 (statement of Rep. D'Amours).
171 A recent Rand Corporation Study noted:
The advantages to the buyer of such an arrangement are ... usually illusory. Al-
though it may seem a bargain to get a loan at 4% below the market rate, the buyer's
interest expense is deductible from his taxable income, so an after-tax cost of the
interest payment is less than the after-tax cost of the same amount paid as principal.
Of course, the interest rate could be reduced by enough, relative to the above-market
price, to compensate for the tax disadvantage. However, most buyers are probably
more adept at comparing interest rates than property values, so they are likely to
agree to a less beneficial arrangement because they do not understand by how much
the purchase prices exceeds the property's cash value.
I. Lowry, C. Hillestad & S. Sarma, California's Housing. Adequacy, Availability, and Af-
fordability 194-95 (1983); see 47 Fed. Reg. 32,433, 32,436-37 n.5 (1982).
127 Lenders calculate buydown points by reference to tables assuming that the loan will be
paid off in 12 years. See, e.g., FNMA, supra note 168. Actually, most mortgage loans are
repaid before year 12, and lenders receive their money back-to lend again at market
rates-and part of the buydown payment has been "wasted" by the homebuyer. See
Kamath & Gesing, Should a Home Buyer Pay a Point to Reduce His Mortgage Rate?, Real
Est. Rev., Summer 1980, at 84 (arguing that taking into account the tax advantages of pay-
ing interest on the mortgage loan, as well as the disadvantages noted above, buyers lose
money if they pay buydown points and then sell their home after less than seven years).
174 Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code permits taxpayers who itemize deduc-
tions to include "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982); see id. § 461(g) (up front "point" charges are deductible but must be
prorated); Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(b) (1984). Section 163(a), however, does not permit deduc-
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Federal disclosures can be tools of deception because they enable
sellers to advertise interest rates that look like bargains. As the
drafters of the Truth-in-Lending Act intended, it is easy for con-
sumers to compare advertised APRs, much easier than it is for
them to compare home prices.17 5 The APR is a convenient "screen-
ing device" that homebuyers use to separate good deals from bad.
The problem with screening devices is that when they are not pre-
cisely defined, sellers can adapt them to their marketing strategies,
offering apparent bargains without really improving the deal.17 6
This strategy is successful not only with naive homebuyers (who
believe in the proverbial free lunch) but also with homebuyers who
are more skeptical about "bargains." In response to questions
about how True Value Homes can offer such a deal, the salesper-
son can emphasize that True Value Financing can obtain mortgage
money at lower rates because the company buys large blocks of
this money at "wholesale prices." This explanation makes sense to
average homebuyers (who receive discounts of 20% or more when
they buy goods at wholesale outlet stores), but it is misleading.
True Value Financing may be able to get a $10 million loan pack-
age at a 13% rate when the market rate is 14%, but it will not be
able to do much better.17 7 Moreover, the "bargain" may evaporate
when the 1% commitment fee paid for the option is included. The
agent may further state that the closing costs are less because True
Value Financing handles most of the matters itself and achieves
tion of "payments made on obligations of others," Sheppard v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A.
279, 281-82 (1938), and it seems probable that seller's buydown points cannot be deducted
by the purchaser. Note that most closing costs are not deductible, even if paid by the pur-
chaser. Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976); Rev. Rul. 297, 1967-2 C.B.
87 (1967). These costs may be treated, however, as part of the price paid for the property,
thus reducing gain on any subsequent sale. Warner Mountains Lumber Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 9 T.C. 1171, 1174 (1947); I.R.C. § 1012 (1984).
175 Even naive homebuyers realize that a home advertised at $60,000 might not be nearly
as good as a similar sized home at $70,000, if the latter has a more aesthetic location or
extra features. Where one builder advertises 11.25% APR financing, however, and others
are advertising higher APRs, the homebuyers can easily see that 11.25% APR is a better
deal and often will anchor their decisions to the clear factor.
1M6 See Salop, Parables of Information Transmission in Markets, in The Effect of Infor-
mation on Consumer and Market Behavior, supra note 98, at 3, 6 ("[ijf sellers are aware of
buyers' use of these rules-of-thumb, they have an incentive to exploit the screening device
to misrepresent the value of their product").
177 See Breckenfeld, supra note 12, at 124 (a national homebuilder can borrow large
chunks of money for as much as 100 basis points (1%) less than a small builder could bor-
row from a local bank or savings and loan).
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great economies of scale. Although believable, this statement is
also misleading. There are economies of scale achieved when the
builder can make a large package deal with a title insurance com-
pany, but the total cost of closing is not much less than that which
could be achieved independently.
Although some salespersons will concede that the home price in-
creases, the impression of a bargain will remain. Falling prey to the
representativeness heuristic, the homebuyers are persuaded that
they are receiving a true bargain - and to a substantial degree so
is the salesperson. Moreover, the whole deal is presented as a vivid
drama in which the homebuyers and True Value come out ahead.
As Professor Leff has argued, this type of presentation is the most
effective sales technique because it paints a credible "unique mu-
tual bargain."'
1 8
The same I-win-you-win drama is even more effectively played
out when the seller of an existing home (advised by a real estate
broker)179 or a builder buys down the interest rate for only a few
years. Here the seller can reduce the advertised rate substantially
below market for a lower cost. The advertisements trumpet: "Qual-
ifying Interest Rates at 10% *," and a note at the bottom says that
the rate goes up to 13 % by year four. Sales based on such rates are
178 A. Leff, Swindling and Selling 117 (1975). Leff generally argues that there are struc-
tural similarities between sales techniques and con deals. Both rely on a convincing script in
which the mark is convinced that his gain is not the con man's loss because marks are
skeptical of getting something for nothing. The deal described in the text, where an average
homebuyer is involved, is a classic example of what Professor Leff calls "The Squaresville
Pitch," in which the seller convinces the buyer that he can sell the good more cheaply than
anyone else. Thus, it is in the buyer's "interest to buy, for what he wants is not available
any more inexpensively anyplace else." Id. at 119. The pitch is deceptive insofar as the seller
really is not more efficient and productive than his competitors-a deception that is easy to
establish in the home selling business because of the meticulously differentiated product.
Professor Leff's description of "The Sale" is similar to the deal described earlier in the
text for the naive homebuyers. Whether based upon a fire, going out-of-business, or George
Washington's birthday, the loudly trumpeted sale tells the buyer that there is a one-sided
bargain (favorable to the buyer, not to the seller) that outside circumstances have forced
upon the seller. Id. at 130-31. Thus, even if the homebuyer were more curious about the
closing costs/financing bargain, the salesperson would have such ready answers as the fol-
lowing: "Business is bad"; "We are trying to clear out our old line of homes."
179 Brokers may also advise sellers to offer full-term below-market rates (through
buydowns or self-financing), though the partial buydowns described in text are now far
more common. The full-term buydown is a good deal for the seller, who receives a higher
price (which might not be immediately taxable), and for the broker, who receives a higher
commission. It is no bargain for the homebuyer, however, if he trades away tax deductible
interest payments for nondeductible principal payments.
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troubling because the homebuyers' advantages are smaller than
they appear. They are actually paying for the buydown fees
through a higher home price; and, although the buydown does help
them qualify for a higher loan, their monthly payments will in-
crease over three years, perhaps to an amount more than they can
afford.180 It is quite likely that only the seller comes out much
ahead-by making a sale to buyers who would otherwise shop for a
better deal or defer purchase until interest rates came down.
Generally, the practice of delivering whatever combination of
buydowns and other loan features is necessary to qualify a buyer
for a more expensive home than he could otherwise afford poses
potential dangers for lenders and borrowers. The problems with
this technique are exacerbated because they are increasingly used
in combination with adjustable rate features. This combination has
spawned a generation of "meretricious mortgages" (to use Profes-
sor Guttentag's term) that are deceptively attractive."8 1
Some sophisticated homebuyers are perfectly aware of the
mechanics of builder-paid points and closing costs. These buyers
will avoid the True Value deal or insist on a price break in return
for their arranging their own financing or paying closing costs. The
late Senator Paul Douglas (sponsor of the Truth-in-Lending Act)
and others have argued that in many markets the existence of a
substantial number of sophisticated homebuyers will discourage
the True Value business practices.8 2  These sophisticated
0so The 3-2-1 buydown is one used by many sellers. For a conventional $80,000 loan at
13% (plus two points), the monthly payments would be as follows (parentheses for the seller
subsidy):
Year 1 (10%) $702.40 ($183.20)
Year 2 (11%) $762.40 ($123.20)
Year 3 (12%) $823.20 ($ 62.40)
Years 4-30 (13%) $885.60
Thus, monthly payments increase by over $180 in three years.
"8 J. Guttentag, supra note 76, at 8-14 (builder buydowns); id. at 14-16 (seller buydowns);
id. at 25-28 (meretricious ARMs); see 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market Hearing, supra note
41, at 215, 216-17 (statement of L. Kendall, President, Mortgage Ins. Cos. of Am.). Offering
low initial qualifying rates that jump up to several points above the index after a year or
two, these teaser rate ARMs resemble bait-and-switch swindling schemes. The dramatic
low-rate financing for the first year or two of the loan is the hook to attract the homebuyer's
interest in the home and then becomes the centerpiece of a drama that induces homebuyers
to anchor their decision onto only one of several important factors.
192 See Nat'l Comm'n on Consumer Fin., Consumer Credit in the United States 176-77
(1972) (summarizing the views of Sen. Paul Douglas). For a recent exposition of the Douglas
approach, see Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 95, at 637-38, 649-50.
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homebuyers are interested in low home prices without the frilly
points and closing cost gimmicks. True Value's builder competitors
theoretically will have an incentive to lower their prices to attract
all the sharp homebuyers. As its market share shrinks, True Value
will abandon its misleading marketing strategy and return to price
competition.
In the home sale market, however, precisely the opposite phe-
nomenon has occurred repeatedly in recent years. Once one builder
offers or one brokerage firm suggests bought-down financing or
closing costs, others offer similar deals instead of cutting
prices-marketing gimmicks replace price competition. "8 The
main reason for this phenomenon is that the housing market is not
perfectly price competitive. Although there are many buyers and
sellers of homes, the product is not homogeneous. Thus, buyers do
not shop extensively enough or compare the many tangible and in-
tangible features carefully enough to recognize the best price deals.
Sales techniques can also short circuit buyer shopping plans and
corner a sufficient segment of the market. For example, an effec-
tive salesperson can blunt the shopping effect of price differences
by arguing that the slightly higher price of his home indicates su-
perior craftsmanship.8 4 Thus, the real estate market tends to be
one characterized by "monopolistic competition," in which each of
the many sellers can exercise some degree of monopoly power over
'8 See supra note 143; see also Homebuilding's New Look, Bus. Wk., Nov. 7, 1983, at 95
("Builders contend that a good financing package is still the most important selling tool.").
Although substantial price cuts (making the home a demonstrable bargain) may still be
very effective sales devices, see, e.g., Price Cuts Do What Buy-Downs Didn't, Builder, Jan.
1983, at 61, the standard wisdom is that recently set forth in the following broker-
homebuilder marketing authority:
I don't believe your primary concern should be cutting someone else's prices by a
few bucks. Worry about being different, about being non-comparable, and you'll have
those buyers coming to you and meeting your sale price because [a little deviation
within the same] range makes no difference!
I've sold more houses by raising the price than I have by cutting the price and
that's a fact. Sometimes we added a feature or a benefit when we raised the price,
true, but we found it to be far more effective than cutting the price to make a sale.
B. Napier, supra note 131, at 15-16; see Cooley & Stockman, Five Projects Blast Out of the
Recession, Builder, May, 1983, at 54, 61.
I" For complex differentiated goods such as homes, consumers' initial reactions usually
are that a slightly higher price means slightly better quality. See McConnell, The Price-
Quality Relationship in an Experimental Setting, 5 J. Marketing Research 300 (1968) (dis-
cussing beer).
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the segment of the market drawn to its form of the deal, resulting
in some price dispersion. 185 Builders and brokers can do perfectly
well catering to naive homebuyers, and any competitors who cut
prices may have a hard time demonstrating their "bargain."
The prospect of repeat business or the desire to maintain a good
commercial reputation does not necessarily give builders and bro-
kers an incentive to cut prices rather than engage in misleading
sales gimmicks. The recent analysis of Professors Klein and Leffler
suggests that, even assuming perfect consumer information, the
promise of repeat business may not prevent higher producer prices
over time.18 Because the home purchase decision is infrequently
made, the competitive pressure of repeat buyers may be less im-
portant in the home sale industry. Also, many homebuilders and
brokers do not remain in the market very long, due to its notorious
fluctuations. These participants will be even less influenced by
long term reputation considerations.
A final irony is that because of the financing system,
homebuilders and other real estate professionals may have a collec-
tive self-interest in keeping nominal home prices high during low-
demand (high-interest) periods, by pushing nonprice bargains.
Before a loan is made, the house to be sold is appraised. Although
the appraiser uses three methods to "value" the house (compara-
tive, cost, and income methods), the bottom-line valuation is usu-
ally based upon the comparative analysis.1 87 The appraiser deter-
mines a fair price by comparing prices for similar homes recently
sold and adjusting the value for differences between the homes.
Thus, the appraiser has a fair amount of discretion, which is usu-
ally exercised in favor of the seller's price. For example, the ap-
praiser of a home in a developer's subdivision will typically com-
'" See E. Mansfield, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications 325-32 (3d ed. 1972) (pro-
viding model for the theory of monopolistic competition); Salop & Stiglitz, Bargains and
Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 138 Rev. Econ. Stud.
493 (1977) (same); see also J. Guttentag, supra note 76, at 13 (buydowns are profitable for
builders because of buyer myopia and enable the builder to practice price discrimina-
tion-buyers who do not want the buydown can pay full price).
,66 See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,
89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981) (repeat business will not assure high quality in the market unless
there is a price premium and substantial sunk capital in the enterprise, such as advertising
and brand identification).
'"' See Am. Instit. of Real Est. Appraisers, The Appraisal of Real Estate 506-09 (7th ed.
1978).
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pare other houses the same developer recently sold.
As a result of this system, if sellers cut prices in periods of de-
pressed demand, they cannot immediately raise prices when de-
mand improves because appraisers cannot justify mortgages in
light of prior sales. On the other hand, if sellers maintain prices in
periods of depressed demand and instead offer bargains on interest
rates, prices will be at a good level when demand picks up.188 Thus,
builders may be able to position themselves for price increases
when the hoped for recovery comes by refusing to cut nominal
prices during depressed conditions. Interestingly, sellers of existing
homes do the same thing, perhaps because of the brokers' influ-
ence. The National Association of Realtors estimates that "real"
home prices were 16.5% lower than nominal ones in 1982 because
sellers were willing to take back low-interest loans in return for the
high prices they were demanding.189
2. Inflated Prices-Title and Mortgage Insurance, Title Search,
Conveyancing Services, and Loans
Recent empirical studies suggest that the price homebuyers pay
for mortgage loans or (especially) settlement services is often
higher than the competitive market price. 190 Two competing theo-
I" "Flexible" (i.e., seller-oriented) appraisals have long allowed sellers to increase the
prices of their homes to incorporate seller's points in VA and FHA transactions. As Profes-
sor Guttentag notes:
[I]f discounts tend to be generally higher in one area than in another, other things
being the same, appraisals also will be higher in the first area. In the existing home
market, appraisals are based largely on price comparisons with "comparable proper-
ties." If the sale price of one property is marked up to reflect discounts, other proper-
ties using that one as a standard of comparison will be marked up similarly.
Guttentag, Changes in the Structure of the Residential Mortgage Market- Analysis and Pro-
posals, in Study of the Savings and Loan Industry 1480, 1500 (. Friend ed. 1969); Zerbst &
Brueggeman, supra note 167, at 1772. Based upon more recent studies, Professor Guttentag
concludes that "buydowns significantly inflate appraisals and thereby increase property risk
to lender." J. Guttenteg, supra note 76, at 11.
'"o Home Prices Overstated Due to Below-Market Financing, Housing Fin., Nov. 1982, at
2; see Salkin & Durning, What Is a House Really Worth?, Mortgage Banking, Oct. 1982, at
10 (proliferation of owner financing reduces real price appreciation). This strategy of below-
market seller loans may be discouraged by Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41, 98 Stat. 494, 553-54
(1984) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 483), which establishes a minimum interest rate for
seller-financed loans and imputes a rate for loans that are above the minimum rate.
190 See 1 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at 11.6-.12 (brokerage, lending, title assur-
ance, conveyancing and mortgage insurance industries); 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note
118, at 40, 74-77, 153-55 (real estate brokers).
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ries have emerged to explain this phenomenon. First, loan-related
costs may be high because homebuyers do not shop and rely in-
stead on referrals. Loan and settlement providers engage in "re-
verse competition," that is, competing for referrals instead of en-
gaging in price competition. Because the intermediaries referring
providers are price-insensitive, prices may be high.' 91 A problem
with this explanation is that it is not clear why, short of outright
collusion, intermediaries do not shop for the best price and use
that to attract more customers.
Advocates of the second theory argue that reverse competition is
not anticompetitive per se because real estate intermediaries are
better able to determine good deals than are consumers. Professor
Wallace, for example, suggests that settlement costs are high be-
cause builders, brokers, and bankers discourage consumers from
taking account of closing costs to increase the total demand for
homes. They then segment homebuyer demand into components of
different elasticities so that the highest prices can be charged for
the items with the most inelastic demand, mainly settlement ser-
vices, after the consumer commits to buy a particular house. 192 One
problem with this argument is that builders and brokers often em-
phasize the closing and loan costs in the sales process, using them
to present an apparent bargain. 9 3
The economic and psychological structure of the home sale and
loan transaction may better explain the phenomenon. Because of
the tendency (reinforced by the sales process) of consumers to shift
responsibility for decisions to intermediaries, buyers often choose
the loan or closing cost providers that intermediaries recommend
or require. The referral does not necessarily assure high prices, but
tends to do so when (1) the intermediary has a strong incentive not
"I See 1 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at mH.5; see also HUD/VA Settlement
Costs Study, supra note 113.
192 See Wallace, supra note 54, at 205-20; see also Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price
Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 931 (1977) (high
prices for conveyancing services are largely a result of price fixing and other anticompetitive
practices).
1'l See supra notes 166-89 and accompanying text. For example, even though RESPA
does not require the distribution of settlement cost estimates and booklets until the loan
application, many brokers and builders routinely provide homebuyers with such estimates.
Fully aware of the integrated nature of the transaction, these intermediaries realize that if
the homebuyer does not have enough cash for settlement expenses, the deal will fall
through, and much effort will be wasted. See infra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
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to recommend the best price deal (the hidden agenda) and the
marketplace does not punish the intermediary for failing to recom-
mend the best deal (the failure of market discipline), or (2) the
provider can exercise market power and exact a high price (imper-
fect provider market).
Generally, the hidden agenda arises out of the increasingly inte-
grated home sale and loan transaction and the interdependence of
the various intermediaries. For example, if the intermediary or his
firm has a business connection with a provider, referrals will be
automatic even if the price is excessive. The failure of market dis-
cipline results from the intermediaries' incentives to cooperate
rather than compete in providing services. An imperfect provider
market may exist if a few firms dominate a particular market, cre-
ating barriers to the entry of new competing firms. Whoever
chooses the provider will then find supernormal prices.
a. Loan Price
The mortgage market in the last two decades seems to have been
competitive, as evidenced by the constant rate fluctuation in re-
sponse to market demands.194 Thus it is somewhat surprising that
the Peat Marwick Study found rate variations of 1.44% to 2.13%
and monthly payment variations of $85-$126 (for a standard
$75,000 loan) within the same metropolitan areas at the same
time.195 Differences in nonprice mortgage terms probably explain
much of this dispersion, but the data suggest possible market
problems that may be exacerbated in the future.
The leading empirical surveys suggest that between 50% and
65% of homebuyers do not shop for mortgage loans.196 About half
19, See Whitman Letter, supra note 5, at 3-4. Except to the extent that mortgages are not
perfectly homogeneous, the classical requisites of pure competition exist with respect to
mortgage lending- a large number of independently acting lenders (variety of fimancial insti-
tutions), ease of market entry (because of easy access to the secondary mortgage market),
and the availability of information to consumers. See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100,
at X.3-.21.
195 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at X.24-.30; accord Stoppelo, supra note 54, at
403-09 (arguing that mortgage lending is not competitive and is characterized by substantial
rate variations). Peat Marwick termed this variation "moderate" and did not consider it
sufficient to conclude that mortgage lending is not characterized by "workable competition"
because the survey did not correct for differences in the terms of the mortgages for which
interest rates were quoted. 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at X.30.
196 See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at X.14, .31 (64% of the homebuyer re-
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of the buyers who do not shop for loans (or, about one-third of all
homebuyers) opt for the lender suggested by the builder, broker, or
attorney.197 Because most buyers fail to shop and because in-
termediaries shop for them, mortgage lenders compete with one
another for referral business, not for direct customers.
Although real estate agents often shop effectively for the best
loan values, they sometimes have incentives to refer homebuyers to
a lender that does not charge the best rates. Traditionally these
perverse incentives were rebates or commissions.119  Today, formal
business links may be more important: the sales agent may send
customers to a lender because the brokerage or building firm owns
or controls it (the formally integrated transaction) or because the
agent or his firm has an ongoing personal or cooperative relation-
ship with the allied lender (the functionally integrated transac-
spondents did not shop for a lender); Hempel, supra note 99, at 243, table 1 (50% of the
homebuyers looked at only one lender); see also Albaum & Kaufman, Variable Rate Resi-
dential Mortgage: Implications for Borrowers, in 1 Alternative Mortgage Instruments Re-
search Study, supra note 78, at VI-1, VI-16 to -17 (60% of the homebuyers did not shop for
a mortgage); Colton, Lessard, Modest & Solomon, The National Survey of Borrower's Hous-
ing Characteristics, Attitudes and Preferences, in 1 Alternative Mortgage Instruments Re-
search Study, supra note 78, at m-85 (46% of the surveyed homebuyers looked at only one
lender; 54% contacted two or more lenders). In a later study of households in Connecticut,
Professors Hempel and Jain found a greater incidence of shopping for a lender; the average
homebuyer sampled contacted three lenders concerning the terms of fimancing. Hempel &
Jain, House Buying Behavior: An Empirical Study in Cross Cultural Buyer Behavior, 6 Am.
Real Est. & Urb. Econ. A. J. 1, 11 (1978). It may be that the sample consisted of fairly
sophisticated buyers. Otherwise, there is no apparent reason why its measure of shopping
for a mortgage loan should be at variance with his earlier findings and those of other recent
studies.
"1' See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at X.14 (10.5% of the borrowers who did
not shop for a lender selected a lender with whom they had prior dealings; 15% relied on
referral by someone unconnected with the homebuying process; 10% assumed existing loans;
40% relied on referral by brokers; and 11.5% relied on referral by sellers (mainly builders));
Colton, Lessard, Modest & Solomon, supra note 196, at m-85 n.68 (41% of the borrowers
who contacted only one lender did so because it was "convenient"; 34% relied on the real-
tor's advice; 12% had no choice (builder-required); 13% had other reasons); Loan Market-
ing: It's Not What It Used to Be, Savings & Loan News, June 1977, at 90, 91-92 (some
lenders receive 75% to 90% of their applications from brokers and builders).
I's Although RESPA prohibits fees to agents for referral of "business incident to or a part
of a real estate settlement service," RESPA § 8(a), 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (1982), the prohibi-
tion does not apply to fees a lender pays to "its duly appointed agent for services actually
performed in the making of a loan" and to "any person of a bona fide salary or compensa-
tion or other payment ... for services actually performed." Id. § 8(c)(1)(C), (2), 12 U.S.C. §
2607(c)(1)(C), (2) (1982).
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tion).199 Perceiving the importance of personal and business con-
nections, lenders can (and apparently do) engage in less price
competition.200 A final perverse incentive may be most important
today. The agent wants the homebuyer to qualify for a loan and
thus may recommend a teaser rate loan that has a low initial rate,
but an aggregate rate (or APR) greater than that of other loans.
Because these loans are hard to compare, especially when the
teaser loan is an ARM, lenders may compete for low initial rates,
rather than low overall rates.
Under principles of market discipline, real estate agents who rec-
ommend high-interest loans should lose customers either to agents
who recommend low-interest loans or to agents who pass on their
profits by reducing their prices or commissions. The former ration-
ale, used by some nationally integrated broker and builder firms,
has met with some success and may exert considerable pressure on
agents to obtain low-interest loans-but the malleable nature of
the APR enables builders and brokers to offer low-interest loans
while raising the home price.
The latter reason seems even less likely to reduce real loan rates.
Builders recommending high-interest loans have little incentive to
pass on their extra profits through home prices, which are harder
to shop and compare. Nor do real estate brokers seem willing to
reduce their commissions in response to competitive pressures.
Since the 1920's the industry has operated under a creed of cooper-
ation and accommodation rather than competition.0 1 Sale of prop-
erty included in a multiple listing, service itself entails mutually
advantageous coordination among brokers, and has contributed to
uniformly high commissions and (apparently) some discrimination
I" See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at X.50 (brokers and builders are fre-
quently represented on the boards of directors of local lenders); Stoppello, supra note 54, at
409 (brokers and builders will refer mortgage borrowers to specific lenders in hope of ready
availability of mortgages for their customers in periods of tight money).
200 Responding to the query how they develop new business, 76% of the lenders that Peat
Marwick surveyed said they develop more contacts with brokers who could recommend their
institution, 61% made more contacts with builders, and only 24% considered the possibility
of lowering the interest rate. Id. at XII.11; accord Stoppello, supra note 154, at 408-09.
201 See 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 141-63; Nightingale, Calif. Real Est.,
Apr. 1924, at 12, quoted in id. at 110 (multiple listing services "have replaced the old spirit
of competition with one of cooperation"); see generally Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, Code of
Ethics arts. 14, 21-23, in Realtors Institute Reference and Practice Book (1977) (ethical
duties of Realtors not to encroach upon or disparage the business dealings of competing
Realtors; disputes to be resolved by arbitration).
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against discount brokers."'2 Brokers will steer their buyers away
from property listed for a discount commission, either because cut-
ting rates is considered "unprofessional" or because the cooperat-
ing broker will get a lower commission himself.2 0 3 Furthermore,
real estate brokerage considers itself a service industry, providing
subjective, intangible benefits to buyers, even if not at the lowest
price. The broker views his success as dependent on his ability to
reduce the homebuyer's stress-to make the purchase and loan
processes easier, not necessarily cheaper.2 4
In short, neither builders nor brokers (the primary sources of
loan referrals) see their commercial reputation as resting upon
their finding the best loan deal. Instead, it rests on their finding an
acceptable home for the buyer and making the purchase minimally
troublesome. Sometimes the deal that profits them most has a
higher than market rate or has terms that impose future costs on
the consumer. The rise of ARMs and teaser rate loans, when com-
bined with these incentives and failures of market discipline, may
undermine, in the short term at least, the workable competition
under which the mortgage market has largely operated for the last
twenty years.
b. Title Assurance and Conveyancing Prices
The charge to the homebuyer for title assurance and conveyanc-
ing typically consists of three items: the cost of the title search and
opinion; the insurance premium; charges for escrow and document
preparation and other settlement services. The price to the buyer
for this cluster of services varies significantly from one location to
another because of different local practices. 0 5 More significantly,
:o See 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 73-78, 268-301.
3OS See id. A 50% share of the standard 6% commission is obviously higher than a 50%
share of a 4% discount commission.
10 The FTC Brokers Study reports that price competition is often displaced by promo-
tional efforts intended to obtain listings, provision of extra services, and intensive advertis-
ing to create an image of friendliness and supportiveness Id. at 44.
2O The title insurance industry is localized based on past custom and state regulation.
Three systems of providing title protection are common. See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra
note 100, at V.19-.22; B. Owen & J. Grundfest, A Report to the State of California: Licens-
ing of Real Estate Brokers as Title Insurance Agents (1976) (Stanford University Studies in
Indus. Econ. No. 64); Payne, Ancillary Costs in the Purchase of Homes, 35 Mo. L. Rev. 455
(1970). An attorney's opinion that title is valid (based either upon the attorney's own search
or the search of title abstracters), backed up by the attorney's assurance that the opinion is
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the price varies substantially within locales. The Peat Marwick
Study found variations of $500 or more for the same title and con-
veyancing services within the Los Angeles market (standard devia-
tion over $200), and smaller but significant variations in the other
seven markets surveyed (standard deviations ranging from $59.21
in St. Louis to $173.95 in Seattle).06
There appear to be two levels at which workable competition
breaks down. With respect to the insurance premium, there are
about fifteen national title insurance-underwriting firms, and a
combination of four of them dominates most of the local mar-
kets.0 7 These companies behave like a classic oligopoly by infor-
mally following a common schedule of uncompetitive title insur-
ance premiums that do not fluctuate with market conditions. 08
Because insurance premiums are uniform (albeit high), the sub-
stantial variation in charges that consumers actually pay occurs at
the retail level. The providers (attorneys, title companies, or
branch offices of title insurers) charge significantly different prices
for title searches and conveyancing services. 09
correct, was the earliest form of title protection and is still the primary protection in New
England and scattered Southern and Midwestern states. In over 15 states (especially in the
Southeast), protection is provided by an attorney's opinion, guaranteed absolutely by a title
insurance underwriter (for which the attorney is usually an agent). In the Western and sev-
eral Midwestern states, a title company performs the search and insures the result. Even
within these three broad groups, practices vary enormously. Thus, the local agent (attorney,
underwriter, title company, or branch office of the underwriter) often performs services as
escrow agent and preparer of settlement documents, again with substantial variation among
the different areas.
208 See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at XJI.11-.15. The Peat Marwick Study
observed 99 providers in the Los Angeles area, of which 11 charged $300-349, eight charged
$350-399, 11 charged $400-449, 13 charged $450-499, seven charged $500-549, eight charged
$550-599, five charged $650-699, four charged $700-749, eight charged $750-799, and the
remainder charged scattered prices. Id. at XII.30.
107 The ten state markets that Peat Marwick surveyed show four-firm market concentra-
tions ranging from 50.21% (Florida) to 93.71% (Washington), with most of the surveyed
states having a four-firm concentration of more than 70% of the local market. Id. at XII.5.
208 See id. at XII.3-.4; Owen, supra note 192, at 939-44. Apart from the concentration of
business with several insurers for each locality, title insurance is also structured like an
oligopoly because it is hard for new firmns to break into the industry due to the high start-up
costs (developing a title plant) and because no one has an incentive to cut prices. Price
information is usually on file with state insurance commissions so that other firms will know
of any price cuts promptly and immediately follow, thus depriving a price-cutter of any
competitive advantage. See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at XII.7-.8.
209 See generally 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at XII.10-.40 (price that a con-
sumer pays for title assurance and conveyancing varies among locations and providers).
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The breakdown in competition for title search and conveyancing
(settlement) charges is not due to market concentration, for there
are often numerous providers at that level. Indeed, the problem is
that these providers charge widely divergent prices. This price va-
riation is due to consumers' failure to shop for title search and con-
veyancing services and their reliance on self-interested referrals by
intermediaries. The Peat Marwick Study found that only 11% of
the interviewed homebuyers spoke to more than one title company,
and of the buyers who hired an attorney, only 18% spoke to more
than one.2 10 Consumers are very likely to shift responsibility for
the decision to the broker (49% of all homebuyers interviewed),
the lender (16%), or an attorney (17%).11
These intermediaries often have perverse incentives for recom-
mending certain high-cost providers. The Peat Marwick Study re-
ports that some brokers and lenders still receive kickbacks and
other financial rewards for referring business to attorneys and title
companies. 12 Attorneys and title companies, in turn, sometimes
receive extra "commissions" in return for referring customers to
particular underwriters..2 1  The most effective way for brokers, at-
torneys, and lenders to profit from these services, however, is to
establish their own title agencies and then refer all their business
to them. Such "controlled companies" are then in a good position
110 See id. at XII.8. This result is not surprising because the decision is considered to be
minor by the consumer, must be made under time pressure, and involves providers about
which the consumer has very little information. Id. at XII.9 (homebuyers believe that title
assurance/conveyancing prices and services are all uniform).
111 Id. at V.24.
212 Although referral fees, kickbacks, and commission splitting by brokers and lenders in
connection with real estate settlement services are prohibited, RESPA § 8(a)-(b), 12 U.S.C.
§ 2607(a)-(b) (1982), Peat Marwick's survey of industry participants indicated that kick-
backs and referral fees to bankers, brokers, and builders continue, albeit at a diminished
pace. 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at XIT.47.
IS In states where the attorney renders the initial opinion on the title and an underwriter
insures the result (Eastern states), the attorney is paid by the homebuyer for the title search
and may receive 50% to 65% of the risk premium as well. In states where there is an all-
inclusive charge for search and insurance, the agent may receive 80% to 90% of the charge
as his commission. See Ford & Allison, supra note 151, at 4-5. This practice is on its face
legal under RESPA § 8(c)(1)(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. § 2607(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1982) (authorizing fees
to attorneys for "services actually rendered" and fees by a title company to its duly ap-
pointed agent for services "actually performed in the issuance of a policy of title insur-
ance"). Although the attorney-agent does most of the "work" (searching title, attracting the
customer), it may be questioned whether the commissions reflect the true level of services
performed. See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at XII.49-.51.
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to charge high prices, which yield high profits for the hidden
owners.
21 4
Rebates and controlled title companies may theoretically be pro-
competitive forces. 15 Controlled title companies might be able to
extract higher commissions from the national underwriters and
pass these savings (and others due to lower transaction costs) on to
homebuyers through lower charges. Likewise, rebates might be a
way of distributing the industry's excess profits to brokers, who
will then lower their commissions to attract new customers. The
problem with this theory is that little if any of the extra commis-
sions or rebates are actually passed on to consumers because of the
familiar cycle of industry cooperation and consumer failure to
shop. Brokers have therefore maintained their commissions at ab-
normally high levels through patterns of professionalism and coop-
eration embodied in their multiple listing services. 1 '
There is also evidence that controlled title companies are equally
unlikely to pass on any cost advantages to nonshopping consumers.
Instead, such companies may charge higher-than-market prices for
title searches or for service as escrow or settlement agent at clos-
ing.2 1 7 Administrative proceedings in California, for example,
found that the title company owned and controlled by Coldwell
Banker charged rates 50% higher than those of competitors.218
Moreover, recent testimony before Congress suggests that con-
214 According to the Peat Marwick Study, in one-third of the cases where the lender re-
quired the use of a specified title or conveyancing provider, there was a formal business
connection, 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at X.50-.51, and congressional hearings
in 1981 suggest that in some areas the incidence of formal connection (controlled compa-
nies) is even higher-and growing. See 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140 (addressing
problem of widespread lender and Realtor ownership of title insurance companies).
S:i See Owen, supra note 192, at 943-44, 949-50.
16 See id. at 944-49; supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
217 See Am. Land Title Ass'n, The Controlled Business Problem in the Title Insurance
Industry (1979); 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at XII.56 (controlled firms help
perpetuate high prices); L Plotkin, The Economic Consequences of Controlled Business in
the Real Estate Industry 4-5 (Sept. 16, 1981), reprinted in 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra
note 140, at 510, 514-15 (prices are "much higher" as a result of the controlled title compa-
nies); Ford & Allison, supra note 151, at 5 & n.17 (controlled business relationships main-
tain high prices; increased escrow and settlement fees can produce extra profits where title
insurance charges are regulated).
3 State of Cal., Dep't of Ins., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Recommendation,
In re Guardian Title Co., File No. L-67, UTC LA-70 (Oct. 27, 1976), rev'd, 2 Civ. No. 55067
(Super. Ct.), rev'd and recommendation reinstated, 102 Cal. App. 3d 381, 162 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1980).
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trolled companies may be more lax in examining the validity of
title than are independent title companies.2 19
c. Mortgage Insurance Price
Perhaps most troubling of all mortgage-related practices is the
way that private mortgage insurance is "sold" to homebuyers.
Most buyers are not given details of mortgage insurance plans-or
informed that they can avoid purchasing that insurance by making
a 20% downpayment.220 Often the insured has little or nothing to
say about the choice of the insurer.221 In addition, the homebuyer
is probably paying too much for mortgage insurance. Here the con-
centrated market structure is important.222 The first mortgage in-
surance company, Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Co. (MGIC), has
dominated the market since the 1950's, and in 1980 it did 40% of
the nation's mortgage insurance business; the top seven firms ac-
count for over 90% of the business. There have been few new en-
trants into this field in the last decade because of the forbidding
capital requirements and the importance of being a recognized
name in the industry.228 As a result of this oligopolistic market
"I For example, the President of Valley Title Co. in San Jose, California testified that
her firm lost most of its business to a broker-owned title firm that charged higher prices and
did shoddy work. 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140, at 150-51 (statement of Clyda
Guggenberger); see id. at 152-211 (other testimony to the same effect).
2* Only about 55.2% of the homebuyers Peat Marwick surveyed discussed the mortgage
insurance with the lender or agent. Of the group that did discuss the policies, 89.6% dis-
cussed price, 52.4% discussed policy differences, and 39.2% discussed policy cancellations.
Lenders failed to discuss the issue of alternative mortgage payment plans 65% of the time.
Of the respondents who purchased mortgage insurance, 36.5% were unaware that an in-
crease in downpayment would reduce the mortgage rate or insurance premium (though of
the group that was aware that a larger downpayment could result in lower mortgage insur-
ance premiums or in a lower mortgage rate, only one in five indicated that such knowledge
influenced the amount of their downpayment). 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at
XI.19.
2' See id. at XI.18 (25.2% of buyers thought that agent required or recommended an
insurer; 23.1% thought that lender required or recommended an insurer); id. at XI.32-.33
(only 50% of buyers believed they had a choice in the selection of an insurer).
2 See generally The Arthur D. Little Study of the Private Mortgage Insurance Industry
25-26 (Nov. 1975) (discussing industry concentration and market shares in 1973); 2 Peat
Marwick Study, supra note 100, ch. IV.
223 FNMA and FHLMC require $5 million in initial capital and surplus before they will
accept insurance from a company. Many states have similar capitalization requirements and
also require a contingency reserve, in which 50% of all premiums are set aside for 10 years
or more unless losses exceed 35% of premiums earned. Thus, a successful new entrant
would need substantial long term capital just to get started-and with no assurance that it
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structure, these firms offer virtually the same plans for the same
prices. Their prices have neither shifted in response to demand nor
in response to differing loss experience in different geographical
areas. Some observers think that profits in the industry have been
abnormally high.224
Despite these problems, there has been increased competition
among the established companies, though not necessarily as to
price. 25 There is little incentive to engage in price competition be-
cause the insurers see the lender-which is relatively price-insensi-
tive-as the only party that they have to please. Lenders choosing
one or more mortgage insurers care less about price, which is ulti-
mately paid by someone else, than they do about benefits they re-
ceive from the choice. Thus, the dominant mortgage insurance
companies compete by offering different levels of risk coverage; by
providing ancillary services to the lender (e.g., prompt analysis of
the soundness of the loan); by building a good reputation for
prompt and fair handling of claims; and by dispensing favors, en-
tertainment, and free services to bank officers.226 These "extra ser-
vices" are of little or no benefit to the homebuyers who actually
pay for them.
3. Dangers of Excessive Risk
Assume that a family with a monthly income of $2800 wanted to
buy a home in 1977. Their income would have qualified them for
an $85,000 mortgage loan at a market interest rate of 9%, because
the loan's monthly principal-and-interest payments (less than
$700) would have put them within most lenders' qualification
would be able to break the lockhold of the top firms (unless it were tied to a parent that
could refer it business) because conservative lenders look to established contacts and
demonstrated performance in choosing the insurers. See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note
100, at XI.22.-.24.
"I See id. at XI.37-.45 (discussing pros and cons of argument that mortgage insurers have
excessive profits).
I" For example, Pamico, a lender-owned mortgage insurance company, sought to break
into the top seven in the 1970's by offering rates 12% below those the dominant firms of-
fered. The firm met with only limited success in attempting to sell a lower priced product
outside of Pennsylvania because many lenders viewed Pamico as an insurer that was "small,
of low capitalization, highly concentrated, and unable to offer the full range of services of-
fered by the larger competitors." As a result, the price reduction policies of the firm have
not been truly tested for market acceptance. Id. at XI.26.
22, See id. at XI.36.
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guidelines. Assume further that the homebuyers had $10,000 to in-
vest in a downpayment, so they could afford a $95,000 home. The
only home they liked, however, cost $100,000. To buy this home,
they needed a $90,000 mortgage, but the monthly payments (al-
most $725) disqualified them under most lender guidelines then in
place.
Wanting to make the sale, the broker told the homebuyers that a
graduated payment, adjustable mortgage loan (GPAML) would en-
able them to buy the home they wanted. The initial rate would be
8%, with a corresponding monthly payment well under $700. In
the third year, the interest rate would be increased or decreased to
match the average rate on mortgages FNMA had purchased in the
preceding quarter, with similar adjustments every six months. At
the end of five years, the loan would fall due.2 Because of the
graduated payment feature, the broker cautioned the family that
monthly payments in the first three years would not even cover
accrued interest, and the principal would increase by over $2000.
The adjustable rate feature would allow for an increase in the ap-
plicable interest rate; thus, the amount of monthly payments
might also increase.
These points concerned one spouse, but the other still wanted
the loan, in part because he was confident that the home would
appreciate rapidly.2 28 His optimism, augmented by the broker's,
'7 The inspiration for this hypothetical is one of the ARM Plans (Plan # 2) that FNMA
offered in the period 1977-1982. Compare the same $50,000 mortgage with an initial rate of
8.78% under a fixed-rate plan; ARM Plan # 2, which adjusted iates every six months based
on Treasury bills; Plan # 3, which adjusted rates every year and had a payment cap; and
Plan # 7, which adjusted rates annually based upon the FHLBB contract rate:
Fixed Rates Plan # 2 Plan # 3 Plan # 7
Monthly
Payment: Yr. 1 $394 $394 $394 $394
Yr. 2 $394 $394 $424 $408
Yr. 3 $394 $394 $456 $450
Yr. 4 $394 $590 $490 $575
Yr. 5 $394 $590 $527 $592
Yr. 6 $394 $590 $560 $644
Remaining
Principal $47,856 $57,020 $54,794 $48,588
See The Facts of ARMs, Housing Fin., Aug. 1982, at 2, 5.
128 A 1982 poll that FNMA commissioned indicated that notwithstanding recent price
stagnation, 22% of the respondents expected home prices in their area to go up "a lot" in
the next two or three years, and homeowners in general gave "investment" as their principal
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closed the deal-but it was not well founded. The interest rate
jumped to over 11% in year three, with a corresponding monthly
payment of over $860, and increased to almost 15% by year five,
with a monthly payment of over $1130. This disrupted the couple's
budget and forced them to borrow heavily. When the principal,
then over $92,000, fell due in year five, the house could not be sold
due to slow demand and the couple's inability to offer creative fi-
nancing. They defaulted, and the lender took over the house.
This scene has been enacted repeatedly in the last few years.
Like the last players in a Ponzi scheme, optimistic homebuyers
taking novel mortgages in 1977 to 1983 found themselves stranded
among high interest rates and a dead resale market. As a result,
many lost their homes or savings.229 Current federal regulations
provide little protection against the risks posed by these mortgages
when a financial institution makes the loan-and virtually no pro-
tection when a seller of an existing house makes it. 3o
Whenever the monthly payment might increase during the loan
term, the mortgagor-homebuyer faces mortgage payment uncer-
tainty, which poses three sorts of risks: default on the loan, pay-
ment shock at sudden big adjustments, and disruption of budget
planning when payments drift upward slowly or unpredictably.
These risks can be minimized by regulating the length of time be-
tween rate adjustments, by requiring the interest rate to be tied to
reason for buying. Buyers Would Accept ARMs-If They Understood Them, Builder, Oct.
1982, at 22, 23.
22 Econometric studies had originally predicted that ARMs would not yield default rates
in excess of those for standard fixed-rate mortgages. See, e.g, Vandell, Default Risk Under
Alternative Mortgage Instruments, 33 J. Fin. 1279, 1294 (1978). The experience of private
mortgage insurers as of 1984, however, has been that default on ARMs has been alarming.
The California Association of Realtors reports that the value of claims paid by private mort-
gage insurers increased from $29 billion in 1981 to $112 billion in 1983-largely as the result
of ARMs and other alternative mortgages. H. Snyder, supra note 70, at 15-16. A 1981 study
by MGIC predicted very high default rates by ARMs combined with GPMs, and industry
experience seems to be bearing this out. Id. at 16.
Balloon mortgages and other creative financing devices have also led to many defaults
and foreclosures. See Andrew, Houses of Cards--"Creative" Financing Ends in Foreclosure
For More Home Buyers, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Califoreclosure-Creative
Financing's Dark Side, Time, June 14, 1982, at 65. For a sensitive analysis of the human
consequences of foreclosures, see Brooks, Foreclosing on a Dream, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1982, at 68 (Magazine).
230 The Truth-in-Lending Act, for example, only applies to a creditor who "regularly ex-
tends... consumer credit which is payable by agreement in more than four installments or
for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)
(1982).
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a stable index, and by capping the amount of the rate increase in
any single period or over the life of the loan.2" Current federal
regulation, however, permits adjustment of interest rates and
monthly payments, based on any index verifiable by the borrower
and not subject to the lender's control; there is no ceiling on the
amount of rate adjustment.232 Thus, within a year after entering
into an ARM a family may be faced with monthly payments sev-
eral hundred dollars greater than they originally planned.
Some risks of payment uncertainty can be decreased by taking
an ARM in which interest rate increases are not immediately re-
flected in the monthly payment, or by taking a GPM that offers a
stable, relatively low monthly payment for the first several years.
This strategy, however, raises the problem of negative amortiza-
tion: the monthly payments do not cover the accrued interest,
which therefore becomes capitalized as part of the principal. At the
end of the period in which monthly payments are shielded from
increases attributable to the real interest rate, the homebuyer owes
more money than he originally borrowed. Negative amortization
restricts the homeowner's ability to sell the property, especially in
periods of sluggish demand, because the sale price may not cover
the increased principal plus the 6% to 7% broker's commission.233
Negative amortization also increases the risk of default on the
home mortgage loan.'" Despite these problems, federal regulation
generally permits negative amortization.
3 5
131 See Guttentag, Solving the Mortgage Menu Problem, 2 Housing Fin. Rev. 227, 234-36
(1983); Kaplan, Recommendations on Alternative Mortgage Instruments, in 1 Alternative
Mortgage Instruments Research Study, supra note 78, at I-1; Weinrobe, Analysis of Con-
sumer Safeguards for AMIs, in 3 Alteruative Mortgage Instruments Research Study, supra
note 78, at XXI-1.
Z" 12 C.F.R. §§ 29.3-.4 (1984) (Comptroller General regulations applicable to banks and
mortgage companies); id. § 545.33(e) (FHLBB regulations applicable primarily to savings
and loans).
233 S. Rohde, Unrestricted Adjustable Rate Mortgages: A Review of the Early Experience
and An Analysis of the Implications of Negative Amortization (July 27, 1981), reprinted in
Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Super-
vision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-157 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 ARM Hearings]; see H.
Snyder, supra note 70, at 8-10; Guttentag, supra note 231, at 237; Weinrobe, supra note 231,
at XXI-33 to -35.
23 See Crawford & Harper, Further Evidence on the Default Risk of AMLs, 1 Housing
Fin. Rev. 377 (1982); Webb, Borrower Risk Under Alternative Mortgage Instruments, 37 J.
Fin. 169 (1982).
233 12 C.F.R. pt. 29 (1984) (Comptroller General); id. § 545.33 (FHLBB)
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Negative amortization becomes even more serious when com-
bined with another problem source-balloon payments (unpaid
principal or interest due at the end of a loan term). Short term
(three-to-ten year) balloons represent a high-stakes gamble by the
home .purchaser that he can refinance the principal with a new
loan, or that he can sell the house for a price close to or higher
than the balloon.3 6 In 1977, there may have been some justifica-
tion for optimistic homebuyers to think (incorrectly, in retrospect)
that interest rates would not be higher in the future and that home
prices would continue their steep upward spiral. There is less basis
for optimism today.231 Balloons thus represent a significant risk
that the homebuyer will either default or lose a significant amount
of money in redeeming his investment. Balloons by financial insti-
tutions are substantially deregulated under the Gan Act,23s and
balloons taken back by individual sellers of existing homes are not
regulated at all.
Because of the publicized problems with alternative mortgage in-
struments, some consumer resistance to the riskiest instruments
has emerged. Moreover, lenders, secondary market buyers, and
mortgage insurers have a market incentive to discourage loans that
will end up in foreclosure and, as a result, have encouraged instru-
ments more protective of the consumer interest in not default-
ing.2 9 For example, in late 1983 FNMA and FHLMC adopted
three new ARM plans using Treasury rate indices, payment caps of
7.5% (no rate caps), and a negative amortization cap of 125%.240
236 See Weinrobe, supra note 231, at XXI-79 to -87.
M See L. Grebler & F. Mittelbach, supra note 145, at 157-69 (arguing that the stampede
of housing prices in 1975-1977 was similar to other periods of cyclical home price inflation,
certain to be followed by a period of price stability or even deflations); see also S. Rohde,
supra note 233, reprinted in 1981 ARM Hearings, supra note 233, at 125-57 (recent regula-
tory actions allowing significant amounts of negative amortization may permit loan balances
to increase as much as 10%, too high to be offset by increased property values, thus eroding
homeowner equity).
2" See supra note 68.
29 Lenders and secondary market buyers generally do not want to foreclose on mortgages
because of the administrative inconvenience involved, and some have recently called for
greater federal regulation of alternative instruments. See U.S. League to Tell Bank Board
that ARM Guidelines Should Be Adopted, 12 Housing & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 113 (July 2,
1984). FNMA and FHLMC, both public oriented buyers of mortgages on the secondary
market, have directed consumer and lender surveys in their efforts to develop guidelines for
alternative instruments they will purchase.
210 See Mylod, ARMs: Cream-of-One-Crop, Mortgage Banking, Aug. 1983, at 13.
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These new instruments significantly reduce the risk of default, but
do not address other risks. They still have an undesirable potential
for payment shocks: if interest rates go up sharply, deferred inter-
est will accumulate rapidly because the yearly payment cap will
prevent immediate pass-on of the full rate increase. Once the nega-
tive amortization limit of 125% is reached, however, the payments
may go up significantly. 41 The disruption of budget planning may
be even greater because some of the plans permit partial seller
buydowns.
More troubling is that many institutional lenders are still offer-
ing much riskier alternative mortgage instruments, including short
term balloons and teaser rate ARMs without rate or payment
caps. 42 This year, Congress heard testimony that lenders are offer-
ing loans advertised at 9% to 10% rates, which jump to 13% to
15% at the end of six months to one year and carry as much as
$400 per month in negative amortization.4 3 It is not apparent that
the marketplace will purge itself of these loans. Lenders and their
managers are under strong pressure to initiate a large volume of
loans. Like sellers that buy down the interest rate and then recover
the cost through a higher home price that is not as easily shopped,
lenders too believe they can attract more business by offering low
initial rate loans whose future risks are hard to evaluate and com-
pare.2  Also, brokers and builders (the source of most loan refer-
rals) encourage lenders to originate such loans and, through the
241 See J. Guttentag, supra note 76, at 26-28.
242 It appears, for example, that short term balloons with a below-market rate for the first
two years and a higher rate thereafter ("multiple rate balloons") are still being offered. See
Levary, Complex Calculations for Balloon Mortgages, Mortgage Banking, Oct. 1983, at 100.
A recent FHLMC Survey reports that only 55.1% of ARM loans have either a rate or pay-
ment cap (23.6% have a rate cap, 19.4% a payment cap, 12.2% both) and 11% of the ARM
loans adjust interest rates twice a year. See Lea, Freddie Mac ARM Lender Survey:. The
State of the Market, in What Makes an ARM Successful? 16-17 (1983) (FHLMC, Pub-
lisher). But see ARM Survey Finds Widespread Use of Rate, Payment Caps to Protect Bor-
rowers, 12 Housing & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 307 (Sept. 10, 1984). Moreover, a large number of
ARM loans and ARM programs bear an initial "hook" rate substantially below that for
fixed rate mortgages-some programs average 4% below market (with most being 2% to
3%).
2S See J. Paulson, Testimony Before the Housing Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 1 (July 25, 1984), reprinted in 1984 ARM Hearings,
supra note 70.
244 See J. Guttentag, supra note 76, at 21-23, 43.
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sales pitch, often persuade homebuyers to enter into them despite
their riskiness.
For example, assume that a homebuyer family in 1984 is in a
situation similar to that of the 1977 family: they cannot afford a
three-bedroom home in the area where they want to live-until
they see a Fancy Homes ad: "9.75% QUALIFYING INTEREST
RATE. BUY A $104,000 HOME FOR LESS!*" [Bottom of ad:
"*9.75% effective rate for six months, APR 12.5%"'].245 The loan
has adjustable rates, graduated payments, and a five-year bal-
loon-all features of concern to the homebuyers. These reserva-
tions can be overcome, however, through vivid, easily available
promotional materials that Fancy Homes developed or has re-
ceived from the National Association of Homebuilders. One chart
shows the appreciation of homes between 1970 and 1981. Even af-
ter accounting for the negative amortization, the chart indicates
that the home will be worth much more than the outstanding bal-
ance after a few years if the appreciation rate continues.2 46 A sec-
ond chart shows that a 1970 buyer having a similar adjustable
mortgage would not have faced alarming payment increases
through 1984; this could rebut homebuyer worries about rate and
payment adjustments.4 7 Another chart shows the homebuyers that
if they consider the tax deductions for mortgage interest and prop-
erty taxes plus the probable appreciation on their home, their in-
vestment will be even more profitable.248 Having overcome the
homebuyers' initial reservations by generalizing from these specific
24' This example is based on the real life one presented by Realtor Jack Paulson. See J.
Paulson, supra note 243, at 4-5.
246 Part of the action selling technique is to be very optimistic about the investment value
of the house. See, e.g., A New House Is The Best Investment You Can Make And NOW Is
The Time To Buy, Prof. Builder, Ap't Bus., Nov. 1980, at 90; Goodkin, Tools For Selling In
Credit Crunch, Prof. Builder, Ap't Bus., June 1980, at 75 ("[m]ake people comprehend that
real estate is the best option against inflation."). The National Association of Home Build-
ers touts the healthy appreciation of homes in the 1970's. See Marketing Strategies to Sell
Homes, supra note 76.
147 See Kamath & Raimer, Do VRMs Really Transfer Interest Rate Risks?, Real Est.
Rev., Spring 1981, at 105-08 (1970 VRM starting at a lower initial rate than a fixed-rate
mortgage would yield only a few hundred dollars' difference in total cost over 10 years,
though a VRM originated in 1975-1978 would create more financial pressure on buyers).
248 The salesperson could use "The Real Cost of Ownership After Tax Benefits" and "Tax
Savings Under the 1982 Tax Law" developed by the NAHB, see Marketing Strategies to
Sell Homes, supra note 76, at 3 (these were used by 34% and 15% of builders in 1982), or
some other promotional materials that dramatically limit the costs of owning. See Goodkin,
supra note 246, at 75 (use simple charts to show how tax deductions subsidize the mortgage
payment).
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examples (using the representativeness heuristic), the salesperson
sees a chance to clinch the deal. "You are losing tons of money as
renters! If you wait even a year to buy a house, this eleven-year
average suggests that the house will cost $110,000. Even with bar-
gain financing you could not qualify for a loan at that point." 4"
The homebuyers buy the house and agree to the GPAML with a
balloon payment at the end of five years. Apart from the false at-
tractiveness of the "bargain" interest rate used to hook the
homebuyers, the homebuyers do not really understand how big a
risk they are taking. By anchoring their decision to the investment
projections of the sales agent, the homebuyers may underap-
preciate the prospect of a rate jump to 13% after six months, and
a steep rise in monthly payments or negative amortization thereaf-
ter. The worksheets and graphics frequently used by builders and
brokers to ease buyer objections to high prices and chancy mort-
gage rates often tell only part of the truth. For example, the second
chart correctly notes that home prices went up a good deal in the
1970's, but does not disclose forecasters' predictions that any rise
in the 1980's will be far more modest.2 0 A home costing $100,000
in 1984 probably will not cost $110,000 in 1985. No one can predict
the course of mortgage rates, moreover, in the next five years.
Thus, a chart that accurately describes the history of an ARM en-
tered in 1970 is no more representative than a chart showing the
terrible consequences of a 1977 ARM. Only the first chart, how-
ever, is developed for the prospective homebuyers.
Real estate brokers often use these same optimistic techniques
to persuade buyers and nonbuilder-sellers to engage in risky crea-
'4 The salesperson might use "The Cost of Waiting for Lower Interest Rates" developed
by the National Association of Home Builders, and used by 33% of its builders in 1982, see
Marketing Strategies to Sell Homes, supra note 76, at 3, to show the qualification problems
if prices were to increase and interest rates not diminish (a very questionable assumption).
See also Yes, You Can Afford To Buy A New Home, Prof. Builder, Sept. 1981, at 103 (chart
showing that owning will save $32,935; critical assumption is that home will appreciate each
year).
250 See generally L. Grebler & F. Mittelbach, supra note 145, at 157-69; 1981 ARM Hear-
ings, supra note 233, at 85-87 (statement of A. Fishbein, Director, Neighborhood Revitaliza-
tion Project, Center for Community Change) (relatively high national average rate of in-
crease in sales prices has, at least for present, dramatically changed). For the first six
months of 1981, real home prices declined 2.8%; appreciation between August 1980 and
March 1981 was virtually nil. See S. Rohde, supra note 233, at 126-27. Even in periods of
housing inflation, certain neighborhoods may not "keep up" with the overall increases,
pinching homeowners in those areas. Id. at 127-28.
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tive financing. The buyer cannot obtain a mortgage at prevailing
rates, and the seller does not want to give a price concession. The
broker therefore persuades both parties to enter into a short term
balloon note, with an inflated selling price and below-market inter-
est rate. The broker may be able to minimize the apparent riski-
ness of the loan through charts showing enormous home apprecia-
tion and rosy forecasts about interest rates.
The unsophisticated seller, advised mainly by the optimistic bro-
ker, is even more prone to finance a risky mortgage instrument
than is the institutional lender-and even more vulnerable to the
ramifications of the buyer's default. A 1983 Rand Corporation
study of the California mortgage market reports that as a result of
below-market financing (and sellers' factoring the cost of financing
back into home prices), over 75% of all California homes sold in
1981 had nominal prices greater than their cash values, and over
25% of the buyers could not have resold the homes for enough to
pay off the loans.251 Defaults are rising as these loans fall due be-
cause property values have not increased much and because the
original loans were so unsound that institutional lenders will not
refinance them. The study projects that home purchasers will con-
tinue to depend on creative (seller) financing through 1986, typi-
cally at below-market rates with short term balloons. This surge of
unregulated, unsound creative financing creates the danger of a de-
fault crisis in the future. 52
III. INTEGRATED FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE RESIDENTIAL FIRST
MORTGAGE TRANSACTION: REDUCING CONSUMER ERRORS
After more than a century of regulatory effort on their behalf,
homebuyers are still subject to unfair dealing in connection with
home mortgages and related charges. Given one hundred years of
ineptitude253 in state (usury) and then federal (disclosure) regula-
tion of home mortgages, one may wonder whether any regulation is
worthwhile.254 This question cannot be definitively answered here,
251 I. Lowry, C. Hillestad & S. Sarma, supra note 172, at 195-97.
25 A buyer default crisis, according to the Rand study, might trigger a chain reaction of
seller defaults as well. Id. at 212-19.
253 Apologies to G. Garcia-Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude (1970).
14 Professor O'Connell cogently argues that many of the defects in the insurance industry
are "cultural" (beyond the ability of conventional forms of regulation to affect), and some
may even have been encouraged by ineffective regulation. See O'Connell, The Frustrations
of Insurance, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 847 (1974).
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but two reasons suggest continued regulatory concern. One justifi-
cation for regulation is its norm-setting role: rules signal the mar-
ketplace participants that our society will not tolerate in-
termediaries' taking advantage of consumers' vulnerability when
they seek home mortgages. Also, regulation has produced some
tangible benefits. Empirical studies suggest that, overall, the
Truth-in-Lending Act has made consumers more aware of credit
costs, and RESPA has made them more aware of closing costs.255
This increased awareness has in turn generated some increase in
shopping, which improves the competitiveness of the loan and set-
tlement industries. 25 Furthermore, federal regulations have proba-
bly caused many lenders to be more cautious about recommending
settlement providers and alternative mortgage instruments, and to
make a greater effort to inform consumers about costs and risks.257
Although the evidence is far from conclusive, disclosure seems to
be one useful mode of regulation. The effectiveness of disclosure
regulation could be significantly increased, and the unintended
negative effects reduced, however, by a more sophisticated regula-
tory regime. Disclosures best inform the consumer and encourage
shopping if they contain accurate information, are useful and com-
prehensible, and are provided before tentative decisions are
made.258 The accuracy of disclosures would be improved by includ-
ing all charges in the APR. Disclosures would be further improved
255 1 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at 1.2 (RESPA); T. Durkin & G. Elliehauser,
1977 Consumer Credit Survey 7, table 2-1 (1978) (level of APR awareness increased from
14.5% in 1969 to 54.5% in 1977).
25 See 1 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at HI.2 (RESPA disclosures induced 10%
of shoppers to engage in comparative shopping; shopping is one reason why inflation in title
charges was modest in the 1970's); T. Durkin & G. Elliehauser, supra note 255, at 23-24 (few
consumers shop more because of heightened APR awareness, but their shopping makes the
market more competitive for all consumers).
267 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at 11.2; E. Gray, supra note 70, at 8, 11-17
(FHLBB concern for prudent alternative mortgage practices has encouraged the industry to
develop in a responsible manner).
258 A leading study, Day, Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure Requirements,
J. Marketing, Apr. 1976, at 42, 47, concluded that disclosures are most effective
when the buyer (a) has easy access to the information at the point of sale, (b) can
readily comprehend and process the information, and (c) can use it to make direct
comparisons of the choice alternatives along relevant attributes-in short, when the
information is easy to use and relevant to the choice process.
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if they provided comparative data for all mortgages and concrete
"worst case" rate and payment scenarios for adjustable mortgages.
Greater standardization of mortgage instruments should comple-
ment this disclosure strategy, especially for new alternative mort-
gages. By removing minor matters from the shopping process and
cutting away the huge diversity of alternative mortgages, standard-
ization could mitigate the existing tension between providing com-
plete disclosures and avoiding information overload. Because of the
risks involved in ARMs and other alternative mortgage instru-
ments, federal standardization should include specific consumer
protections for these mortgages.
Disclosure plus standardization may be an incomplete solution,
however, because many consumer mortgage problems can be traced
to the structure of the real estate industry and the sales process.
To the extent that some mortgage-related problems are structural,
systemic changes may be justified to protect consumers. One such
problem arises from homebuyers' reliance on self-interested in-
termediaries for advice about mortgages and settlement services.
Ideally, these consumers should have "buyers' agents" to advise
them. Some homebuyers retain agents now, but it is unclear
whether this practice will become widespread in the near future.
Until it does, there should be more specific common-law or federal
fiduciary standards for intermediaries to explain misleading sales
gimmicks, to be honest about the range of prices and any business
connection between the intermediary and a referred provider, and
to set forth the risks of alternative mortgages.
A second structural problem is the rise of controlled loan and
settlement providers. Some evidence suggests that controlled pro-
viders charge higher prices and deliver inferior service. Until more
decisive conclusions can be made, no structural reforms should be
adopted. At a minimum, though, consumers should be warned
about the potential dangers of a formally integrated transaction
and given the opportunity to opt out of it. A final systemic prob-
lem arises from the patterns of cooperation found within the real
estate sale, financing, and settlement industry. Prophylactic rules
and the application of antitrust precepts should be used to disrupt
systematic anticompetitive behavior.
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A. More Effective Disclosures to Homebuyers
It is time to refine the philosophy of federal disclosure rules."5 9
Reform lies neither in requiring fewer disclosures (the approach of
the Simplification Act) nor in requiring more (the FHLBB's ap-
proach to alternative mortgages). Instead, federal regulations
should provide disclosures that more accurately reflect the total
costs and risks of the loan and that consumers can realistically use
during the shopping process.
1. More Accurate Disclosure of the Cost and Risk of Mortgages
The keystone of existing disclosure rules is the APR, a standard-
ized measure of the cost of credit that can be advertised, quoted to
buyers, and compared across lenders. The APR must be re-evalu-
ated because it understates the true cost of credit for standard
fixed-rate mortgages, can be manipulated by sellers paying
buydown fees or lenders advertising low initial rates, and is virtu-
ally meaningless for many alternative mortgage instruments. To
address these accuracy problems, there must be new rules for APR
calculation, advertisement, and (in connection with ARMs)
supplementation.
a. Expanded Definition of Finance Charges Used to
Calculate the APR
Many charges are not currently considered part of the finance
charge even though they accrue to the lender's benefit-seller's
points, title insurance, attorney's fees, appraisal charges, and credit
checks. These charges are analytically indistinguishable, however,
from charges that are included-buyer's points, mortgage insur-
ance, and origination fees.28 0 This phenomenon is problematic be-
'", There may also be a bureaucratic problem as a result of the plethora of disclosure
regimes-the Truth-in-Lending Act administered by the Federal Reserve Board and FTC,
RESPA administered by HUD, and the alternative mortgage rules for specific lenders ad-
ministered by the FHLBB, Comptroller General, and the National Credit Union. Although
the agencies have done a commendable job of coordinating their rules, a unified disclosure
regime administered by the Federal Reserve Board could reduce some of the regulatory
overlap that now occurs. For example, the Housing Subcommittee of the House Banking
Committee called upon the Federal Reserve Board this summer to take the lead in develop-
ing more helpful disclosure rules for alternative mortgage instruments (specifically, to re-
quire "worst case" disclosures).
14o See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
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cause in the integrated transaction; the builder, broker, or banker
has an incentive to "bleed" expenses from the APR items to those
not included in the finance charge. That is, because the APR is so
easily shopped and compared, lowering it may create a false bar-
gain when the bleeding results in a higher home price, title charge,
or insurance burden, all of which are harder to compare.
A payment by the homebuyer should be part of the finance
charge if it is "imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an
incident to the extension of credit." 261 The Act's original philoso-
phy assumes a functional definition of finance charge that, carried
to its logical conclusion, should include not only interest charges
but also premiums for insurance that lenders require; estimated
fees for credit reports, surveys, or appraisals that lenders require;
estimated attorney or other fees necessary to prepare the mortgage
documents, unless the buyer retains his own attorney; loan or ser-
vice charges and buyer's points; and seller's commitment and
buydown points.
The APR should also be calculated on the basis of the loan's
expected life rather than its nominal term. It would be the rate
that would yield the finance charge "when it is applied to the un-
paid balances of the amount financed, calculated according to the
actuarial method of allocating payments made on a debt between
the amount financed and the amount of the finance charge" 2 2 (as-
suming that the loan were paid off after its expected life). For ex-
ample, if the loan's expected life were twelve years,28 3 the finance
charge would include the net expected interest payments plus an-
ticipated lender-required insurance premiums plus up front
charges (e.g., points and title insurance). The APR would be the
rate needed to generate this total over the twelve-year loan term.2
notes 15-30 (state usury law approach to what is included as interest).
261 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1982).
262 Id. § 1606(a)(1)(A).
262 Twelve years is the figure used by a standard lender yield table to calculate the num-
ber of points needed to buy down interest rates. FNMA, supra note 168, at 4, 7 ff.
264 This differs from the present method of computing the APR in at least one significant
respect. Under the current system, the lender simply adds any up front charges to the total
interest charges projected over the 30-year life of the mortgage and computes the APR from
that total "finance charge." This method results in the understating of the lender's return
from the up front charges (such as points) because mortgage loans are generally paid off
before their term-meaning that the lender receives the principal within 12 years or less and
can then lend it out again, charging more up front points.
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Oral statements and advertisements including credit terms would
have to use this APR. The Truth-in-Lending Act disclosure state-
ment would reveal the total principal and the total finance charge
plus a breakdown into interest charge (interest plus points) and
ancillary charge components, in addition to this APR.
The proposed finance charge definition (embracing many cur-
rently excluded charges) and the proposed calculation of the APR
(based upon the expected life of the loan rather than its term)
would make the APR a more realistic indication of the real cost of
credit for the home mortgagor. It could also make shopping easier
and give lenders an incentive to minimize closing costs. The propo-
sal incorporates the advantages of the "lender pay" concept, but
without its main drawbacks.
In the early 1970's, Professor, now Dean, Whitman formulated
the lender pay concept. He suggested that the law compel lenders
to pay all closing and financing expenses except for prepaid items
and taxes. The lender would be expected to cover the expenses ei-
ther by charging a higher interest rate or (according to a later ver-
sion of the proposal) by charging one lump sum.2 65 The advantage
of lender pay is that it requires a knowledgeable party to shop and
pay for closing services. Because the cost would be included in the
easy-to-compare interest charge or lump sum, the lender would
have a substantial incentive to eliminate marginal services and to
shop for the lowest price. 266 The present proposal gives lenders an
even more powerful incentive: the estimated closing charges are re-
flected both in a lump sum on the disclosure statement and in the
disclosed and advertised APR.
245 Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62 Geo. L.J. 1311,
1346 (1974), proposed that (1) mortgage lenders be required by federal law to pay all closing
costs; (2) mortgage lenders be required to provide homebuyers with title and settlement
services equivalent in quality to those services obtained by lenders for their own benefit;
and (3) mortgage lenders would not be permitted to charge homebuyers or sellers any fees,
discounts, or other charges except simple interest.
266 Id. at 1346-47. Professor Stoppello has argued that lender pay will not necessarily put
pressure on lenders to shop carefully (and thereby keep their stated interest rate as low as
possible) because loan rates themselves are not competitive. Stoppello, supra note 54, at
400-11 (1979). Although Professor Wallace contends that "[t]here is no significant evidence
that loan rates are not competitive," Wallace, supra note 54, at 247 n.232, the Peat Marwick
Study found interest rate dispersion that may indicate imperfect mortgage loan competition
in some markets under certain circumstances. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, the Peat Marwick Study found the market for loans to be one of worka-
ble competition, and it seems quite clear that the mortgage loan industry is much more
competitive than that for most loan-related closing expenses.
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Despite lender pay's conceptual strength and enduring political
support in the last decade, it encountered serious opposition
within the mortgage industry and in Congress. 87 Lenders objected
that they did not want the added administrative burden of retain-
ing settlement service providers. Consumer advocates objected that
lender pay deprived consumers of any role in choosing settlement
providers. Members of Congress were concerned that lender pay
would encourage the proliferation of settlement providers con-
trolled by big lenders.268
By redefining the Truth-in-Lending Act finance charge to in-
clude lender-dictated settlement expenses, this article's proposal
avoids these concerns. It does not impose substantial burdens on
the lender, but instead provides an incentive for lenders to
reevaluate loan-related services and to seek out the least expensive
provider. More important, this present proposal preserves the
buyer's freedom to shop for settlement providers charging prices
that are lower than those estimated by the lender. As Professor
Wallace has observed in his critique of lender pay, a disclosure-
oriented approach may have the advantages of lender pay while
permitting greater consumer flexibility.
26 e
b. Including Seller's Points in the Finance Charge
An advantage of this expanded finance charge definition is that
it would reduce consumer confusion often caused by the use of
seller's points to buy down the interest rate while raising the price.
267 Senator Proxmire introduced legislation embodying Professor Whitman's proposal.
See S. 3232, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 8091 (1974) (remarks of Senator
Proxmire). Representatives of the Reagan administration proposed "lender packaging," in
which the lender would provide all settlement services and charge a lump sum for the pack-
age. 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140, at 7-9 (statement of Dr. E. Savas, Ass't Sec.
Policy Dev. & Research, HUD); id. at 74 n.2 (statement ofT. Stanton & J. Brown, FTC); see
3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, ch. IV (evaluating and generally approving lender
pay concept). The Senate rejected Senator Proxmire's proposal in favor of the disclosure
and anti-kickback rules of RESPA. See Real Estate Settlement Costs: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. (1973-1974). The Reagan administration proposals were also not acted upon by
Congress.
268 See, e.g., 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140, at 30-31, 39-40 (remarks of Rep. Pat-
terson); id. at 41-43 (remarks of Rep. Carman); id. at 44, 140-42 (remarks of Rep. Gonzalez).
269 Wallace, supra note 54, at 256; see 1979 Simplification Act Hearing, supra note 58, at
32-33 (statement of R. Hobbs, Nat'l Consumer Law Center).
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Allowing sellers to buy down the advertised interest rate can be
deceptive because homebuyers often assume that the points are
not built into the home's price. The proposal adopts the bright-line
rule that seller's points should be added to the finance charge, and
rejects the pre-1981 rule that seller's points should be included
only to the extent that sellers pass them on as part of the home
price. Although the pre-1981 rule has a distinguished history in
state usury regulation,27 0 lenders cannot realistically determine
how much of the seller's payment has been passed on to consum-
ers. In addition, lender competition for homebuilder and broker re-
ferrals creates an incentive for lenders to be conservative in esti-
mating the amount of seller's points passed on to consumers.27 1 A
pass-on rule is simply an invitation for lenders to ignore seller's
points, as they did in the 1970's.
An alternative to the proposed bright-line rule would be to re-
quire the disclosure of the information recommended by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board staff in 1982. The staff recommended that
seller's points not be included in the finance charge (APR), but
that advertisements would have to alert consumers that "[t]o ob-
tain financing for you at the annual percentage rate shown, the
seller may have incurred some costs, and these costs may be in-
cluded in the purchase price you pay. '27 2 This approach apprises
170 See Johnson v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 271 Ark. 588, 609 S.W.2d 60 (1980);
Schleimer v. McPherson, 60 A.D.2d 837, 400 N.Y.S.2d 566, appeal dismissed, 44 N.Y.2d 730,
405 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1978); Maynard v. England, 13 Wash. App. 961, 967-68, 538 P.2d 551, 555
(1975).
271 If one bank consistently includes seller's points in the finance charge and another
bank does not, builders and brokers-who want to be able to advertise low-rate bargain
rates-will tend to take their business to the second. Thus, a "competition of laxness" in
computing seller's points in the finance charge (and APR) characterized lenders and sellers
in the 1970's, when the Federal Reserve Board's "pass-on" test was in effect. In the 1980's,
when many builders and brokers own their own mortgage subsidiaries, the controlled lender
is even less likely to include the seller's points in the finance charge.
17' Fed. Reserve Bd. Div. of Consumer & Community Affairs, Seller's Points Under Regu-
lation Z (Truth-in-Lending) 10 (Sept. 27, 1982) [hereinafter cited as FRB Seller's Points
Memo.] (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). The staff memorandum
evaluated various alternatives for dealing with seller's points. It rejected a "pass-on" rule
because it would have involved complicated and expensive calculations by lenders and prob-
ably would have resulted in inconsistent practices (some lenders would routinely include
seller's points, others rarely, if ever). Id. at 7. Two other proposals, requiring disclosure that
seller's points had been paid and that the home price might be affected, were rejected be-
cause they would have required revamping Truth-in-Lending Act disclosure statements and
would have imposed unjustifiable burdens on lenders. Id. at 9-10. The staff rejected the
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the consumer of the general problem, relieves the lender of the
sticky determination of the amount of points passed on to the con-
sumer, and permits the seller to market the home through a low
APR rather than a low home price.
The staff's 1982 proposal, however, would confuse or mislead
many homebuyers. The proposed language is so contingent and
general (seller "may" have incurred costs, which "may" be in-
cluded in the price) that the consumer is likely to pay little atten-
tion to it; if he does ask the builder or broker about the relation
between the home price and the loan rate, the sales pitch can mini-
mize the relationship. 73 Soft approaches have simply not worked
to regulate seller's points. The only approach that will work is a
hard rule that seller's points must be included in the finance
charge.
The only real objection to the proposed rule would be that it is
unclear whether "most" or merely "some" seller's points are
passed on as part of the home price. 4 Common sense suggests,
however, that a seller offering a lower interest rate will generally
charge a higher home price. The evidence is overwhelming that
most, and often all, of the seller's points are reflected in the home
pricey. Even in 1981-1982, when many sellers offered low-rate fi-
nancing without raising prices, housing demand was so depressed
that sellers would have been forced to cut prices otherwise-so the
failure to reduce prices was itself a way of having home prices re-
1981 rule that seller's points are not part of the finance charge and not otherwise disclosed
because it found that
seller's points are in some instances passed along to the consumer in part or in full
.... When the seller's points passed on are substantial, the APR that is calculated
excluding seller's points is significantly different from the APR that would result if
the points were treated as a finance charge. This could lead to misleading cost disclo-
sures concerning the credit transaction.
Id. at 6. The Board of Governors, however, voted in favor of this last proposal.
273 See supra text accompanying note 178.
274 See Fed. Reserve Bd. Seller's Points Memo., supra note 272, at 7 (although seller's
points are "often" passed on "to some extent," staff believed that degree of problem in 1982
or in the future was very unclear); Fed. Reserve Bd. Div. of Consumer and Community
Affairs, Summary of Comments on the Treatment of Seller's Points (Regulation Z) 2-6
(Sept. 28, 1982) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
275 See supra note 167 (summarizing empirical studies); J. Guttentag, supra note 76, at 11
& n.1 (citing unpublished studies that "find that some significant portion of the true value
of concessionary financing terms is capitalized in house prices"); Benfield, The Effect of
Credit Regulation on Real Estate Transactions, 25 Bus. Law. 501, 501-02 & n.2 (1970).
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flect seller's points. Because seller's points are passed on to con-
sumers to some extent, they should be included in the finance
charge.
c. Limiting Teaser Rates
Under the rule proposed thus far, the seller could buy down the
interest rate for the first several years of the loan and advertise a
bargain, or teaser, rate if the term of the low rate and the APR
(including the buydown points) were both revealed. Because the
buydown is only for a year or two, the points would not increase
the APR significantly, and many homebuyers would still be lured
by the apparent bargain or the ability to qualify for a larger loan.
Similarly, lenders advertising very low initial rates for ARMs may
attract homebuyers to very risky investments. These meretricious
mortgages require additional regulatory attention. Recent FNMA
and FHLMC mortgage plans limit initial teaser rates by stipulat-
ing that the monthly payment on loans they purchase may not in-
crease by more than 7.5% in any given year.2"6 This approach is
sound and should be incorporated into federal regulations of alter-
native mortgages.
2. "Worst Case" or "Bad Case" Disclosures for Adjustable Mort-
gage Instruments
The APR can be a useful shopping tool for standard mortgages
and GPMs where the schedule of payments is known at the loan
initiation. It is less useful, however, for mortgages whose rates fluc-
tuate with a market index (ARMs). The APR for such loans is an
average of the projected interest rate for each year of the loan, us-
ing the current index rate.2" This projection may mislead consum-
ers: the firm numerical value suggests much greater certainty
276 See Mylod, supra note 240, at 13. At the 1984 ARM Hearings, Professor Guttentag
proposed that mortgage payments not increase more than 10% per year, as one way of dis-
couraging teaser rates. J. Guttentag, supra note 76. The lower FNMA/FHLMC figure may
be preferable because it is closer to the expected rate of income inflation for the 1980's.
Gordon Steinbach of MGIC (the main mortgage insurer) believes that a 7.5% yearly pay-
ment increase is "about the maximum that's prudent." Quoted in H. Snyder, supra note 70,
at 8.
'77 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.22 (1984); id. pt. 226, Supp. I-Official Staff Interpretations, Com-
ment 22(a)(1)-4; 49 Fed. Reg. 13,482, 13,485 (Apr. 5, 1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
226, Supp. I-Official Staff Interpretations, Comment 18(f)-8).
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about the future than is reasonable s.2 7  The APR also does not re-
veal significant risks inherent in some of the adjustable mortgages.
These problems do not necessarily support the elimination of
APR disclosure for ARMs, but instead suggest that their Truth-in-
Lending Act disclosures and advertisements must at least reveal
the APR's contingent nature. In any event, a more meaningful
disclosure for these mortgages would give a concrete indication of
how the interest rate and the monthly payment might fluctuate.
The FHLBB requires disclosure of a scenario of the interaction of
all the loan's variable features over any period of time.28 0 This
form of disclosure is useful because it illustrates how the loan
works in dollars-and-cents terms-it is information vividly
presented to the consumer. Unfortunately, the FHLBB scenario
typically paints a rather safe picture, if anything reinforcing the
message of the sales pitch.
A worst case scenario is needed so that the consumer can see the
possible downside risks.28" The scenario for an ARM might assume
that interest rates will rise substantially (to the extent allowed by
caps) and demonstrate the effect this rise would have on the rates
and monthly payments for each year of the loan, together with the
278 Another possible problem is that sellers and lenders may have a long term incentive to
push ARMs in periods when they expect the index to increase, thus creating a bias in the
APR that causes it to understate risk. For example, if the ARM index were currently 12%
and expected to increase, lenders would want buyers to enter into ARMs and would be
willing to offer the loans at an initial rate significantly below that which they charge for
fixed-rate mortgages. Encouraged by brokers, homebuyers would then gravitate toward what
appears to them to be a much better deal than it really is. On the other hand, if interest
rates were 17% and expected to fall, lenders would not offer a low initial rate for ARMs and
would not push them with consumers.
279 Suggested language for forms and advertisements stating APR:
Because the future interest rate on this loan will fluctuate with a market index, the
APR is a projection that assumes that the current index rate applies for the life of
the loan. This is an assumption of convenience. THE APR FOR THIS LOAN OVER
TIME WILL DEVIATE FROM THE QUOTED APR.
280 12 C.F.R. § 545.33(0(11) (1984). The Comptroller General requires a 10-year historical
series tracing the index chosen for the ARM, but does not require that the lender show what
effect increases in the index will have on the mortgage rate, monthly payments, or the prin-
cipal. Id. § 29.7(a)(3).
281 The FHLBB's VRM Regulations issued in 1978, and amended in 1979, required lend-
ers to set forth a worst case schedule for the VRM, showing every maximum increase at the
time it could first occur, the highest possible payment during the loan term, and the total
cost over the term of the loan, including a statement that extension of the maturity would
increase the total cost of credit. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(c)(5)(ii) (1980). This requirement has
been superseded by the Board's AML Regulations, described in the text.
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principal outstanding at the end of each year (loans with a gradu-
ated payment element would show increasing principal amounts in
the early part of the loan). 82 The advantage of worst case disclos-
ure is that it gives homebuyers concrete facts (rate, monthly pay-
ment, and loan balance) that also indicate the risk of fluctuation.
The disadvantage of worst case disclosure is that it is not a realis-
tic indication of what might happen. For that reason, a bad case
scenario (reflecting pessimistic assumptions) might be required
instead.
Even a two-scenario disclosure would not necessarily enable con-
sumers to make accurate comparisons. For example, assume two
adjustable mortgages. Mortgage A is tied to one-year Treasury
notes, bears an initial rate of 9.875%, has no yearly rate cap but
has a 5% life-of-loan cap and a 4.875% floor rate. Mortgage B is
tied to three-year Treasury notes, bears an initial rate of 12 %, and
has a cap of 2% for each three-year change, a 4.5% life-of-loan
cap, and a 12% floor. Also, assume two scenarios, one providing an
example of rising and volatile interest rates and another a period
of relative stability.2 83 The ten-year average for Mortgage A is
13.15% under the bad case scenario and 11.74% under the stable
181 Professor Guttentag has proposed that disclosures for ARMs include three schedules
for two scenarios-(1) an "interest cost" schedule setting forth the average interest rate for
each year of the loan, (2) a mortgage payment schedule showing the projected monthly prin-
cipal-and-interest payment for each year, and (3) a loan balance schedule for each year. See
J. Guttentag, supra note 76.
28 This hypothetical is taken from a chart developed in Berry, Choosing Mortgage May
Be Harder Than Choosing House: Analysis Shows Different Performance of Adjustable
Loans, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 1984, at El; id. at col. 4, E62 (reproduced in full as Appendix 1
to this article). I have scrambled the order of the scenarios. The stable scenario noted in
text is scenario 2 below; the first volatile scenario in text is scenario 1 below. The second
two volatile scenarios (invoked in the following paragraph in text) are scenarios 3 and 4
below-
Year Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4
1984 11 11 11 11
1985 14 12 12 14
1986 15 9 15 9
1987 10 9 8 10
1988 9 10 9 11
1989 11 12 11 14
1990 12 8 12 10
1991 14 9 9 12
1992 9 8 12 15
1993 11 8 14 8
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scenario, while the averages for Mortgage B are 13.75% and
11.95%. The homebuyer would probably assume that Mortgage A
is "better" than Mortgage B, but he would not necessarily be right.
If the highest interest rates in the bad case scenario occur in
different years, Mortgage B would have the edge. Its ten-year aver-
ages of 12.25% and 12.85% would be demonstrably better than the
Mortgage A averages of 13.01% and 12.95%. By chance, Mortgage
B's years of adjustment were low-rate years under the previous two
scenarios. For this reason, disclosure of several scenarios would be
useful for homebuyers.8 4
3. Comparative Data Presented During the Shopping Process
The APR for a loan and its specific closing cost components are
of diminished value to the consumer if he does not receive them
during the decisionmaking process or if it is hard to compare them
with the deals that other lenders and settlement service providers
offer. Mortgage disclosure regulations should be amended to re-
quire intermediaries to provide some type of comparative disclo-
sures before a loan application is made if they make representa-
tions about financing or recommend a specific loan. Alternatively,
HUD or another appropriate agency should periodically publicize
comparative loan and settlement service data.
a. Comparative Disclosures
Current disclosures only provide loan and settlement cost infor-
mation about the mortgage for which the homebuyer applies. Yet
sometimes the homebuyer fails to shop because he assumes incor-
rectly that all lenders and providers charge about the same
price.2 5 Psychological studies suggest that if consumers are
"2 The broader lesson to be drawn from this hypothetical is that no disclosure can tell
homebuyers exactly what their likely rate on an ARM will be because there is no crystal ball
for the course of interest rates. See W. Eskridge, Call to ARMs: Protecting Consumers Who
Enter into Adjustable Rate Mortgages 18-19, 23-25, 26-28 (June 21, 1984), reprinted in 1984
ARM Hearings, supra note 70.
" The Peat Marwick Study surveyed both borrowers and lenders to determine why 64%
of all homebuyers do not shop for a loan. 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100. Nearly
two-thirds of the lenders surveyed believed that homebuyers assume that all lender institu-
tions are the same (though homebuyers themselves gave this as the main reason for not
shopping in only 12% of the responses). Id. at X.14. Of the 34% of the homebuyers who did
engage in shopping activity, 78% (in the first survey) and 84% (in a second survey) believed
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presented with a display of unitized price data in systematic tabu-
lar arrays, they are more likely to comparison shop because such
arrays negate conditions for bolstering and shifting responsibil-
ity.25 6 Comparative price information should therefore be made
available to homebuyers as part of the standard Truth-in-Lending
Act disclosures.
Consumers interested in a fixed-rate mortgage should have avail-
able a list of mortgage lenders plus their current APR rates plus
lump sums of estimated closing costs. Similarly, the consumer
should have referral lists of mortgage insurers, title companies or
agents, and other settlement providers.287 Consumers interested in
alternative mortgage instruments should be given an array of se-
lected alternative instruments, with columns comparing the main
variable features and a tabular comparison of interest rates for
those selected loans under four scenarios.2 8
Homebuyers should have these comparative disclosures; the
question is how they should be provided. Such tabular compari-
sons are now developed and distributed in many metropolitan real
estate markets to help brokers and builders shop for mortgage
rates.28 9 Regulators should select a few areas and require in-
termediaries to subscribe to approved comparison services on a
trial basis and to distribute the weekly-updated sheets to consum-
ers. If the experiment works, it could be expanded to other real
estate markets.
that their shopping efforts were worthwhile. Id. at X.17.
I" Russo, Krieser & Miyashita, An Effective Display of Unit Price Information, J. Mar-
keting, Apr. 1975, at 11, found that "unit pricing" in grocery stores (giving total price plus
price per unit for a product) did not generate increased shopping behavior on the part of
consumers. The explanation was that although useful information was available to consum-
ers, they found it too difficult to process because of the diffuse way it was displayed. The
authors tested the effectiveness of using a single, organized list of all raw prices and corre-
sponding unit prices and found that for relatively homogeneous products (e.g., dishwashing
liquid and facial tissue) the organized list significantly increased consumer sensitivity to
price differentials and stimulated shopping behavior. Id.
217 Cf. 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at Ill.26-.28 (recommending referral lists of
mortgage insurers); id. at mT1.49-.50 (recommending referral lists of title insurers and
attorneys).
2U See infra Appendix 1.
"I See 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at Im.16-.17 (publishing services in se-
lected areas of the country collect and publish comparative mortgage financing terms up-
dated frequently, often weekly).
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b. Disclosures During the Shopping Process
Although homebuyers typically make a tentative commitment to
specific loans while shopping, most disclosures are not made until
they actually apply for a loan. The psychological dynamics of the
home sale and loan transaction suggest that more information
needs to be given to homebuyers during the shopping process.
Lenders or credit arrangers should make some or all of these dis-
closures available to homebuyers upon oral inquiry or when they
receive application forms. Thus, the lender or sales agent must
under current law give the APR whenever the lender or agent pro-
vides any interest rate quotation (orally or in writing) to a
borrower. 9 o
If the transaction is integrated, the basic disclosures (APR, good
faith estimate of closing costs, settlement booklet) should be made
by the sales agent if he makes representations about financing or
recommends a specific loan.2 91 For example, homebuilders offering
pre-arranged financing should have standard mortgage disclosure
forms on hand at their model homes, so that sales representatives
can give them to homebuyers. Similarly, if a broker recommends a
particular loan during the sales pitch, he should give the disclo-
sures to the buyer before he applies. On the other hand, the
builder salesperson or the broker need not provide disclosures if he
does not make representations about credit and does not steer the
buyer toward a particular loan.
This proposal roughly reflects the current practice of many bro-
kers and builders. Before the sales contract is signed, national
homebuilders generally encourage their sales representatives to
demonstrate on a printed form what closing costs will likely be
paid at settlement and what APR the allied lender is charging.
29 2
29" 15 U.S.C. § 1665a (1982); see 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at I1.9-.10 (rec-
ommending earlier delivery of the RESPA good faith estimate of closing costs by the
lender).
292 See 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at I.4-.5 (recommending delivery of a
special information booklet by the sales agent during the sales process).
292 In my survey of national homebuilders, supra note 141, the builders' standard operat-
ing procedure is as follows: once the builder's sales representative narrows down the possible
houses to one or two that would be "right" for the prospect, the representative will work
through a "cost estimate sheet" that shows the price of the house, probable monthly pay-
ments if the buyer fimances the house through the builder's allied lender, and estimated
closing costs.
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The more sophisticated brokers also show buyers the prospective
closing costs and probable interest rate before allowing the buyer
to sign the sales contract.2 3 This better business practice should
be mandatory: if the seller or its agent refers the buyer to sources
of financing or settlement services, or uses tied-in financing or set-
tlement as part of the sales pitch, then the buyer should at least be
given disclosures so that he can compare the representations and
recommendations before he becomes committed to the deal.
c. Regulating Brokers and Builders as Arrangers of Credit
Mandating earlier comparative disclosures would require amend-
ment of the Truth-in-Lending Act to expand the definition of
"creditor 2 9 4 to include brokers and builders that arrange credit. In
the Gan Act, enacted in 1982, Congress deleted "arrangers of
credit" from the statutory definition so that real estate brokers
would not have disclosure duties.95 This decision should be recon-
sidered. The disclosure duties imposed on real estate agents would
only be as onerous as the agents make them: if the agent makes
financing or settlement deals part of the sales pitch, he is acting
like a lender and should have disclosure duties. More important,
failure to impose disclosure duties on sales intermediaries leaves a
significant regulatory gap. Brokers regularly orchestrate creative fi-
nancing deals where the lender is a private person (the seller) who
does not regularly extend credit. A striking irony under current law
is that these deals present the greatest risks to homebuyers, be-
cause they often involve short term balloons on overvalued prop-
erty, and yet are substantially unregulated, because neither the
seller nor his agent is a "creditor" who must provide Truth-in-
Lending Act disclosures.
A legal requirement of earlier comparative disclosures, however,
2' See 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140, at 454 (testimony of C. Hilton, Senior
Vice-Pres., Coldwell Banker & Co.); id. at 461 (testimony of D. Treadwell, First Vice-Pres.,
Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors) (general practice among Realtors is to provide a total cost estimate
before "writing up" the contract on a home sale).
'" See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982) ("creditor" as defined by the Act refers only to a person
who both (1) regularly extends consumer credit for which the payment of a fimance charge
may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit
transaction is initially payable).
2" Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 702, 96 Stat. 1469, 1538 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (Supp. V
1981)).
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would probably encounter intense political opposition from bank-
ers, brokers, and builders.2 9 6 Therefore, an alternative nonmanda-
tory approach must also be considered. One alternative would be
for HUD or another agency to develop a program for periodic gath-
ering and publication of loan and settlement information.29 7 The
information could then be disseminated through the news media,
consumer groups, and voluntary cooperation by bankers, brokers,
and builders. This sort of voluntary or HUD-centered early dis-
closure program could be beneficial by calling attention to rate or
cost variability, and by encouraging comparative shopping.
B. Standardization of Home Mortgages
Even if the consumer receives early, accurate, and comparative
federal disclosures of loan and settlement terms, they still may be
difficult for the homebuyer to evaluate because of information
overload.2 8 Under current regulation and practice a loan cannot
effectively be compared with other loans unless the consumer
knows the APR, the associated settlement costs, the terms of fu-
ture variation in the interest rate and monthly payments, the due-
on-sale and balloon features of the loan, and the contract-based
penalty features (default, delinquency, and prepayment). It is hard
for most consumers thoroughly to evaluate and synthesize so many
different characteristics. Standardization of many mortgage terms
would make shopping easier, and could also reduce the administra-
tive burdens on creditors. Indeed, effective consumer evaluation of
alternative mortgage instruments may be virtually impossible
without greater standardization. Standardization of alternative
11" In 1980 the Federal Reserve Board proposed an alternative to the detailed transaction-
oriented disclosures by allowing lenders to give disclosures for "representative transactions"
before the consumer applied for a loan. 45 Fed. Reg. 29,702, 29,726, 29,748-49 (1980) (pro-
posing new 12 C.F.R. § 226.11(h)). The great majority of the 230 comments that the Board
received were negative, on the ground that earlier disclosures were unnecessary or would
result in consumer confusion or creditor expense, and the proposal was dropped. 45 Fed.
Reg. 80,648, 80,676 (1980). This intensive industry campaign is evidence of solid and effec-
tive opposition to mandated disclosure during the shopping process.
I See 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at 111.17 (recommending voluntary and
community program to distribute loan and settlement information during the shopping pro-
cess). Dean Whitman observes that HUD considered such an approach in the early 1970's,
but was not certain of its feasibility. That many newspapers do this now suggests its feasi-
bility, but many details would remain to be ironed out. Whitman Letter, supra note 5, at 5.
2 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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mortgage instruments might be necessary both to reduce the con-
fusing array of choices and to create a range of less risky choices.
1. Standardization of Ancillary Mortgage Terms
Congress attempted to reduce this information overload in the
Simplification Act of 1980 by focusing disclosure on the finance
charge/APR and on plain language summaries of various loan
terms. Thus the Federal Reserve Board's model forms for mort-
gage transactions require disclosures describing the existence of a
"demand feature" to the loan, late charges, prepayment penalties,
and a due-on-sale clause, but refer the homebuyer to the mortgage
agreement for "additional information about nonpayment, default,
any required repayment in full before the scheduled date, and pre-
payment refunds and penalties."299 The consumer is therefore gen-
erally informed of the main contract provisions without being bur-
dened by detail.300
Critics complain that the Act provides the consumer with less
information, and that creditors might insert unfair provisions in
the "fine print."301 In light of such criticisms, the Simplification
Act should be carried one step further: federal rules should sub-
stantially standardize ancillary terms of the mortgage note, thus
preempting state regulation in the same way that the Gan Act
preempted state rules concerning due-on-sale clauses and alterna-
tive mortgage instruments. 02
Professor Jeffrey Davis argues that uniform federal rules are
needed to regulate the terms of credit agreements (though his
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, App. H-Closed End Model Forms and Clauses (1984).
The congressional goal was to balance "the competing considerations of complete dis-
closure . .. and the need to avoid providing so much information that the consumer is
discouraged from studying it." S. Rep. No. 73, supra note 58, at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 281; see 1979 Simplification Act Hearing, supra note 58, at 101-
02 (statement of S. Feldman, counsel, Nat'l Retail Merchants Ass'n) (recommending simpli-
fication of disclosure requirements); 1978 Simplification Act Hearings, supra note 58, at 77-
79 (statement of P. Coldwell, Member, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.) (Truth-in-
Lending Act information should be simplified and segregated from other contractual
provisions).
301 See 1979 Simplification Act Hearing, supra note 58, at 30 (statement of R. Hobbs,
Nat'l Consumer Law Center) (information overload has not been shown to be a real prob-
lem); id. at 51-53 (statement of J. Boyle, Tex. Consumer Ass'n) (information overload
should not be solved by eliminating useful disclosures, but by simplifying language).
"2 See supra notes 68-69, 73 and accompanying text.
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study does not address home mortgages).303 State regulation pro-
duces too much inconsistency and provides little consumer protec-
tion. The consumer is expected to protect himself by careful shop-
ping but actually pays little attention to the ancillary terms, even
though these terms may make a real difference in the loan's value.
Based upon a survey of creditor practices, Professor Davis con-
cludes that uniform federal contract terms can be established that
are sensitive to both creditors' needs and consumer protection.
3 04
Professors Goetz and Scott agree that "preformulated" (stan-
dardized) contract terms are often welfare-enhancing, because they
can reduce transactions costs and interpretational errors, and cre-
ate a fairer and more uniform system of communication. But they
caution that these advantages may sometimes be offset by new er-
rors or interpretational problems introduced with preformulations,
by dangers that the new norms will deteriorate through rote use
and encrustation, and by barriers standardization may pose to the
development of new formulations responsive to emerging business
needs.30 5 These potential disadvantages of standardized mortgages
might be minimized, however, by tying the standardization to
terms that FNMA and FHLMC develop in the marketplace. The
federal government created these organizations and has structured
303 Davis, Revamping Consumer Credit Contract Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1333 (1982). Profes-
sor Davis argues that two underlying regulatory assumptions have impeded successful regu-
lation of the terms of "form contracts"--"first, that the regulation of contractual relation-
ships should be left to the states, and second, that parties should be free to contract as they
choose." Id. at 1348. To make a serious effort at solving the problems, Professor Davis sug-
gests "a completely preemptive federal takeover of the regulation of both pre- and post-
contract aspects of the consumer-credit legal relationship." Id. at 1353.
3" Id. at 1392; see also id. at 1360-90 (methodology and results of the empirical survey,
which was limited to closed-end, nonrealty-mortgage credit).
Section 501(c) of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1982), for example, adopted this approach for mobile home
financing. Such financing is not exempt from usury ceilings unless the mortgage note in-
cludes consumer protection provisions concerning balloon payments, prepayment penalties,
late charges, deferral fees, limitations on foreclosure actions, and other protections that the
FHLBB specifies. See supra note 88.
305 Goetz & Scott, The Dynamics of Contractual Formulation and Interpretation, Calif. L.
Rev. (1985) (forthcoming). The last (barriers to innovation) is the most important problem.
Even without standardization, there may not be enough incentive for businesses to develop
new formulations because of a free rider problem: the inventor does not receive all of the
profit from the new formulation, as it is picked up by others. If standardization is accompa-
nied by state bureaucratic resistance to amending the preformulated terms, it can all but
kill market innovation.
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them to ensure responsiveness to public policy, but as mortgage
buyers they are also sensitive to market needs5 0 Thus, in the last
decade these secondary market buyers have experimented quite
flexibly with various ARM plans before settling on ones that are
both acceptable to lenders and less risky for consumers. Their uni-
form mortgage note and deed of trust 0 7 reflect the needs of the
marketplace and consumer protection.
For example, the FNMA/FHLMC standard instrument contains
a due-on-sale clause that protects the lender from the substitution
of a less reliable borrower for the original borrower, thus ensuring
that the buyer's alienation does not undermine the original assess-
ment of risk. In fairness to the consumer, however, the mortgage
limits the circumstances under which the lender can exercise its
due-on-sale rights,308 and prohibits prepayment charges that pe-
nalize the homebuyer when the lender accelerates the payment due
on the loan.309 The FHLMC/FNMA standard instrument similarly
reflects both consumer protection and lender flexibility concerns in
3" FHLMC was initially capitalized through subscriptions by the 12 Federal Home Loan
Banks; the FHLBB, which supervises the Home Loan Banks, is also the board of directors
of FHLMC. See FHLMC, The Secondary Market in Residential Mortgages 10 (rev. ed.
1983). FNMA's stock, in contrast, is publicly traded, but its operations and policy are sub-
ject to the regulatory authority of the Secretary of HUD. 12 C.F.R. pt. 81 (1984). FNMA's
15-member board of directors consists of five members elected by the shareholders and 10
appointed by the President of the United States. As a result of this structure, together with
specific statutory responsibilities of each, FHLMC and FNMA have actually been "pio-
neers" in developing new mortgage instruments and mortgage plans that make housing "af-
fordable" for more Americans, without imposing on them excessive risks. See 1984 Second-
ary Mortgage Market Hearing, supra note 41, at 26-27 (statement of D. Maxwell, Chairman,
FNMA). On the other hand, each institution pays dividends to its shareholders and is under
some pressure to maintain profits. FNMA, for example, was not profitable in 1980-1982,
largely due to the unfavorable market conditions, but through careful planning was able to
turn a $75.5 million profit in 1983. Id. at 27.
-' FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument, Note and a Deed of Trust (rev. 1977 & 1979)
(copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). In recent years, FNMA and
FHLMC have developed new plain language forms for ARMs. See FHLMC Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Note (1981), reprinted in Browne, supra note 70, at 217-24; FNMA Adjustable
Rate Note (1983) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
s" The acceleration of payment cannot be triggered by short term leases of the property,
second mortgages, and other transactions not impairing the lender's security or negating its
original risk assessment. FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument, supra note 307, 1 17; see
FHLMC Adjustable Rate Mortgage Note, supra note 307, 1 10; FNMA Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Note, supra note 307, 11.
s" FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument, supra note 307, 1 4; see FHLMC Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Note, supra note 307, 1 3(B); FNMA Adjustable Rate Mortgage Note, supra
note 307, 5.
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its provisions relating to avoidable future charges or occurrences.
Delinquency charges are only assessed after a grace period (usually
fifteen days) has elapsed and the penalty is in practice limited to
5% or less of the amount due.310 The homebuyer also cannot be
found in default unless he has both received actual notice of de-
fault and has had at least thirty days to cure the default.3 11
The provisions that FNMA and FHLMC adopted for their stan-
dard mortgage agreements have not only been followed by lenders
originating loans to be sold to these organizations, but have also
been followed in many loans held by originating lenders for their
own portfolios. These lenders adopt these agreements either be-
cause they want the option of later selling to FNMA or FHLMC,
or because they want to standardize their documents.312 This is
some indication that FNMA and FHLMC instruments do not con-
flict with market demands.
There would be at least two advantages to generalizing the
FNMA and FHLMC standardized contracts. First, all consumers
would receive the protections now afforded only to those whose
mortgages are sold on the secondary market or whose lenders have
adopted the secondary market standards. When lenders deviate
from these standards, the consumer usually suffers through pre-
payment penalties, strict provisions concerning monthly payments,
and due-on-sale clauses triggered by liens on or leases of the mort-
gaged property.313 Second, standardizing contractual terms would
310 FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument, supra note 307, 3; see FHLMC Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Note, supra note 307, 1 5(A); FNMA Adjustable Rate Mortgage Note, supra
note 307, I 7(A).
"I FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument, supra note 307, 18; see FHLMC Adjustable
Rate Mortgage Note, supra note 307, 5(B)-(C); FNMA Adjustable Rate Mortgage Note,
supra note 307, % 7(C). There is, moreover, no proviso unfairly facilitating lender prosecu-
tion of default, such as cognovit clauses where the borrower waives any defenses, even no-
tice, if he does not make payments on time.
312 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at 111.4-.6; see Secondary Mortgage Market
Hearing, supra note 41, at 94 (testimony of K. Thygerson, President, FHLMC) (FHLMC's
"mortgage and security instruments, underwriting and appraisal guidelines and standard-
ized documentation have been widely used throughout [the mortgage] industry and serve as
prototypes for many institutions and private [secondary market] conduits.").
313 The Peat Marwick Study found the least variability from secondary market standards
in requirements that reduced lender risk-credit report requirement (1.8%), title insurance
requirement (0.9%), mortgage insurance requirement (5.7%)-and the most variability in
the terms of the secondary market that help homebuyers-different interest rates (19.6%),
loan-to-value ratio (14.4%), and no prepayment penalty (18.2%). 2 Peat Marwick Study,
supra note 100, at 111.5. My experience is that lenders sometimes put special "riders" onto
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help relieve the consumer of information overload. Disclosure
forms could be further simplified if there were no significant varia-
tion in prepayment, due-on-sale, and other ancillary terms, and the
consumer's attention would therefore be more tightly focused on
the APR and the itemized closing cost estimates. Narrowing the
consumer's shopping criteria would not only facilitate decision-
making, but would make the mortgage market more competitive.
The Peat Marwick Study, for example, concluded that one reason
the mortgage market may not be perfectly competitive is that the
product is not homogeneous-lenders are selling both an interest
rate and a bundle of contract terms. 14 Reducing this product di-
versity should facilitate competition.
2. Standardization of Alternative Mortgage Instrument Options
The case for greater standardization is even more compelling for
alternative mortgage instruments. The proliferation of a veritable
alphabet soup of alternatives-ARMs, GPMs, GEMs, PLAMs,
RAMs, SAMs, GPAMLs-has engendered enormous confusion
among borrowers, portfolio investors, brokers, builders, and lend-
ers themselves. 15 Buyers find that the endless variety of differ-
ences, even within single instruments, makes comparative shop-
ping extremely difficult. An ARM that offers a lower initial rate
may not be as good a deal as a mortgage that offers a higher initial
rate, if the latter is tied to a less volatile index or permits less fre-
quent rate adjustment or has a cap on either the interest rate or
the monthly payment increases over each year or has cap on rate
adjustments over the life of the loan or has no prepayment penalty
or contains any number of other variable features. This diversity
undermines the purpose of early comparative disclosures by mak-
ing mortgage evaluation more difficult. Because many consumers
are confused by the plethora of characteristics and choices, they
mortgage notes that they do not expect to sell on the secondary market and that the riders
generally impose extra costs or burdens upon borrowers.
314 Id. at X.6 (absence of homogeneity in terms and services impairs the consumer's abil-
ity to shop).
315 See Guttentag, supra note 231, at 229-30 (because of multiplicity of alternative mort-
gage instruments "confusion reigns" among borrowers and even intermediaries); Lea, supra
note 242, at 11, 13 (61% of lenders surveyed do not believe that their borrowers understand
ARMS; case interviews indicate that most lenders feel that other lenders and Realtors do
not understand many ARM features, including margins, indices, and discounts).
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may assume a riskier loan than they want. Moreover, sales agents
and even lenders find the variety confusing. In many cases where
an intermediary recommends an excessively risky instrument, it is
because he, like the homebuyer, underestimates those risks due to
confusion.
Federal rules have encouraged the proliferation of choices, ratio-
nalizing that the market needs "breathing room" to experiment
with different mixtures of indices, payment caps, and negative
amortization.316 This policy may have addressed a valid concern in
1980 or 1981, when it was not clear which instruments would be
successful in the market. There is some indication, however, that
general precepts about the success of certain instruments are be-
ginning to emerge from this experimentation. For example, based
on market experience and sophisticated polling of consumer and
intermediary opinion3 17 FNMA and FHLMC announced a simpli-
fied series of ARMs in 1983.318 This winnowing process can be ex-
pected to continue as some of the currently available mortgage
products lose acceptance with consumers.3 19
It does not appear, however, that left to its own evolution, the
market will yield the standardization needed for consumers to
make effective choices. Lenders still strive to differentiate their
mortgage offerings, either to increase their volume by teaser rate
or other "bargain" loans, or to distinguish their product and pro-
"26 48 Fed. Reg. 9506, 9508 (1983) (Comptroller General); 47 Fed. Reg. 36,612 (1982)
(FHLBB).
31 The polling results are reported in Fannie May Surveys Lenders, Housing Fin., May
1983, at 1; Lea, supra note 242 (FHLMC survey of lenders, borrowers, and Realtors).
318 The FNMA plans promulgated in May 1983 had the following characteristics:
Graduated
Rate & Payment Payment Payment Buydown
Index Adjustments Caps Period Option?
1-year 1 time per year 7.5% p.a. 3 years No
Treasury
Securities
3-year Once every 3 7.5% 3 years Yes
Treasury years graduated
Securities
5-year Once every 5 7.5% 3 years Yes
Treasury years graduated
Securities
319 See Marcis, The Shakeout in Alternative Mortgage Instruments, Real Est. Rev.,
Spring 1983, at 29, 31.
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mote institutional identity. As a result, there may be as many as
400 to 500 separate alternative mortgage instruments in the con-
temporary financing market.32 0 Market needs do not justify this
tremendous diversity. For example, there is no defensible business
reason for using dozens of different market indices as the basis for
rate adjustments in different ARMs. Lender options would not be
meaningfully narrowed if federal rules standardized the range of
indices to three: one index stable over time, one fairly volatile in
response to short term interest-rate fluctuations, and one moder-
ately stable. To extend the concept of standardization, federal reg-
ulators should develop and limit lenders to several well-defined
"menus" of alternative mortgage terms.321
Professor Guttentag has cogently demonstrated that a series of
seven adjustable rate instruments would fulfill most of the risk
preferences of borrowers without impairing the lender's desire to
protect against financial reverses if interest rates increased over
time.s3 2 The riskiest menu of mortgage terms would permit fre-
320 See J. Guttentag, supra note 76, at 21-22. The lender incentive to differentiate the
loan product can create a market of monopolistic competition, in which higher prices can be
charged, because consumers find it hard to shop and compare alternatives. Id. at 23; see also
H. Snyder, supra note 70, at 13 (California Ass'n of Realtors reports that there are 150
different ARMS in the California market and that the number is growing); Lancaster, So-
cially Optimal Product Differentiation, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 567 (1975) (divergence from so-
cially optimal degree of product differentiation increases the resources consumers need to
attain specified level of welfare).
21 The concept of "menus" of alternative mixes of terms is not new to commercial law
and practice. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce codified international
export practice with its Incoterms, first published in the 1930's. See Int'l Chamber of Com-
merce, Incoterms (rev. ed. 1980). Each different "menu"-each Incoterm-places different
duties on the buyer and seller. The existence of a limited number of standardized and well-
understood menus has simplified the negotiation and reduced misunderstandings surround-
ing the export sales transaction.
32 See Guttentag, supra note 231, at 247, table 5:
Treas. Payment Maximum Maximum
Interest and Rate Payment Rate Change
Rate Index Adjustment Change (Life)
Plan Pd.
1A 6 months 6 months None None
1B 3 years 3 years None None
2B 3 years 3 years 15% None
3B 3 years 3 years 15% 5%
iC 5 years 5 years None None
2C 5 years 5 years 20% None
3C 5 years 5 years 20% 5%
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quent rate adjustments (twice per year), without any payment or
rate caps. This menu might encourage lenders to offer mortgages
at a relatively low initial rate. Lenders might charge a higher initial
rate for borrowers wanting to acquire the safer menus, which pro-
tect against the risks of payment instability. Borrowers who want
protection against large jumps in the monthly payment, but also
seek lower initial rates than the more conservative rate menus,
could choose menus that adjust rates every three-to-five years and
have payment caps of 15-20% for each adjustment period. Because
these menus have no total rate cap, there is the possibility of nega-
tive amortization and upward payment drift. The most risk-averse
consumers could pay a higher initial rate and choose between two
menus offering adjustments every three-to-five years, plus pay-
ment and rate caps. Similarly, Professor Guttentag suggests four
basic menus for GPMs. These menus would offer two graduation
rates and two graduation periods to present different mixes of ad-
vantages (ease of qualifying) and risks (budget and mobility
problems).2 3 The Guttentag menus demonstrate the feasibility of
reducing the number of alternative mortgages from hundreds to a
handful.
3. Federal Prophylactic Rules to Protect Against Excessive Opti-
mism About Risk
Standardization could not only reduce the confusing diversity of
choice among alternative mortgage instruments, but could also cre-
ate a range of less risky choices for the homebuyer. Current federal
regulation contains some consumer protections, such as the re-
quirement that the rate adjustment index be readily available to
and verifiable by the borrower, and be beyond the lender's con-
trol.3 24 Other consumer protection requirements, such as rate and
payment caps, have been eliminated from federal rules on the
ground that consumers educated by disclosure statements are in a
better position to decide what level of risk is best for them, and
U3 Id. at 244-46. Adding different terms of prepayment and assumption introduces fur-
ther variation, yielding 16 menus in all.
12 C.F.R. § 29.3 (1984) (FHLBB); id. § 545.33(e)(1) (Comptroller General). Another
consumer protection, for national bank ARMs, is the prohibition of prepayment fees when
the borrower pays the principal ahead of schedule. Id. § 29.6. These protections are justified
because they relate to minor matters on which the consumer is unlikely to focus during the
shopping process.
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the market will then respond by offering the appropriate instru-
ments.2 5 This is an unrealistic view given the problems with cur-
rent disclosures. Even with improved disclosures, there is reason to
believe that in certain periods many homebuyers are too optimistic
about future risks.
In the context of consumer default on installment payments for
products, Professors Schwartz and Wilde demonstrate that con-
sumers use inferior theories to evaluate the probability of their
own default. They further argue that there is insufficient reason to
think that these faulty theories routinely lead to optimistic predic-
tions, because in many instances the theories generate excessive
pessimism.32 6 These same arguments might apply to home nmprt-
gages. For example, using the representativeness heuristic, many
homebuyers will overgeneralize the good experience their friends
or relatives had with ARMs and enter into risky ones; other
homebuyers know families whose budgets have been pinched by
rising adjustable rates and will overgeneralize in a pessimistic di-
rection. The availability heuristic might generally create pessi-
mism: homebuyers read about people who lose their homes (the
"horror stories") but do not read about homebuyers who bought a
more expensive house because of the lower initial rates and then
sold before rates were adjusted upward (the "success stories").
Publicized failures tend to be more vivid and therefore more avail-
able to the decisionmaker.
Yet data for 1983 suggest that actual and prospective
homebuyers were overly optimistic about the future: they thought
that mortgage rates would go down (they have not overall), home
values would appreciate substantially (they have not), and they
would be able to handle balloon and adjustable mortgages (which
remains to be seen). 17 It appears that over the last decade
homebuyers have often underestimated the problems with novel
mortgage instruments. One reason for consumer misjudgment is
the sales pitch, in which the optimistic agent fits the homebuyer
into a loan that will facilitate the purchase of the desired home
325 See E. Gray, supra note 70, at 9-10.
316 Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 95, at 1431-45.
327 See Consumers Upbeat About Economy and Homebuying, Housing Fin., June 1983, at
1, 2.
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(and the sales agent's commission).2 8 Another reason may lie in
homebuyer psychology. To own a home is still part of the Ameri-
can dream, even though renting may make better economic sense.
Because they have anchored their decisionmaking to the prime di-
rective of buying an appropriate house, consumers may underesti-
mate future risks to buy the home. Cognitive dissonance leads
them to overlook or denigrate information pointing out disadvan-
tages to their prime decision.
3 29
Another psychological mechanism that may contribute to exces-
sive homebuyer optimism, at least during certain periods, is the
"fundamental attribution error," in which people attribute conduct
too much to personal characteristics of the actor and too little to
situational factors.330 If most homebuyers view themselves as rela-
ys Numerous psychological studies have suggested that people will tend to place signifi-
cantly greater emphasis on face-to-face statements about the future than on statistics and
other information that they read or encounter more casually. See, e.g., Borgida & Nisbett,
The Differential Impact of Abstract Versus Concrete Information on Decisions, 7 J. Applied
Soc. Psychology 258 (1977); Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall & Reed, Popular Induction: Informa-
tion Is Not Necessarily Informative, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
supra note 114, at 101. Thus, an automobile buyer may be attracted to a Saab because of
the statistically impressive performance of these cars, but will ultimately decide not to
purchase one if a friend tells him of problems he had. See id. at 112-13. What the sales pitch
tries to do, often successfully, is to monopolize and direct the flow of highly available, emo-
tive information about housing and mortgage alternatives. To the extent that the sales pitch
is optimistic about the risks involved in a GPM or ARM, it will be more persuasive than
statistics to the contrary, though it may be negated by the equally emotive (and more credi-
ble) experience of the homebuyer's friends and relatives.
32 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
"0 See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 114, at 202-17; Ross & Anderson, Shortcomings
in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assess-
ments, in Judgment Under Uncertainty- Heuristics and Biases, supra note 114, at 129, 135-
40. As Schwartz and Wilde state:
Environments may, in short, influence behavior more than many people believe. Re-
garding the risk of default, one might suppose that consumers, when assessing this
risk, place too much weight on their own traits such as prudence and too little weight
on situational factors such as a shaky economy. If people ordinarily think highly of
their abilities, they will then be more sanguine about their repayment prospects than
their circumstances actually warrant.
Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 95, at 1444. There is evidence that
actors accounting for their own behavior are relatively more inclined to cite situational fac-
tors and less inclined to cite dispositional factors than are observers of such behavior, how-
ever. See Jones & Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer. Divergent Perceptions of the Causes
of Behavior, in E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H. Kelley, R. Nisbett, S. Valins & B. Weiner, Attribu-
tion: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior 9, 11-12 (1971); Watson, The Actor and the Ob-
server: How Are Their Perceptions of Causality Divergent?, 92 Psychological Bull. 682
(1982).
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tively prudent and adaptable (an unprovable assumption but intui-
tively appealing), they would tend to overvalue their ability to ad-
just to adverse economic conditions, such as a steep rise in interest
rates and fall in home prices, and to underappreciate the risk of
default. Although it is impossible to gauge the importance of the
bias, the theory suggests that on balance the most vulnerable
homebuyers-first-timers-may underestimate the risks involved
with alternative mortgage instruments.
The dangers of alternative mortgage instruments should not be
overstated. The risks of ARMs relate mainly to the possibility of
steep rate increases. Interest rates also go down, and in that event
holders of ARMs would usually see their mortgage rate decline.
(This does not apply to GPMs, though.) Thus, in many instances,
consumers' objectively questionable optimism will be borne out.
Risk regulation is still justified because consumer biases and mar-
ket mechanisms tend to expose too many homebuyers to downside
risks in certain periods. More important, the bad consequences of
taking on too much risk if rates go up are quite extreme (loss of
the home or severely constrained budgets), whereas the good con-
sequences of risk if rates go down are milder (more disposable in-
come than expected). As a result, either Congress or agency regula-
tors should impose new consumer protection rules on alternative
mortgage instruments.3 1 Suggested rules include a grace period
and rate caps, limits on negative amortization and payment caps,
and limits on balloons.
a. Grace Period and Rate Caps
Many lenders and builders offer ARMs that bear an initial rate
well below the market rate. After one or two years, the rate on
these mortgages may jump sharply. Often the homebuyer loses
sight of the prospect of a big rate jump, or fails to appreciate that
a low initial rate ARM may be especially risky over time. To pro-
tect against budget shock and discourage teaser rates, there should
31 The proposals might be seen as a return to the concern for consumers of the late
1970's, when rate caps and other consumer protections were carefully justified as "sound
and necessary" to ensure against excessive risk for borrowers, without undermining the ad-
justable rate instrument as a tool to avoid lender disintermediation. See 1981 ARM Hear-
ings, supra note 233, at 285-90 (statement of Rep. Rosenthal); id. at 305-12 (statement of
FHLBB Office of General Counsel); Kaplan, supra note 231, at 1-7 to -10; Weinrobe, supra
note 231, at XXI-11 to -33.
1984] 1189
HeinOnline  -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  1189 1984
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 70:1083
be a two-year grace period in which the initial rate applies. Also,
the interest rate should be adjusted no more than once every year,
and no rate change should exceed 1% per year. To protect against
an upward payment drift, there should be an overall 5% cap on
the top rate the ARM can reach.,"2 These constraints on the varia-
bility of mortgage rates should have little effect on lenders' yields
over time, but will protect the consumer who might be severely
harmed by short term fluctuations.333
b. Limits on Negative Amortization and Payment Caps
The negative amortization associated with GPMs may be troub-
lesome because it may prevent a homebuyer from building up suf-
ficient equity in his home to enable him to move. It also might
encourage default: as negative amortization eats away at the home-
owner's equity, he will have an increased incentive to walk away
from the obligation.3 4 These risks for both lenders and borrowers
are even more troubling in light of poor prospects for home value
appreciation in the next several years. Some state usury laws and
early proposed FHLBB regulations limited negative amortization
to 110% of the principal, and a similar limit should be reintro-
duced into the regulatory scheme.33 5 Because negative amortization
32 Compare the similar protections promulgated by the FHA for ARMs. 49 Fed. Reg.
23,580 (June 6, 1984) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 203.49).
" The sophisticated simulation models developed by Weinrobe, supra note 231, at XXI-
4 to -21, measured the effects of limitations on adjustment periodicity, the maximum ad-
justment in each period (50 basis points), and the maximum adjustment over time (250
basis points). Weinrobe concluded from the simulations that where interest rates are fairly
stable over time, the consumer protections have no effect on lender yields; where there is
moderate interest rate inflation, the limitation on annual adjustments has a small effect on
lender yields, and the life-of-loan limitation has no effect; where interest rates spurt upward
and then fluctuate at high levels, the 50/250 (periodic/maximum rate change) rule is very
effective in limiting changes in payments and preventing budget shock for consumers, with-
out prohibiting lenders from obtaining a yield that is substantially responsive to the in-
creased cost of money. Id. at XXI-2 to -22. "The 250-basis-point cap on changes in the debit
rate offers some element of security to the borrower without greatly affecting the desirabil-
ity of a VRM for lenders. This is true even in very extreme situations." Id. at XXI-22.
3" See id. at XXI-34; see also sources cited supra note 234.
11 See, e.g., 1979 La. Acts 764 (codified at La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:3504(C) (West 1983)
(amended by 1982 La. Acts 424, 767)) (preempted by the Garn Act). Consumers Union takes
the position that negative amortization ought to be prohibited. See H. Snyder, supra note
70, at 10. This result would all but abolish GPMS, which have been useful mechanisms for
many first-time homebuyers to enter the housing market. See Weinrobe, supra note 231, at
XXI-36 to -42 (concluding that a safeguard against all negative amortization "would be oti-
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limits might lead to large unanticipated increases in the monthly
payment,336 there should also be a payment cap of 7.5% per year.
Such a cap would not only prevent budget shock, but would also
set limits on the use of seller buydowns, teaser rates in ARMs and
GPMs, all of which tend to lure homebuyers into low initial rate
loans whose risk is minimized either by the sales process or by the
homebuyer's decisional biases.
c. Limits on Balloons
Short-term (three-to-ten year) balloons must be controlled be-
cause they create dangers of default in periods of high rates and
low housing demand.3 3 7 These balloons are unnecessary for ARMs
and GPMs, because professional lenders can offer reduced pay-
ments by having the seller pay points or by waiting until the loan
is paid off to collect the negative amortization (loans usually are
paid off within seven to twelve years of origination).3 As a result,
professional lenders should be required to refinance or roll
over-at a rate not more than a certain percentage higher than the
original loan rate-any short term loan. This requirement would
give them an incentive not to push balloons that may be beyond
the capacity of their borrowers.339
ose, at best"). My view is that if teaser rates can be controlled through a 7.5% payment cap
(the next proposal in text), then homebuyers ought to have some room to choose mortgages
whose initial rate is low enough to enable them to qualify for a slightly more expensive
mortgage.
33' That is, unless there is also a payment cap, once the negative amortization cap is
reached, the excess interest is then included in the monthly payment, thus creating the
possibility of sharp and unplanned increases in the monthly payment.
33 Indeed, in the 1930's (and, to a lesser extent, in 1981-1983), extensive foreclosures
occurred when borrowers found themselves unable to pay sizeable balloons, or sell their
houses, as the balloons fell due. See Kaplan, supra note 231, at 1-3 to -4 (balloons should be
prohibited, citing their contribution to the real estate crash of the 1930's).
Balloons are required for one instrument, the shared appreciation mortgage, which
requires the buyer to pay part of the property's appreciation after a number of years,
whether or not he wants to sell at that time, thus forcing the buyer to take out a costly
second mortgage or sell early. Also, under some instruments, the buyer is liable for an addi-
tional amount of interest even if the property does not appreciate. See FTC Mortgage
Money Guide, supra note 79, at 9. These features are likely to surprise buyers and are not
necessary to the shared appreciation concept. They should be regulated out of existence.
33 See generally Weinrobe, supra note 231, at XXI-83 to -85 (eliminating balloons for
professional lenders or imposing a refinancing obligation would offer marginal benefits to
borrowers and few costs to lenders, but would reduce the range of options available to the
borrower).
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Individual sellers taking back short term balloon first or second
mortgages are in a different situation. They have a greater need to
be paid off at the end of the balloon period because they usually
cannot refinance. Such balloons might be prohibited entirely, but
for these noninstitutional lenders there may be no other way to
structure the deal. Given this constraint, a useful rule would be to
require no less than a 20% downpayment when sellers take back
short term balloons. An alternative would be to require the buyer
to obtain private mortgage insurance to insure the seller against
default. Further experience with seller-financed balloon mortgages
might justify eliminating them entirely. At this point, however,
this article proposes only limiting such balloons. If enacted, this
proposal, as well as those regarding rate caps, limits on negative
amortization, and payment caps, should significantly protect
homebuyers against the excessive risk of alternative mortgage
instruments.
The chart on the following page summarizes the consumer pro-
tections proposed by this article for alternative mortgage instru-
ments, and compares them to existing FHLBB rules.
C. Structural Consumer Protection
Even with the proposed reforms, the homebuyer might still pay
excessive prices or enter into disadvantageous mortgages, because
market structures and the decisionmaking process remain system-
atically biased. Structural flaws might justify further government
intervention to assure fair dealing t6 consumers. Three such flaws
can be identified: the homebuyer's vulnerability to manipulation
by the sales pitch, the effective elimination of many consumer
choices in the formally integrated transaction, and patterns of co-
operation and anticompetitive conduct in the real estate industry.
Because of their structural dimension, these problems are not go-
ing to be "solved" immediately, if ever. Constructive directions for
regulation are explored here, including more specific fiduciary du-
ties for intermediaries who give advice to homebuyers, the right of
homebuyers to opt out of the formally integrated transaction, and
injection of more competitive conduct into the relevant markets.
1192 [Vol. 70:1083
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1. The Duty of Intermediaries to Warn and Inform
The disclosure and standardization proposals outlined above will
leave many information problems unresolved because sales agents
will still be a major source of information on financing and settle-
ment costs for many homebuyers. Their oral explanations will
often be much more vivid to homebuyers than the dull paper dis-
closures that will be handed to them and often thrown away. In-
termediaries' recommendations will sometimes carry dispropor-
tionate weight because homebuyers tend to shift responsibility to
them. In short, there will always be opportunities for sophisticated
agents, as part of their sales pitch, to manipulate unsophisticated
buyers, despite the early promulgation of better-calibrated APRs,
worst case hypotheticals, and comparative price lists.
On the other hand, due to their experience in the home sale and
loan transaction, sophisticated intermediaries are uniquely situ-
ated to educate homebuyers in ways that disclosures cannot. They
can answer questions the disclosures raise, suggest options tailored
to the particular homebuyer's desires, and narrow the shopping
process to make it less overwhelming. In many instances the real
estate professional performs this educational function, and the
consumer receives a fair deal. How can the sales process be di-
rected more systematically toward educating rather than mislead-
ing the consumer? Two means will be examined: buyers' agents
and state and federal fiduciary duties for sales agents.
a. Buyers' Agents
The most interesting approach to the consumer education di-
lemma lies in the market and not the law. Some homebuyers now
explicitly retain and pay their own brokers or attorneys to help
them shop for a house, negotiate a price, obtain financing, and
guide them through the settlement.3 0 Buyers' agents have a clear
duty to represent only buyers, and therefore have no built-in con-
flict of interest; they are generally not paid on a commission basis
and, as a result, do not have an incentive to push buyers into unfa-
34 See Levine, Does the Home Buyer Need His Own Broker?, Real Est. Rev., Spring
1983, at 98; Miller, Who Can Help You Buy a House, Washingtonian, Nov. 1982, at 269;
Mariano, Idea of 'Buyers' Brokerage' Gains Advocates, Wash. Post, June 30, 1984, at F1, col.
3; 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at VI.6-.77 (use of attorneys varies widely from
area to area).
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vorable deals. Unlike the average buyer, buyers' agents are capable
of representing buyers' interests in the complex market sales. The
sophisticated buyers' agents will not be fooled by gimmicky adver-
tising and points schemes. They should be able to shop and com-
pare prices for homes, loans, and settlement services more effec-
tively, and are better able to explain to homebuyers the risks and
advantages of alternative mortgage instruments.
Despite some positive initial experience with buyers' agents,
their use is apparently not widespread, nor is it expected to be in
the near future. Even if they know about buyers' agents (and most
do not), homebuyers are generally reluctant to pay a buyer's agent
for what may appear to be the same services the seller has already
purchased. In most cases this is an illusory disadvantage. The cost
of a buyer's agent should be offset by his effective representation
of the buyer in the transaction. In fact, a buyer's agent can usually
get the seller to pay his commission through negotiating a lower
sale price, or by splitting the 6% commission that the seller's bro-
ker charges.3 41 However illusory the disadvantage might be, it
probably discourages naive and average homebuyers (those most in
need of assistance) from hiring their own agents.
There may be a second reason hindering the spread of buyers'
brokers: professional resistance. The philosophy of most multiple
listing services is that once the property is listed, other brokers
who show the property have a duty to cooperate with the listing
broker. Although the National Association of Realtors has officially
encouraged cooperation with buyers' brokers,"' the FTC Brokers
Study found that many brokers still disparage the idea of buyers'
representatives.us In addition, the constant interaction between
"I The buyer's broker may, functionally, take the place of the cooperating broker, the
agent of the seller who actually sells the house but must split the 6% commission with the
listing broker. See Levine, supra note 340, at 99-100; Miller, supra note 340, at 269. Attor-
neys who are not members of multiple listing services, though, might have more difficulty
achieving this result.
3"2 The National Association of Realtors has apparently sanctioned the ability of a
buyer's broker to qualify as a "procuring cause" and receive the standard commission split.
NAR, Official Interpretation of Art. 1 § 2, By Laws of the Nat'l Assoc., Interp. No. 31,
reprinted in 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 340-41.
"I 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 339-40. Some argue that the National Associ-
ation of Realtors is attempting to "smother the single-agency [buyers' broker] concept,
while maintaining the inherently misleading practice of working with a buyer on a co-op
basis and having a fiduciary duty to the seller." Mariano, supra note 340, at F12.
1984] 1195
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brokers and lenders discourages many brokers from actually repre-
senting buyers, since they do not want to disrupt their more im-
portant ongoing relationship. 44 A final reason for broker resistance
is that brokers see their profession as a sales profession. They view
representation very casually-as ancillary to the main goal of sell-
ing homes. 45 As one broker recently stated, "[flrom an agent's
point of view. . . it is a lot easier to make a living when you can
control both sides of the process. "346 Because attorneys are more
professionally committed to representing rather than selling, they
may be more appropriate buyers' agents than real estate brokers,
though there appears to be no great rush of attorneys to this role.
b. State Law Fiduciary Duties
State law may enforce more balanced disclosures to buyers by
requiring sales agents to be more forthright. Although state law is
often vague about the nature of the broker's agency duties, 347 tort
law in most jurisdictions would support even a seller's agent's
"duty to deal fairly and honestly with the prospective buyer.
3 48
This duty may be breached when the agent makes representations
that he knows (or should know) are false, or conceals material ad-
verse information from the homebuyer after having made partial
and fragmentary representations inconsistent with the concealed
facts s.3 4 Although the law of fraud and misrepresentation has tra-
34 See Whitman Letter, supra note 5, at 6.
"I See 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 346 ("Over the years, brokers have car-
ried on the business of brokerage by dealing with both parties without much concern about
the technical legal requirements of agency law and fiduciary relationships.").
36 Quoted in Mariano, supra note 340, at F12.
31 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
-' Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975); see Neff v. Bud Lewis Co.,,89 N.M. 145, 548
P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1976) (broker owes fiduciary duty to buyer); Emily v. Bayne, 371 S.W.2d
663, 670-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (similar).
"I See, e.g., Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05
(1963) (broker liable for "negative fraud" when he fails to disclose material facts); Dicker v.
Smith, 215 Kan. 212, 523 P.2d 371 (1974) (broker could be liable for suppressing unfavor-
able termite report); DeSoto v. Ellis, 393 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (broker has duty to
reveal to buyer any material defect of home under consideration); Nelson v. Real Estate
Comm'n, 35 Md. App. 334, 370 A.2d 608 (1977) (broker liable for erroneous statement that
unit could be used as an apartment); Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty, 556 P.2d 1328 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1976); Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 615 P.2d 1305 (1980) (broker re-
quired to make reasonable effort to refute information from seller which he knows or should
know is false and is pivotal to the buyer's decision); see generally W. Prosser & W. Keeton,
The Law of Torts § 106, at 736-40 (5th ed. 1984) (party may be liable for words or acts that
create a false impression through active misrepresentation or passive misleading).
1196 [Vol. 70:1083
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ditionally reprehended only misstatements of fact, some courts
have held agents liable for misleading statements of opinion (e.g.,
value of the home) when made to persons not having roughly equal
knowledge.35 0 Sellers' agents have a further duty to disclose their
loyalty. They cannot mislead the buyer into thinking that the
agent is protecting the buyer's interest if he is not. 51
An important question is whether the agent should be liable only
for intentional misrepresentations to homebuyers, or should also
be liable for negligent advice or recommendations upon which
homebuyers justifiably rely. Realtors' codes of conduct typically
prohibit only the former, and there is substantial case law to the
same effect. 52 On the other hand, in some fraud cases brokers and
builders have been found liable for excessive optimism in the sales
pitch.3 53 For example, California brokers have been held liable in
fraud suits for recommending creative financing that proved disas-
380 In California, for example, the law of fraud requires the broker or agent representing
the seller to disclose "facts materially affecting the value or the desirability of property
offered for sale" where the broker knows or has access to such facts, and knows that the
buyer is unaware of them. Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727
(1976); see Peterson v. Auvel, 275 Or. 633, 552 P.2d 538 (1976); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 542 (1976) (vendor's opinion can be the basis for a fraud suit when the vendor "(a)
purports to have special knowledge of the matter that the recipient does not have, or...
(c) has successfully endeavored to secure the confidence of the recipient"). Other courts
reject this view. See, e.g., Coleman v. Goran, 26 Ill. App. 2d 288, 168 N.E.2d 56 (1960);
Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 84 A.2d 94 (1951) (real estate broker's representations of
home value are not actionable in fraud); Eaton v. Sontag, 387 A.2d 33, 37 (Me. 1978). Even
these jurisdictions, however, have found broker fraud where the representation of value is
backed up by specific misrepresentations of fact. See Willis v. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 136 So.
358 (1931); Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 185 A.2d 344 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845
(1963); see also W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 349, § 109, at 758 (trend among courts
is to convert misrepresentation-of-value cases into misrepresentation-of-fact ones); cf. Wis-
consin Steel Treating & Blasting Co. v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 379, 127 N.W.2d 5 (1964) (false
representation by seller that he was selling property at actual cost is fraud).
381 Meerdink v. Krieger, 15 Wash. App. 540, 550 P.2d 42 (1976).
"I M. Levine, Realtors' Liability ch. 2 (1979); Nat'l As'n Realtors, Code of Ethics art. 3
(1984) (duty of Realtor to protect against "fraud, misrepresentation, and unethical practices
in real estate transactions"); id. art. 9 (Realtor "shall avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation,
or concealment of pertinent facts"); see Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853,
856 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 507 (1918) (seller's "puffery" cannot be
basis for fraud suit); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 349, § 109, at 755 ("There can be
no recovery, for example, for a statement that the plaintiff is being offered an exceptionally
good bargain.").
"3 See infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  1197 1984
Virginia Law Review
trously risky. 5' These cases reflect the practical expansion of fraud
to create a common-law cause of action for unsuitable recommen-
dations. Thus, a broker might be found liable in fraud upon theo-
ries of (1) explicit misrepresentation, (2) implicit misrepresenta-
tion, or (3) concealment, upon recommending an unsuitable loan
and then discouraging the homebuyer from shopping or making
further inquiry.35 The description of the sales process set forth
here suggests that these theories could often be used against real
estate intermediaries.
The modern trend in fraud cases finds a parallel in state agency
cases, suggesting that the real estate intermediary may in many
instances be found to be the buyer's agent. In such cases, the inter-
mediary has a fiduciary duty of honest and nonnegligent advice-
giving to the buyer because of the relationship of confidence that
exists. Notwithstanding the traditional view that the
homebuilder's saleperson and the cooperating broker are sellers'
agents, there is a tendency
for the court to examine the specific facts and then to resolve the
issue of agency in line with the reasonable expectations of the prin-
cipals and principles of fairness and justice. In a few cases this re-
sults in the broker being held to be the agent of both buyer and
seller, or in the broker being held to be the agent of the buyer,
even though his commission is paid out of the proceeds of the
seller.
35 6
Andrew, Suits Against Realtors Grow as Financing Balloons Burst, Wall St. J., Sept. 1,
1982, § 2, at 17, col. 1.
36" Support for one or more of these theories can be found in Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d
702 (9th Cir. 1961), cart. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962) (unsuitable recommendation by insur-
ance salesperson; district court finding of liability under theory one, court of appeals under
theory two); Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga. App. 602, 80 S.E.2d 490 (1954) (home sale, theory
three; evasive answer to questions about a problem is concealment); Fairfield Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Kroll, 106 IM. App. 2d 296, 246 N.E.2d 327 (1969) (home mortgage, theory one or
two; fiduciary responsibility of broker to buyer because of the latter's inexperience and the
former's efforts in finding a loan); Barylski v. Andrews, 439 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
(home sale, theory two or three; statement that "house is in fine condition" was conceal-
ment or implied representation of fitness); cases cited supra notes 349-50; cf. Leatherberry,
Remedies for the Buyer or Beneficiary of an Unsuitable Life Insurance Plan, 32 Rutgers L.
Rev. 431, 445-57 (1980) (fraud theories to use against life insurance salesperson recom-
mending an unsuitable policy).
3"B. Brown & E. Green, The Role of the Broker in Residential Real Estate Transactions:
A Report to the Federal Trade Commission on the Status of State Agency Law as It Affects
the Role of Residential Real Estate Brokers 19 (1983); see Cashion v. Ahamadi, 345 So. 2d
268 (Ala. 1977) (whether cooperating broker contacted by home purchaser is agent of seller
1198 [Vol. 70:1083
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The Louisiana Civil Code provides an example of this approach.
The Code characterizes a broker as a "mandatary" (agent) of both
the buyer and the seller.35 7 As the mandatary of both parties, the
broker "should observe the same fidelity towards all parties, and
not favor one more than another."358 The duty of fidelity includes
responsibility "not only for unfaithfulness [fraud] in his manage-
ment, but also for his fault or neglect.
'3 59
A recent California appellate decision, Easton v. Strassburger,60
reached the same result as the Louisiana statute through a synthe-
sis of tort and agency principles. Without holding that real estate
agents are necessarily agents for the buyer, the court held the bro-
ker liable for negligently failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the value of a home recommended for sale, and for failing to
disclose all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the
property that such an investigation would reveal. The court lik-
is a question for the jury; caution that a broker who seeks to establish a confidential rela-
tionship with the buyer to procure a sale cannot assume that he remains the seller's agent);
Grandchamp v. Patzer, 39 Mich. App. 350, 197 N.W.2d 537 (1972) (agency relationship be-
tween broker and homebuyer because the former assured the latter that "I'm taking care of
everything"); Pumphrey v. Quillen, 102 Ohio App. 173, 141 N.E.2d 675, aff'd, 165 Ohio 343,
135 N.E.2d 328 (1956) (cooperating broker, but not listing broker, found to be purchaser's
agent). The court in Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975), indicated that
unless clearly proven otherwise a multiple listing arrangement for selling homes does not
create an agent-subagent relationship between the listing and cooperating brokers and that
the cooperating broker is presumptively the agent for the buyer. Although I find the Wise
result to be correct in light of the psychological dynamics of the transaction, it goes beyond
the reasoning in other cases and is contrary to cases holding that multiple listing services for
home sales generally assume that the coooperating broker is the seller's agent. See, e.g.,
Marra v. Katz, 74 Misc. 2d 1010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (multiple listing services generally
assume that the cooperating broker is the subagent of the listing broker, thus the agent of
the seller); Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967) (cooperating broker is
subagent of listing broker, notwithstanding multiple listing bureau rule that the cooperating
broker is the agent of the buyer); authorities cited supra note 134.
" La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3016 (West 1983) (broker is employed to negotiate a matter
between two parties and is considered mandatary of both); see Uhlich v. Medallion Realty,
334 So. 2d 788 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (art. 3016 applies to real estate brokers); Treadaway v.
Piazza, 156 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (similar). Contra Leggio v. Realty Mart, Inc., 303
So. 2d 920 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
:" La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3017 (West 1983).
59 Id. art. 3033 ("Mandatary's liability for fault or negligence"); see Davis v. Davis, 353
So. 2d 1060 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (neither listing nor cooperating broker liable to buyer for
flood damage because they did not know of the damage); cf. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3018
(West 1983) ("Brokers are not responsible for events which arise in the affairs in which they
are employed; they are only, as other agents, answerable for fraud or faults.").
360 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
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ened the broker-buyer relationship to the attorney-client relation-
ship, noting that "'the buyer, like the client, relies heavily on an-
other's acquired skill and knowledge . . because of the
complexity of the transaction and. . . because of his own dearth
of experience.' "361 The court suggested that the duty of investiga-
tion might not exist if the buyer were customarily represented by
his own agent.
362
For loans and settlement services, the real estate agent should
have fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care for the interests of
the homebuyer to the extent that the agent gives advice on these
matters. Specifically, the agent should have duties (1) to tell the
complete truth about the marketing techniques used in an inte-
grated transaction, the range of prices available, and any special
arrangement with a provider; (2) to reveal disadvantages and risks
of bought-down financing, teaser rate mortgages, alternative mort-
gage instruments, and creative seller financing; and (3) to make
honest recommendations tailored to the homebuyer's needs and
preferences, rather than the agent's self-interest. These common-
law duties should be enforceable in lawsuits for damages, or in ad-
ministrative or disciplinary proceedings.
c. Federal Suitability Rule
The development of these fiduciary duties should not be left en-
tirely to ad hoc state law evolution because that process may not
have a systematic impact on broker behavior. A federal rule might
be created along the lines of the federal suitability rule for stock-
brokers established by the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
A special consumer protection rule is necessary because the
stockbroker (like the real estate broker) has a potential conflict of
interest when recommending investments to the customer: the bro-
ker receives a commission only if the customer buys stock; the
361 Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (quoting Comment, A Reexamination of the Real
Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1343 (1972)); see Sinclair, The
Duty of the Broker to Purchasers and Prospective Purchasers of Real Property in Ilinois,
69 Ml. B.J. 260, 263-64 (1981) (discussing the extent to which buyer relies on seller's broker
for vital information); Comment, Dual Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Con-
flict of Interest and Interests in Conflict, 12 Golden Gate L. Rev. 379 (1982) (discussing
nature of broker-homebuyer relationship).
362 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102 n.8, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.8.
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more expensive the purchase, the larger the commission. This con-
flict is especially serious since the stockbroker holds himself out as
an expert in complex financial matters. Thus, consumers tend to
shift responsibility for making decisions to brokers. 63 The suitabil-
ity rule requires that the stockbroker who recommends a purchase,
sale, or exchange of a security have "reasonable grounds" for be-
lieving that the recommendation is "suitable" for the customer.
The "reasonable grounds" must be based on information furnished
by the customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the customer's
investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and other im-
portant information.'
The same reasoning would support a rule that real estate in-
termediaries must not only provide buyers with required disclo-
sures, but must also have reasonable grounds for believing that
their recommendations for mortgage credit and settlement services
are suitable for the homebuyer. As with the securities suitability
rule, any recommendations must be made on the basis of both in-
formation furnished by the buyer after reasonable inquiry, and in-
formation readily available to the intermediary.
This rule should be enforced through a private suit for dam-
ages. 6 5 Damage actions are traditionally available for professional
malpractice to compensate consumers and deter professional negli-
393 See Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969) (by "hanging out his shingle" broker
represents himself as an expert in investment matters); In re Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 634-39
(1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (by holding themselves out to the public as
possessing specialized skills/knowledge, brokers cultivate a relationship of special "trust and
confidence").
I" SEC Rule 15b10-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1984); NASD, National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Manual 1 2152 (1976). Excellent background and analysis of these
rules may be found in Cohen, The Suitability Doctrine: Defiming Stockbrokers' Professional
Responsibilities, 3 J. Corp. L. 533 (1978).
343 The stockbroker suitability rules are generally not enforceable through a private dam-
ages remedy, see Utah State Univ. of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Bear Steams & Co.,
549 F.2d 164 (10th Cr.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977), based in part on industry argu-
ments that "greedy old ladies," who lost money speculating on the market would sue as
"sweet trusting widows," whose nasty churning brokers had lost their life saving. See
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965
Duke L.J. 445, 463-72. But see Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410
F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). Recent commentary urges the adop-
tion of a private damages remedy, however. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 364, at 552-59;
Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 Minn.
L. Rev. 233, 244-48 (1966).
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gence.3 6 Although the traditional arguments against a private suit-
ability damage action are unpersuasive, the remedy would produce
some trade-offs. 3 7 For example, an enforceable suitability rule
would probably make real estate intermediaries less inclined to
give oral advice to homebuyers. Having to rely more on compli-
cated written disclosures, without intermediaries' guidance, would
be a hardship for some consumers and might discourage others
from buying a home. On the other hand, more caution and less
advice would be beneficial if it encouraged buyers to increase their
shopping. There are other advantages to a bias favoring caution,
especially with regard to alternative mortgage instruments: when
the stakes are so high, many homebuyers would be best served by
a risk-averse strategy.
It is difficult to frame suitability standards that are detailed
enough to have an impact on intermediary behavior, but not so
technical as to stimulate liability for nonmaterial errors.36 8 Regula-
tions should clearly state that the real estate intermediary is liable
only if his recommendation was materially unsuitable and he ei-
ther had no reasonable grounds for believing that the recommen-
dation was suitable, or failed to investigate the customer's financial
situation and needs. Standards might also include a presumption
that the sales agent meets the suitability obligations if the buyer is
'" See, e.g., Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1863) (implied
warranty by engineers that specifications for proposed subdivision would improve drainage).
Thus, even if the stockbroker's suitability requirements do not give rise to an"independent
damage action, see supra note 365, some courts have found that violation of suitabilty stan-
dards is evidence of common-law fraud or negligence. See, e.g., Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood,
Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 299 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Tem-
pleton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 720-22, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968). Indeed, the Easton
decision relied on guidelines similar to suitability found in the Realtors' Code of Ethics. See
Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
"7 Contrast Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liabilty for Negligence, 1972
Duke L.J. 895, which criticizes damage liability for corporate directors because it makes
them too cautious and paperwork-oriented. That may be a fair criticism because corpora-
tions are expected to take risks. Homebuyers, on the other hand, can see their lives shat-
tered by risky mortgages. A risk-averse strategy fits their needs better.
'" Although the Truth-in-Lending Act disclaims liability for a violation that "was not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error," 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1982); see id. § 1640(f)
(no liability for good faith reliance on a Federal Reserve Board rule or interpretation), it has
produced a good deal of litigation based on technical infractions. See Miller, Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 34 Bus. Law. 1405, 1420-21 (1979). One reason the suitability doctrine has not had
greater impact in the securities field is that it is too vague in its standards. See Cohen, supra
note 364, at 542-59.
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advised by his own broker or attorney. Such a presumption could
give intermediaries an incentive to urge buyers to retain their own
agents.
The suitability rule's standards and enforcement by consumer
suits should be supplemented with a government campaign to
monitor sales practices and educate the real estate community. In
1983, a similar FTC campaign reportedly increased real estate ad-
vertisement compliance from 13% to 84% in the targeted areas.'6 "
The program not only pinpointed violations, but achieved a high
level of voluntary compliance through a "Manual for Businesses"
that could be used in builder and broker operations.3 7 0 Federal en-
forcement of suitability standards could take advantage of the in-
creasing domination of the market by multi-office brokerage firms
and regional or national homebuilders.3 1 Voluntary programs
could be created where these entities would incorporate federal
sales materials into their regular training programs and seminars.
The concrete examples of unsuitable recommendations and the
penalties set forth in the federal materials could be a partial anti-
dote to the philosophy of action selling.
2. Opting Out of Parts of the Formally Integrated Transaction
(The Problem of "Controlled Companies")
In 1981 hearings, Congress considered amending RESPA to pro-
hibit lenders and brokers from having a business interest in title
"I Div. of Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC, Real Estate Credit
Advertising Voluntary Compliance Report 1 (June 1983) (copy on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
170 See id. at 2-6. When violations were found, the FTC contacted advertisers and out-
lined the steps necessary to correct the ads (recontacting the advertisers if mistakes contin-
ued). The staff also gained the cooperation of broker and homebuilder trade associations to
promulgate the manual, How to Advertise Consumer Credit (copy on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
17 By 1982, 28.7% of all real estate brokers were associated with firms of more than 100
salespeople, and another 22.3% were associated with medium-sized firms (20-100 salespe-
ople). Trends in Real Estate Firm Size, Real Est. Q., Spring 1983, at 19, 20. In the late
1970's multicity broker franchises grew rapidly: Century 21 expanded from 3000 affiliated
fims to 6900, Electronic Realty Associates from 1050 to 2500, Realty World from 400 to
1500, Red Carpet from 680 to 1050, and Gallery of Homes from 530 to 800. See Haney,
supra note 13, at 36-37. In 1981, almost one-third of the new homes built were produced by
national or interregional homebuilding companies having sales volume of $15 million or
more. See America's Giants in Housing, Prof. Builder, July 1981, at 114, 116; Homebuild-
ings' New Look, supra note 183, at 92.
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companies to which they referred homebuyers. Those favoring this
prohibition argued that this tie-in gives controlled companies an
artificial business advantage, which allows them to charge higher
prices and still drive other providers out of business: consumers
will go to the controlled company because they are not aware that
better deals exist (bolstering), or defer to the expertise of the bro-
ker or lender (shifting responsibility).,7 2
Although the 1981 congressional hearings were limited to broker-
or lender-controlled title agencies, the phenomenon may be a
broader one. Thus it appears that many lenders engage in differen-
tial pricing for a broad range of settlement services-ch.rging
higher prices for services for which demand is relatively inelas-
tic.37 3 The same criticism might be made of the formally integrated
transaction established by many national builders and brokerage
firms. The builder or broker can charge higher prices on services
for which demand is inelastic.
7 4
On the other hand, it is not clear that controlled companies
should be prohibited, as some have argued, because the formally
372 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. The Title Insurance Company of Min-
nesota provides a graphic example. In April 1979, it did the title work for 81.1% of the
mortgages financed by Twin City Federal Savings & Loan, the largest mortgage lender in
the state. In March of 1979, Twin City acquired majority ownership of rival firm Northstar
Abstract and Title Company. By August 1980, Northstar did the title insurance for 83.3%
of the mortgages financed by Twin City;, Title Insurance Company was reduced to a 9.8%
market share. 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140, at 604-05. Other evidence suggested
that this phenomenon was commonplace in the two largest housing markets in the coun-
try-Southern California and Northern Illinois. See id. at 145-52 (statement of C. Gug-
genberger, President, Valley Title Co., San Jose, Cal.) (dealing with situation vwhere brokers
formed their own title companies); id. at 193-94 (statement of S. Daley, President, In-
tercounty Title Co. of Ill., Chicago, Ill.) (Coldwell Banker Title Service, a broker-owned title
agency, snapped up 20% of the DuPage County market based upon referrals from Coldwell
Banker Realtors); see also id. at 188-92 (letter from Z. Sullivan, President, American Land
Title Cos. of Missoula) (similar problem in Montana).
-17 See Wallace, supra note 54, at 200-02, 212-14.
374 Thus, the builder could offer a low APR by jiggling the home price up, or could charge
an average price and APR but make extra profits by charging high prices for settlement
services it provides or by obtaining kickbacks from allied settlement providers, who pass on
the extra costs to the homebuyer. Experience teaches that there will be a tendency in the
direction of higher prices whenever markets are foreclosed, as they assuredly are when the
builder directs all of its lending and settlement business to controlled providers. I. Plotkin,
supra note 217, at 514-15. Additionally, it is worth noting that in the midst of the worst
housing depression since the 1930's, the major homebuilders have recently been making sub-
stantial profits from their mortgage banking subsidiaries. See Breckenfeld, supra note 12, at
121-22.
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integrated transaction offers the opportunity for economies of
scale. As a result of being integrated into standardized options, the
lender's controlled title company need not advertise. It therefore
has lower overhead than its competitors, and may charge lower
prices .7 5 Besides the overhead advantages of the captive market,
the mortgage subsidiary of a national homebuilder or brokerage
firm usually can obtain the best mortgage rates available on the
secondary market because it buys large blocks of money or is able
to float bonds backed by mortgages. 78 If the homebuilder also ar-
ranges for settlement services, it should be able to bargain for a
low rate for each settlement because the large business \volume
would be important to the provider, which can economize as it
gains experience with the builder's operations. In short, the inte-
grated transaction can provide lower prices to consumers. Even if
the price were the same as that of the nonintegrated transaction,
the no-hassle loan and settlement saves consumers time and en-
ergy. Consequently, one should hesitate before disrupting the
housing industry's trend toward vertical integration, especially if
there are less intrusive ways to discourage price and quality
abuses.
The disclosure and fiduciary duty rules proposed in this article
would allow this trend to continue, but would also increase com-
petitive pressures on controlled providers. The rules would allow
the homebuyer to see at a glance whether the integrated transac-
tion really offers a better deal.377 The procompetitive effect of
these disclosures can be reinforced by providing consumers with a
right to opt out of portions of the integrated transaction.
RESPA now prevents lenders from requiring homebuyers to use
'75 See 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at lI.47-.49 (controlled title companies
should not be prohibited; no reason to believe prices would fall); cf. Craswell, supra note 95,
at 681-87 ("tie-ins" may offer consumer efficiencies, e.g., when two products are cheaper to
process/distribute as a single unit).
37s See Breckenfeld, supra note 12, at 122, 124.
377 The traditional objection to controlled title companies is that although vertical inte-
gration may produce consumer efficiences in many other, more price-competitive markets,
"the ancillary nature of the (settlement) services combined with consumer ignorance has
meant high, not low, charges in the past." 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140, at 615
(statement of D. Ford, Professor of Fin., Univ. of Baltimore). A disclosure-oriented ap-
proach meets this objection: when the consumer is aware of comparative settlement costs
and when the APR includes these charges, the consumer is certainly no longer "ignorant" of
the market, and the services assume a somewhat greater significance in the transaction if
the disclosures reveal a substantial differential among providers.
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a particular title company.3 7 8 This precept should be generalized.
The intermediary should have an obligation not only to provide
the homebuyer with comparative data regarding loan-related costs
but also to make clear that the homebuyer need not obtain his loan
from the intermediary's mortgage subsidiary, that he need -not re-
tain the attorney and title company allied with or controlled by the
intermediary, and that he need not choose the mortgage insurer
suggested by the intermediary. Although most homebuyers will not
exercise this option, allowing them to opt out, combined with im-
proved disclosures, should give intermediaries an incentive to offer
better deals.
This disclosure/opt out approach would discourage price-goug-
ing, but might not address the following problem: poor service by
the controlled provider might result not only from insufficient
competitive pressures, but also from a subtle conflict of interest.
1
For example, a broker-controlled title agency may have a conflict
between the brokerage firm's interest in minimizing title problems
that could thwart the sale, versus the purchaser's and under-
writer's interest in identifying title problems before sale.38 0 A
builder-controlled mortgage company may have a conflict between
the builder's interest in qualifying the homebuyer for some kind of
loan so that the home can be sold, versus the secondary market's
interest in having sound mortgage lending practices yielding few
defaults and delinquencies.381 In theory, this could be a basis for
prohibiting referrals to controlled title or mortgage companies, but
there is simply not enough evidence that this phenomenon occurs
very often.
378 RESPA § 9(a), 12 U.S.C. § 2608(a) (1982).
379 See Am. Land Title Ass'n, supra note 217, at 70-78; Dep't of Justice Report to the
Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance (1977), re-
printed in 1981 RESPA Hearings, supra note 140, at 212, 249 [hereinafter cited as Dep't
Justice Study].
380 Am. Land Title Ass'n, supra note 217, at 71-72; Hofflander & Shulman, The Distribu-
tion of Title Insurance: The Unregulated Intermediary, 44 J. Risk & Ins. 435, 444-45 (1977).
"8 Most secondary market buyers have limits on qualification standards for the mort-
gages they will purchase, which provide a palpable constraint on originators of such mort-
gages. The initial calculation of the homebuyer's annual income, the expected stability of
that income, the prior credit history, and other debts and liabilities, however, is done by the
builder- or broker-controlled mortgage company and thus may be subject to substantial
manipulation.
[Vol. 70:10831206
HeinOnline  -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  1206 1984
Home Mortgage Rules
3. Reforming Markets by Attacking Patterns of Cooperation
Improving consumer awareness of prices and choices in the inte-
grated home sale and loan transaction would likely pressure lend-
ers and settlement providers to engage in greater price competi-
tion. Even so, lower prices may not follow for some of the loan-
related services because anticompetitive patterns of cooperation
are entrenched in the real estate industry.32 These patterns penal-
ize consumers by discouraging low prices and comparative shop-
ping for loan-related services. This article examines three of these
patterns: price leadership among mortgage and title insurers, group
cooperation among brokers participating in multiple listing ser-
vices, and appraiser accommodation to the selling strategies of
builders and brokers. It also suggests ways to start tackling them.
a. More Competition for Title and Mortgage Insurance
Even with greater consumer shopping, prices might remain high
in the settlement service markets that have anticompetitive struc-
tures. The best example of such a structure is mortgage insurance.
The mortgage insurance industry is dominated by seven firms and
appears to follow the classic oligopoly pricing pattern. The price
leader (MGIC) sets a price, and the few other firms charge the
same price whatever the market conditions. These firms know that
if they cut prices to obtain a higher market share, MGIC and the
others will automatically follow, thus lowering profits for everyone,
without changing the market shares. 83 Consequently, even if
homebuyers had the right to choose mortgage insurance providers
and were apprised of the different deals and rates offered, they
might still have to pay high prices.
Although state- and market-imposed capitalization requirements
may make new entry difficult,"' existing small firms might try to
"2 On the perseverance of cooperation as an inherent trend in human institutions, see R.
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) (reviewed and summarized in 93 Yale L.J.
1147 (1984)).
" See 2 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at XI.26 (price for the most popular mort-
gage insurance plan is about the same for all carriers). For example, in 1975 one of the
mortgage insurance firms eliminated the $20 insurance application and review fee that had
been used since the late 1950's by all of the insurers-each of the firms immediately elimi-
nated the $20 fee, thus heading off any probable market share increase for the price-cutter.
Id. at XI.25.
3"Id. at XI.23. All states require that 50% of all premium dollars earned by a new firm
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increase their market share through lower prices if homebuyers
were inclined to shop-thus putting pressure on the top seven to
cut prices to remain competitive. On the other hand, even with
consumer shopping, bankers might veto small insurers by redefin-
ing their insurance requirements to be tailored to the ancillary ser-
vices the big firms offer. Also, the managers of the top seven firms
assert that they would respond to direct competition, not by cut-
ting prices, but by an advertising campaign to attract consumers'
attention.38 5 Like the broad range of services, smaller firms could
not match these campaigns. Thus, the mortgage insurance industry
would remain concentrated. With added advertising costs, the
price might actually increase. e
Conceivably, this phenomenon could also minimize or negate the
effect of greater title insurance shopping, though not on title
search and conveyancing costs, because these latter providers are
not part of a concentrated industry.38 7 Less than ten national firms
currently provide this service, and start-up costs and regulatory
barriers prohibit free entry. One response to this potential problem
is evaluation or prosecution under the federal antitrust laws. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, exempts the insurance business
from federal antitrust scrutiny "except to the extent that such bus-
iness is not regulated by state law."38 8
be reserved for a period of 10 years before they can be used (a reserve fund against ex-
traordinary or catastrophic losses). Id. at XI.38.
38 Id. at XI.37.
386 Although noting this as a possibility, the Peat Marwick Study believed it more likely
that the smaller firms would try to compete as to price and would drive.the price of mort-
gage insurance down somewhat. Id. at XI.37, .51-.52.
387 Id. at IV.19 (30-34% of surveyed lenders believed greater shopping for title searches
and title assurance would result in lower prices; 17% had the same level of confidence for
mortgage insurance).
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982). Many of the cases in which this exemption is invoked have
been prosecutions against title insurers, and these authorities might equally well protect
mortgage insurers. See Lawyer's Realty Corp. v. Peninsular Title Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 1288
(E.D. La.), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1977) (alleged conspiracy of title companies to
exclude plaintiff was not actionable under federal antitrust laws because such conduct may
be actionable under state insurance code); Schwartz v. Common Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F.
Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (even if seller charges imposed by title insurers were not actually
regulated by state insurance law, the exemption would be effective against allegations of
price-fixing so long as the mechanism for regulation was available); cf. United States v. Title
Ins. Rating Bureau, 517 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Ariz. 1981), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984) (provision of escrow services by title companies may be
object of antitrust suit because not "business of insurance").
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Most states regulate the rates charged by mortgage and title in-
surance companies, but the perfunctory nature of most state regu-
lations (the rate is filed and routinely approved) 8 9 hardly justifies
the continued exemption from antitrust scrutiny. Indeed, state in-
surance regulation may itself have anticompetitive effects. A 1977
Justice Department study found that in many cases, state insur-
ance departments protected industry participants and tolerated
excessive filed rates.39 0 Furthermore, public rate filing ensures that
all firms in an oligopoly can react immediately to an attempt by
any one firm to obtain a larger market share by cutting prices.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act has long outlived its usefulness (if
ever it had any) and should be repealed, so that the federal anti-
trust laws will apply to the insurance industry. Parallel pricing and
price leadership could be prosecuted on grounds of explicit or im-
plicit collusion among a few competitors and, if problems per-
sisted, the largest firms might be broken up to ensure a broader
spectrum of competitors.39 1 More open competition through con-
sumer choice among several insurance options, earlier disclosure of
comparative price data, and antitrust scrutiny of thp industry
should mitigate reverse competition and its effect on prices. To the
extent that these reforms do not lead to greater competitive pres-
sure on national insurers, direct federal regulation of mortgage and
title insurance should be explored.9 2
38 Four different regulatory regimes for mortgage insurance were represented in the ten
states surveyed by the Peat Marwick Study: (1) open competition, in which there is no
regulation of rates (California and Colorado); (2) a filed rate system, in which the insurer
simply files its proposed rate with the regulatory agency, and the rates goes into effect auto-
matically unless the agency vetoes it (D.C., Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, Virginia, and
Washington); (3) a file and approval system, in which a revised rate schedule does not go
into effect unless the agency actually approves it (Maryland); and (4) state rate-fixing, in
which the agency determines a fair rate based upon evidence submitted to it (Texas).
f: For these reasons, the Department of Justice urged deregulation ("open competition")
for the insurance industry--except for title and credit life/health insurance. The Depart-
ment excepted those segments because of their reliance on reverse competition-because
referrers were not price-sensitive, they would not respond perfectly to open competition.
Dep't Justice Study, supra note 379; accord 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, at
Ill.38-.40. To the extent that the disclosure and buyer's agent proposal of this article cir-
cumvent reverse competition, however, the Department's arguments would be inapplicable.
See 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law- An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application 841 (1978).
32 3 Peat Marwick Study, supra note 100, considered federal insurance regula-
tion-including requirements that the lender partially absorb mortgage insurance costs, id.
at I.29-.36; that state insurance commissions evaluate mortgage and title insurance charges
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b. Opening up Multiple Listing Services
Although the real estate brokerage industry does not look like an
oligopoly, it behaves like one. Brokers charge uniform commis-
sions, which do not fluctuate with supply and demand, and firms
that charge lower commissions do not prosper.aas The main reason
for this behavior lies in the unique pattern of cooperation found in
this industry. In the 1920's, when homebuying started to become a
major industry, real estate brokers formed multiple listing services
and adopted a credo of cooperation instead of competition. As a
result, four-fifths of existing homes sold today are sold through
multiple listing services, and two-thirds of those sales involve both
a listing and cooperating broker.3 "
Evidence suggests at least two ill effects from multiple listing
services. First, brokerage fees are excessive because low-commis-
sion brokerage firms have sometimes been excluded from multiple
listing services. Even when they are members, discount brokers
have not prospered because other brokers refuse to show their
homes, disparage their reputation, and discourage advertisers from
running their ads. s5 The exclusion or suppression of alternative
mortgage firms enables the profession as a whole to charge 6 % -7 %
commissions, which some experts believe to be excessive.'"
more carefully, id. at Ill.32-.35, .42-.47; and that title assurance charges be set by the gov-
ernment, id. at llI.41-.42-but reached few conclusions.
S3 See 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 82-108.
" See id. at 68-69 & Figure I-1.
395 Overall, the FTC Brokers Study found that alternative brokers could obtain seller list-
ings easily, but had a hard time selling houses, in part because of the low rate of cooperative
sales (29% for multiple listing service brokers, compared with 66% for brokers generally).
Id. at 154. One reason for the smaller degree of cooperation is that the cooperating broker's
split with an alternative broker is typically less (half of the 3% -5% rate, rather than half of
the normal 6%-7% rate), thereby discourgaging cooperating brokers from pushing property
listed with alternative brokers. Other problems that alternative brokers reported included
the following: (a) professional disparagement (93% of the alternative brokers experienced
disparagement in their first year of operation, and 74% said that it occurred frequently, id.
at 156); (b) refusals by other brokers to show homes listed with alternative firms and lost or
cancelled listings (about two-fifths of the alternative brokers surveyed experienced lost or
cancelled listings "frequently" as the result of professional disparagement, id. at 159); (c)
refusals by the media to run advertisements by alternative brokers, apparently as the result
of pressure from other brokers (34% of the alternative brokers surveyed reported this prob-
lem, id. at 163).
3" See Yinger, A Search Model of Real Estate Broker Behavior, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 591
(1981). A 1979 study by Arthur D. Little, Inc. suggests that even though brokers charge
supernormal prices, individual brokers typically do not accrue excessive profits because of
their low productivity. See 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 107-08.
1210
HeinOnline  -- 70 Va. L. Rev.  1210 1984
1984] Home Mortgage Rules 1211
The lack of price competition gives brokerage firms little incen-
tive to pass on rebates they receive from lenders or profits from
their controlled title agencies to consumers in the form of lower
commissions. The patterns of cooperation may also be an impedi-
ment to the growth of buyers' brokers because of professional dis-
paragement and refusals to cooperate. Limiting multiple listing
service membership to brokers impairs the development of buyers'
attorneys as shopping aides.
Although they discourage competition, multiple listing services
are also useful because they give listed homes exposure to a large
number of homebuyers; 9 7 thus, they should not be abolished. Any
exclusion of alternative brokerage firms from the services, or any
pattern of disparagement or collective refusal to deal, however,
should be met with antitrust scrutiny."9 8 More important, new
ways of organizing the listing service should be considered, ways
that could preserve the usefulness of the service while removing
some of the perverse cooperation.
If the listing service were open to any professional who could
pass a HUD-administered competency examination, problems of
discriminatory exclusion could be eliminated.399 Open membership
might also foster use of buyers' attorneys. 00 Also, as explained
39 See 1 FTC Brokers Study, supra note 118, at 59 (pooled home listings expand the
potential exposure of properties to a larger number of buyers, reduce search costs for buy-
ers, lessen the "free rider" problem for brokers who help the seller market the property, and
diminish somewhat the advantages of brokers who have a superior ability to attract new
listings).
398 In connection with the home sale and loan transaction, lawsuits have already been
brought in some localities to challenge minimum fee schedules for attorneys, see, e.g., Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and exclusive broker practices in connection
with multiple listing services. See, e.g., McLain v. Real Est. Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); United
States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980); see Austin, Real Estate
Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1325 (1970);
Siedel, Antitrust Implications of Trend to National Real Estate Firms, Real Est. Rev.,
Spring 1982, at 88.
39, Yinger argues that greater membership access should be a "focal point" of regulatory
concern. See Yinger, supra note 396, at 603-04. I believe that the commission system and
patterns of noncooperation with discount brokers and buyer's agents are more troublesome
than the problem of exclusion.
400 A variation on this proposal would be for HUD or another appropriate federal agency
to promulgate periodic comparative lists of broker services and fees and to publicize the
advantages of listing and buying through discount brokers. A rule requiring real estate sales
personnel to distribute such a booklet (perhaps with the RESPA special information book-
let) would be very useful, even if politically difficult to accomplish.
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above, the agency and fiduciary duties of cooperating brokers
should be clarified.
40 1
The most useful and important change, however, might be in the
method by which sales agents are compensated. Although commis-
sions are great motivators, they contribute to two problems-the
sales pitch and disparagement of discount brokers. 02 Long term
reform of the real estate sales industry must entail consideration of
alternatives, including lower commissions fixed by law, a salary
system for sales personnel, and perhaps even a listing system en-
tirely open to homebuyers and sellers (thus obviating the need for
sales personnel in many instances). Each of these alternatives car-
ries with it significant trade-offs and disadvantages, which might
be explored more thoroughly.
403
These suggestions will not solve all the problems of real estate
brokers' anticompetitive behavior, but may be the start of a gen-
eral reexamination of the brokerage industry. Ultimately, the pat-
terns of cooperation can probably be broken down only by reforms
that are not politically likely in the near future-eliminating the
commission basis for reimbursement or converting multiple listing
services into public utilities open to everyone, for example. Despite
the political problems, this area deserves greater exploration be-
cause of its critical importance to the home sale and loan
transaction.
401 See supra notes 347-71 and accompanying text.
'01 See supra notes 119-38, 395 and accompanying text.
403 Thus, legally fixed commissions would have some of the same disadvantages usury
ceilings have had, such as distortion of resources if the commissions are not set at a realistic
level, as well as politicization of an economic issue. Sales personnel paid a salary might have
perverse incentives just as those paid commissions. For example, salaried personnel might
put just as much pressure on homebuyers to make a specific purchase, so that the sales
agent would not have to put as much time and effort into the sale. A listing system open to
nonprofessionals (buyers and sellers) might produce some confusion, without reducing the
dependence of most buyers and sellers on the assistance of brokers and builders.
As a general matter, any proposal to change the existing commission mode of compensa-
tion or the multiple listing service ought to recognize that most buyers and sellers appear to
be pleased with the job done by real estate sales personnel. See Econ. & Research Div., Nat'l
Ass'n of Realtors, Inside the Real Estate Business: Practical Information for Real Estate
and Non-Real Estate Professionals 122 (1982) (83% of buyers and 82% of sellers were ei-
ther "moderately" or "very satisfied" with the performance of their real estate agent).
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c. Making Home Appraisals More Rigorous
A recurring problem with the mortgage transaction is its intrin-
sic connection with the home sale. However rigorously disclosure
requirements are tailored to the integrated transaction, there will
be room for sellers and their agents to play with the different
costs-advertising low loan rates or settlement charges while rais-
ing home prices. One way to police the home pricing process-and
to reduce bleeding of mortgage costs back into the home price-is
to improve the appraisal process, which is now too accommodating
to home sellers and their agents. Comparable houses should be
more discriminatingly selected and evaluated. Choosing homes sold
by a homebuilder as the comparables for appraising other homes
sold by the same homebuilder (as is often done now) is clearly a
circular means of determining value. It provides no continuing
check on the developer's pricing. Instead, the appraiser should se-
lect similar homes offered for sale by competing homebuilders or
should select (appropriately discounted) existing homes.
Appraisers must also evaluate the prices of comparable homes
against the backdrop of seller-provided financing. A $100,000
house in which the seller paid five points to buy down the interest
rate is not worth the same as a $100,000 house in which the seller
paid no points.0 4 The more sophisticated appraisers have been
considering such variations by collecting paired sales of properties
identical in all ways except the terms of financing and then deter-
mining the average percentage price adjustment for the desired
type of financing. 0 5 This method should be the rule rather than
4" "[T]he volume of favorably financed homes and the tremendous rise in interest rates
have created the need for price adjustments due to financing terms. To estimate the value
of property alone, prices of comparables purchased with favorable financing need to be re-
duced by the premium associated with that financing." Friedman & Harris, Seller deserves
premium for favorable financing, Tierra Grande, Issue 20, at 19 (1983).
405 Id. at 19-21; see Schwartz, Influences of Seller Financing Upon Residential Property
Sales Prices, Real Est. Appraiser & Analyst, Winter 1982, at 35 (comparing difference in
actual cash-equivalent value between seller financed and nonseller financed condominiums).
One problem with this approach "is that the type of data needed might not be available. To
accurately determine the value of specific financing there must be data for sales of compara-
ble property with and without favorable financing." Friedman & Harris, supra note 404, at
20. Without such data, however, the appraiser can still estimate the necessary adjustment
by referring to the discount charts used by builders to determine how many "points" they
will have to pay to buy down the interest rate from the market rate to the desired rate. See
Gallagher, The Effect of Financing Terms on Residential Property Values, Fed. Home Loan
Bank Bd. J., June 1981, at 20, 21.
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the exception. To the extent that the market does not adopt these
rules, the government should set down mandatory guidelines, per-
haps in connection with the FHA and VA programs and FNMA's
and FHLMC's secondary market purchase requirements.
CONCLUSION
As a consequence of their own decisionmaking and cognitive bi-
ases, their reliance on intermediaries who have perverse incentives,
and their entrapment in markets that are intrinsically imperfect,
homebuyers are often misled into entering deals that are not what
they appear, regularly pay excessive prices for loans and settle-
ment services, and sometimes take on too much risk. Regulators
have perceived, even if dimly, the homebuyers' dilemmas, but their
attempts at protecting homebuyers have been deeply flawed and
often wholly misplaced. The hundred years of ineptitude in regu-
lating home mortgages, first through state usury laws and now
through federal disclosure requirements, is the result of ad hoc leg-
islative, administrative, and judicial responses that have not care-
fully considered the psychological and economic dynamics of the
integrated home sale and loan transaction.
Protecting homebuyers should be a top priority for government
regulation. Financing the purchase of a home is a critical event for
most Americans, and mistakes can have severe consequences for
families' financial and emotional well-being. Government interven-
tion can do an enormous amount of good in this area, if policy
sheds its ad hoc approach and grounds reforms upon a more so-
phisticated understanding of the problems. The government
should start with the most immediate problem, namely the one
that poses the greatest short term disadvantages, and begin with
the most direct solutions. It should build upon these solutions to
address the other related problems, through the less intrusive
methods first, followed by structural changes if further study justi-
406 This approach is suggested because legislators and administrators typically do not ap-
proach problems by a "rational comprehensive" method of policy change, but rather by a
"successive limited comparisons" method, in which immediate problems are handled first
and change is incremental rather than sweeping. See Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling
Through," 19 Pub. Ad. Rev. 79 (1959). I believe, however, that having a broad policy model,
such as the one in this article, helps policymakers formulate incremental responses and rec-
ognize their limitations.
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fies them °.40 In terms of priorities for Congress and federal regula-
tors, the following five phases of reform should be considered.
Phase I: Standardize Alternative Mortgage Instruments
The most immediate problem facing American homebuyers is
the confusing array of diverse and risky alternative mortgages. The
costs to a household of a wrong choice are thousands of dollars in
unplanned mortgage payments, severe constraints on budgets or
mobility, and, in many cases, default. The most direct solution is
standardization. Using a limited range of mortgage menus for
ARMs and GPMs would make shopping much easier for
homebuyers and intermediaries assisting them, because the choices
would be fewer and comparative disclosure using several scenarios
could be instituted. Additionally, standardization should include
the consumer protection provisions set forth in this article-a
grace period and rate caps, limits on negative amortization and
payment caps, restrictions on balloon mortgages-because the
sales process and intrinsic decisionmaking biases tend to make
homebuyers too optimistic.
Phase II: Eliminate Misleading Practices by Amending Disclosure
Rules
Misleading advertisements and sales gimmicks are second in im-
portance only to the risks of alternative mortgages, and many of
them can be regulated simply by changing current disclosure rules.
Teaser rates for adjustable and other mortgages should be con-
trolled by the requirement that the monthly payment cannot in-
crease more than 7.5% per year. "Free" closing costs and seller's
points to buy "bargain" interest rates would be discouraged by in-
cluding those seller-paid fees in the advertised APR. Consumers
may still be misled by the sales pitch, but at least the federal gov-
ernment, through its disclosure rules, will no longer be an unwit-
ting accomplice in deception.
Phase III: Encourage the Use of Buyers' Agents and Impose Du-
ties of Disclosure and Suitability on Brokers and Builders
This would help homebuyers avoid excessive risk and under-
stand the transactions they are entering. This reform process is al-
ready being pursued by court decisions expanding the fiduciary
duties of real estate sales agents. Such state law efforts should be
1984] 1215
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supplemented by federal rules. Any reform of the well-entrenched
sales pitch will take time, but even small progress could signifi-
cantly facilitate ongoing consumer education. Thus, sales agents
should have a federally created fiduciary duty to make only suita-
ble recommendations. In advising homebuyers, intermediaries
must explain potentially misleading aspects of the sales process,
must be honest about the range of prices and any business connec-
tion between the intermediary and the referred provider, and must
set forth the risks and disadvantages of alternative mortgages. And
buyers should be encouraged to retain their own brokers or attor-
neys to help them make wise choices. This might be done through
a combination of a consumer education campaign, legal incentives
for sellers' agents to urge buyers to retain their own agents, and
reconstituting the now ambiguous role of the cooperating broker in
multiple listing services.
Phase IV: Establish Simplified, Early, and Comparative
Disclosures
The problem of high loan and settlement service costs is not as
important as the problems of risk and confusion. A suboptimal
loan might cost the homebuyer a thousand dollars or so extra per
year, and excessive closing costs would only be several hundred
dollars or less. These costs are small in comparison to the risks of
alternative mortgage instruments (or, for that matter, the overall
cost of the home), and the violation done to the precepts of fair
dealing not so outrageous as the violation through misleading sales
gimmicks. The most direct way to attack these excessive costs is
earlier, comparative, simplified disclosures. The proposals for cal-
culating the APR, the timing of disclosure, the comparative lists,
and the standardization of ancillary mortgage note and deed terms
should be instituted as soon as practicable, but need not take pre-
cedence over the other proposals.
Phase V: Attack Imperfect Markets
Because they address a less important problem (high closing
costs) and take a long time to have effect, the market-correcting
proposals for settlement services have the last priority. By then,
there may be more concrete evidence concerning the effect of con-
trolled companies on the price and quality of loan and settlement
1216 [Vol. 70:1083
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services, and policymakers might be able to determine whether in-
creased shopping is sufficient to force prices down in the mortgage
and title insurance industries. If not, federal antitrust prosecution
might be in order. In any event, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
should be repealed.
Taken together, the reforms proposed here can help fill some of
the gaps in current regulations that allow many homebuyers to be
misled and to pay too much for their home loan and settlement
services. To the extent that our society is seriously opposed to un-
fair treatment or manipulation of homebuyers entering into mort-
gages, its opposition should be articulated through rules grounded
in a systematic understanding of the psychological and economic
dynamics of the transaction.
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Appendix I
PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES OVER 10 YEARS
RATES BORROWERS OF THESE LOANS WOULD PAY UNDER FOUR POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR TREASURY INDEX
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This table originally appeared in Berry, Choosing Mortgage May Be Harder Than Choosing
Home: Analysis Shows Different Performance of Adjustable Loans, Wash. Post, Apr. 28,
1984, at E62, cols. 1-4.
TERMS OF SELECTED ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES
MAXIMUM
INSTITUTION INDEX SPREAD INITIAL RATE CHANGE CEILING FLOOR POINTS
PROVIDENCE S & L Treas lyr 2.5 9.875 NONE 14.875 4.875 3
MORTGAGE FUNDING Treas lyr 2.8 10.375 2 16 10.375 2.5
NATIONAL PERMANENT Treas lyr 2 10.5 2 15.5 10.5 4
NATIONAL PERMANENT Treas lyr 2 10.875 2 15.88 10.88 2
GOLDOME MORTGAGE Treas lyr 3 10.5 2 15.5 5.5 3
CONTINENTAL FEDERAL Treas lyr 2.5 10.875 2 15.875 5.875 2
UNITED VA. MORTGAGE Treas lyr 2.5 10.125 2 16 NONE 3
SUBURBAN S & L Treas lyr 2.5 9.75 2 15.875 NONE 3.5
COLUMBIA FIRST FED. Treos lyr 2.4 10.5 2 15.5 5.5 3
HOME FEDERAL S & L Treas lyr 2.25 11 2 15 10 2
PERPETUAL AMERICAN Treas lyr 2.5 10.375 2 15.375 10.375 3
FIRST FEDERAL (VA) Treas lyr 2 10.875 2 15.875 5.875 2
MORTGAGE FUNDING Treas 2yr 2.25 11.5 2 15.5 11.5 3.5
PERPETUAL AMERICAN Treas 3 yr 2.5 12 2 16.5 12 3
COLUMBIA FIRST FED. Treas 5yr 2.4 12.5 2.5 17.5 7.5 3
This table originally appeared in id. at E60, cols. 3-6.
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